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ABSTRACT
Conflict pervades decisionmaking about the use and allocation
of public land resources. While conflict has always
accompanied these decisions, today its consequences differ-
markedly from the past. The administrative decisionmaking
process is not decisive. Decisions, once made, are
frequently undermined through administrative appeals,
lawsuits and Congressional intervention.
The current malaise in public land management can only partly
be explained by the magnitude of the stakes involved. As
seen in the case of oil and gas leasing and permitting in the
national forest system, the process is not decisive because
it is structured to determine scientifically and technically
justified decisions when such decisions do not exist. Right
decisions are elusive. As a result, the administrative
decisionmaking process is not sufficiently informative or
convincing and, moreover, is divisive.
Several factors contribute to this failure of the
administrative process. The objectives of public land
management have expanded since the scientific paradigm of
public land management was developed during the progressive
era of conservation. New policies promoting non-commercial
uses of public lands have been established by Congress.
These new policies reflect the increasing demands being
placed upon public land resources. They legitimize
recreational ends, endangered species protection, wilderness
preservation, wild and scenic rivers protection and other
objectives that compete with the commercial timber and
mineral development objectives that originally dominated
public lands policy. While the objectives have expanded,
however, the administrative process has remained intact, one
premised in conservation and use and adhering to the
scientific paradigm.
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Past prescriptions for reforming the land management process
have been targeted at either curbing administrative
discretion or expanding the agenda of land management
agencies. Both sets of prescriptions assume that scientific
land management expertise is capable of making the inevitable
value judgments inherent in satisfying the complex array of
land management objectives. The Forest Service, perhaps more
than any other administrative agency, has responded to
proposed reforms by improving public participation in its
decisionmaking processes. But, these efforts have failed and
the problem persists. No administrative structure exists in
which disputes might be resolved and the inevitable tradeoffs
might be made in a manner that satisfies all affected groups
that their concerns have been accommodated as well as
possible.
Past experience and research in environmental conflict
management indicates that some particularly controversial
public land management disputes might be resolved. A
mechanism should be institutionalized that is specifically
designed to recognize the legitimate claims on public land
resources and resolve the disputes that arise in trying to
satisfy these claims. The proposed process applies the
concept of "principled negotiation" in bargaining between
parties to these disputes and in building consensus on
proposed decisions and rules for the Forest Service. The
outcome, if successful, will be a more decisive
decisionmaking process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence S. Bacow
Associate Professor of Law
and Environmental Policy
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CHAPTER 1
CONFLICT AND THE PUBLIC LANDS
When President Ronald Reagan appointed James Watt as his
Secretary of the Interior, public lands issues were
immediately thrust into the limelight. Watt's proposals were
headline news in the western dailies where public lands
issues customarily come first as well as in the New York
Times and other major eastern newspapers usually little-
concerned with this topic. Watt's vision of the proper use
and disposal of public lands was in direct contrast to that
of his immediate predecessors and, as such, seemed a
startling transformation of public land policy. But, Watt's
positions were hardly unusual. His western development
policies and the demands of the "Sagebrush Rebels" who
supported him, when combined with the counter-claims of
conservationists and preservationists, mirror much of public
lands history. Decisions governing how the public lands
should be used have always been controversial. In fact, the
conflict generated by these decisions has been so intense
that at times the history of public land law development
reads like the same action-packed Wild West stories that it
inspired.
That public land management decisions generated conflict
in the past and continue to do so today should come as no
surprise. These decisions allocate the tremendous wealth of
resources contained in the public lands. With so much at
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stake, it should only be expected that the many groups
affected by land management decisions will actively pursue
decisions favorable to their interests. One critical
difference sets today's conflict far apart from that of the
past, however. Today the process by which decisions are made
is failing; decisions, once made, are unable to withstand the
inevitable attacks of dissatisfied interest groups.
Decisions are consistently being undermined through
administrative appeals, lawsuits and congressional action.
The policies of Secretaries of the Interior and other federal
officials, no matter how popular or despised, seem to have
little effect on the indeterminate nature of public lands
decisions.
This thesis argues that the problem posed by public
lands conflict today results from an inadequate
decisionmaking process, one that was established to conform
to a public land management paradigm that was developed in a
different time, responding to different problems and based on
assumptions that no longer hold true.
The Public Land Management Paradigm
Public lands conflict today is generated by the question
of who gets what: should land be allocated to wilderness or
development; timber or recreation; light recreation or heavy
recreation; minerals development or wildlife management?
These are resource allocation questions that have very large
distributional consequences. In contrast, at the turn of the
century a very different question confronted policymakers.
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At that time, the central question that dominated policy
debates was not "who gets what?" but, much more
fundamentally, "who should decide who gets what?" and,
moreover, "what principles should they use in deciding?".
The answer was clear to the conservationists of the
progressive era and their response and activism led to the
development of the public land management paradigm that
persists today. Conservationists argued for rational land
management based in scientific expertise:
Since resource matters [are] basically technical in
nature...technicians, rather than legislators, should
deal with them. Foresters should determine the
desirable annual timber cut; hydraulic engineers
should establish the feasible extent of multiple-
purpose river development and the specific location of
reservoirs; agronomists should decide which forage
areas could remain open for grazing without undue
damage to water supplies. [1]
The proponents of this paradigm did not ignore the political
dimensions of land management. Instead they attacked head-on
the consequences of political land management and compared
them with the virtues of scientific land management:
Conflicts between competing resource users,
especially, should not be dealt with through the
normal processes of politics. Pressure group action,
logrolling in Congress, or partisan debate could not
guarantee rational and scientific decisions. Amid
such jockeying for advantage with the resulting
compromise, concern for efficiency would disappear.
[2]
Professional land managers succeeded in their effort to
supplant political decisionmaking with scientific
decisionmaking. Their paradigm continues today to govern
public land management.
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Why Conflict Persists
This land management paradigm successfully prevailed for
more than fifty years. Today, however, it frequently fails
when controversial decisions must be made. Analysts have
offered several reasons why land management decisions prove
so controversial. Common attacks on public land agencies are
based upon one of two claims: either that one resource user
group or another has amassed enough power over an agency to
control that agency and ensure that all decisions advance its
best interests (the capture theory); [3] or, that the agency
itself has amassed enough power to ignore all resource user
groups and make decisions that enhance the organization's
power, prestige and managerial discretion. [4]
This thesis rejects these two explanations. Rather than
consciously making decisions that defy the "public's
interest" because they are either captured by a single group
or are serving their own political ends, public land
management agencies are generally trying in good faith to
make decisions that promote the "public's interest." The
problem arises, though, in that recent developments in public
land and natural resources law have changed the balance of
power in public land management by legitimizing many land
uses and, thereby, the claims of their advocates. As a
result, decisions that fail to address the interests of any
particular resource user group are not viable decisions; they
are successfully contested as soon as they are made. The
land management paradigm, premised on rational,
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scientifically-based resource conservation and use, is not
equally able to accommodate the more recent preservation and
non-commercial objectives. The decisionmaking processes
oriented towards maintaining long-term yields from the public
lands are not effective at determining appropriate levels and
allocations of non-commercial resources such as wilderness,
wildlife, recreation and scenic amenities.
The transition from public land management policies
geared toward late 19th and early 20th century conditions to
new policies adjusted to late 20th century objectives calls
for a revision of this public land management paradigm.
Moreover, it demands reform of the administrative
decisionmaking process in concert with an updated paradigm.
This process must be designed to recognize and take advantage
of the current balance of power among competing resource user
groups and the legitimate claims of each. Failure to resolve
the inevitable differences between the many affected groups
only guarantees that the current impasse in decisionmaking
will persist.
This thesis analyzes the current land management problem
in the context of oil and gas leasing and permitting in the
national forests. First, the history that gave rise to the
current decisionmaking process is reviewed. Then, the
administrative process is studied to determine where and why
it differs in practice from the theory of land management. In
so doing, the nature of public land management today is
better understood and the type of policy process best suited
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to this type of policy problem is identified. The analysis
concludes by proposing specific administrative reforms
designed to better accommodate all affected interests in
public land management decisionmaking and, thereby, to reduce
the now inevitable opposition to land agency decisions.
The History of Public Land Management
The federal government controls one-third of the
nation's land -- 740 million acres. These lands -- the
public lands -- contain tremendous and varied resources.
Some of these resources are found on the surface: timber,
grazing and agricultural lands, wildlife habitat,
recreational and scenic amenities, and wilderness. Others
lie beneath the surface: coal, potash, phosphate, sulfur,
oil shale, helium, copper, and oil and gas. [6]
The resources comprising the public lands are managed by
several different federal agencies. The Department of the
Interior has jurisdiction over public lands through its
Bureau of Land Management (398 million acres) , Fish and
Wildlife Service (43 million acres) and National Park Service
(68 million acres). The Department of Agriculture, through
the US Forest Service, controls 187.5 million acres. The
remaining acreage is split amongst many different agencies
including the Departments of Defense, Transportation and
Energy. [7]
The history of the public lands -- their acquisition,
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disposal and the gradual development of laws governing their
management -- is hardly a dull story. It is a story of the
taming of the "Wild West" and the forces of "good" against
"evil." It is a story of a relentless struggle for power and
wealth. The history leading to today's public land
management process is one rift with political battles in
Congress, the courts and federal agencies. It is a history
of land management agencies fighting to maintain their
administrative discretion and therefore their ability to make
"professional" decisions.
Public land policy has evolved through three major
phases. The first phase (1781-1867) covered the massive
acquisition of land by the United States from the original
thirteen states, through purchase from European monarchies
(ie. the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska Purchase) and through
transfers from Mexico. Through these acquisitions, four-
fifths of the nation's land was at one time or another under
the jurisdiction of the federal government. The second phase
(1872-1934) saw the massive disposition of these same lands
by the federal government to promote development of the new
territories and generate revenues for the General Treasury.
Indeed, the Treasury Department was the nation's first public
land manager. The third and current phase (1891-present) is
characterized by a shift from disposal of public lands to
federal government retention and management. [8]
For the purposes of this study, the important time
period in federal land management is the late 19th and the
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early 20th centuries. During this time the federal
government shifted from a policy of disposal in hopes of
encouraging development to a policy of retention and
conservation. It was a time when the government began to
acknowledge the commercial value of these lands; a time when
predominant public sentiment, influenced by scientific
arguments, embraced the view that federal ownership and
management could more directly serve national needs than
could disposition.
The Public Lands in the Late Nineteenth Century
As the nineteenth century came to a close, it was
readily apparent that the federal government's public domain
disposal programs were contributing to wasteful development
and lawlessness in the West. Rather than "taming" the wild
west, these programs were encouraging its destruction. The
government's policies had not been well-conceived and they
required reassessment and revision.
Many "settlers" were using the homestead laws to acquire
public lands for non-agricultural purposes. [9] With
disposal programs run from Washington D.C., there was little
field surveillance 2000 or more miles away in the west. Most
federal employees in the General Land Office, in fact, had
never even seen the lands they were disposing. Often,
individuals acquired land intending only to speculate on, not
develop, its resources. In 1889 alone, 55 General Land
Office agents spent the equivalent of 30 man-years
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investigating 3,307 cases of land fraud. Timber trespass
accounted for 581 of these cases and $3-6 million in lost
revenues to the federal government. [10] Timber fraud was
widespread. One GLO land agent estimated that 75% of the
timber claims he reviewed were fraudulent. A less
pessimistic agent put the figure at 50%. [11] Illegal entry
by individuals to cut timber or extract minerals was rampant.
Timber cutting practices by private lumber companies
reflected the bountiful supply of forests and lack of
management principles. Private companies paid considerably
less than market prices for public timber. As a result, only
first rate timber was taken. The still marketable second rate
timber was left as waste as lumber companies moved on to the
next forest. These "cut-and-run" practices created extreme
fire danger and disease problems throughout the forests. In
1871, a single forest fire destroyed the town of Pestigo,
Wisconsin, killing 1500 people and burning 1 million acres of
forest. [12] Additionally, the failure of private companies
to reseed and restore cut areas increased erosion and led to
flooding in some areas. [13] These visible consequences of
mismanagement eventually helped professional foresters gain
support for forest retention and management and helped to
institutionalize two goals of forestry management: watershed
protection and fire prevention.
The western range hardly fared better than the forests.
With "free" grazing lands everywhere, cattle and sheep herds
rapidly multiplied. The classic "tragedy of the commons" led
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to overgrazing in major areas with substandard forage
replacing the original vegetation. [14] Some stockmen took
the liberty to fence off portions of the range for their own
use but rival stockmen would inevitably break down those
barriers. [15]
The homestead programs were failing because they had
been developed without an understanding of Western
agricultural conditions. Instead, the programs were based
upon Eastern farming needs. The West, being very arid,
required much larger acreages than in the East to make
workable farms. Unlike the East, irrigation programs were
necessary in the West. [16] The more promising agricultural
areas were also the better grazing lands. When settlers did
move into an area to farm under the Homestead Laws, violence
erupted between settlers and the stockmen already grazing
there. [17]
Finally, it was becoming obvious that the best western
forests, range and agricultural lands were rapidly being
acquired by private interests and that the federal government
would soon be left, literally, with "the lands nobody
wanted." [18] Indeed, when the dust finally settled, what
remained were the more marginal mountainous forests and the
uncultivatable, substandard range and desert. To a large
extent, this condition still persists; after decades of
management, 83% of BLM range lands are still considered
substandard for grazing purposes. [19]
Both the federal government and private land users
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acknowledged the deteriorating condition of the public
domain. Cries for reform came from many fronts but most
forcefully from preservationists and conservationists.
Preservationists, who viewed any development of some public
lands as undesirable, successfully fought to have Yellowstone
National Park set aside as the first national park in 1872.
One historian wrote of their efforts: "The bill to establish
Yellowstone succeeded after one of the most formidable,
public-interest lobbying campaigns in history." [20]
Preservationists continued their efforts to preserve scenic
forest lands and, in 1891, were able to obtain an amendment
to the General Land Law Revision Act that gave the President
authority to create forest reserves by proclamation. [21]
The Act contained no provisions for the management of these
forests once reserved, however. The federal government
continued to be preoccupied with development, not
preservation, of the West. Forest Reserves and National Parks
could not remedy public domain problems on a broader scale.
The conservationist's alternative of scientific land
management seemed to provide the solution to the land
problems then plaguing the west.
The Progressive Era of Conservation
The history of the conservation movement has been well-
documented by the historian Samuel P. Hays. [22] Hays
rejects the traditionally accepted belief that widespread
protest and unified support gave birth to the conservation
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movement. Rather, he argues that "it is from the vantage
point of applied science, rather than of democratic protest,
that one must understand the historic role of the
conservation movement":
Conservation, above all, was a scientific movement,
and its role in history arises from the implications
of science and technology in modern society.
Conservation leaders sprang from such fields as
hydrology, forestry, agrostology, geology, and
anthropology. Vigorously active in professional
circles in the national capital, these leaders brought
the ideals and practices of their crafts into federal
resource policy. Loyalty to these professional
ideals, not close association with the grass-roots
public, set the tone of the Theodore Roosevelt
conservation movement. Its essence was rational
planning to promote efficient development and use of
all natural resources. [23]
The professional orientation of the conservationists was
not universally accepted nor immediately adopted by Congress.
To implement the conservation ideals in their purest form
would entail wresting power from the commercial interests
already entrenched in the west and in turn placing it in the
hands of professionals dedicated to conservation in land
management. It required tremendous political support to
counter the already well-supported Western interests.
Congress needed reason to change. At the time, the land
disposal programs, combined with tariffs and excise taxes,
generated most federal revenues. [24]
Success came slowly but was facilitated by a parallel
social reform movement that advocated management principles
for municipal and industrial management. The nation was
entering the progressive era of political reform; values
towards the appropriate role of government, science and
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industry in society were being transformed. Society was
entering a technological age wherein scientific methods of
management and decisionmaking were perceived to be a godsend
that would improve living conditions, create efficiency, and
overcome political corruption in urban centers as well as in
the West. [25] Society was also leaving the frontier period
during which rapid growth and development were both desired
and rewarded. [26] Now it turned to managing the cities and
the public domain and to gaining control over those who had
exploited them in the past; The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was
passed in 1890. Groups such as the American Civic
Association, General Federation of Women's Clubs and
Daughters of the American Revolution were actively pursuing
similar objectives in the nation's cities, trying to wrest
power from politically corrupt influences and install
administrative structures based on theories of efficient
municipal management, service provision and rational
planning. [27] Similarly, the American city planning
profession was forming. These groups gave their support to
the natural resource conservation movement.
Progress in institutionalizing the conservation ideal
was fostered by the respected and influential standing of its
advocates. Scientists and economists, they were typically
well-bred, well-educated and traveled in the same circles as
the Congressmen they sought to influence.
was in a period during which knowledge
valued and respected. This attitude
[28] The country
and science we-re
was reflected in
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Congressional decisionmaking. As one historian describes it:
By that time it had also become a practice for
Congress and state legislatures to appoint special
committees authorized to employ experts and carry on
extensive investigations, before undertaking the
business of lawmaking relative to such intricate
matters as the regulation of railways, conservation of
natural resources, and the provision of social
security. [29]
And, obviously, those appointed to these commissions were
those who had initially raised the issues and potential
solutions: the professional, applied science community.
But, while these early conservationists set the scene
for change, their scientific arguments alone could not effect
that change. What was needed was political savvy. Success
would not be achieved until the strong western opposition
could be quieted or overcome; that implied compromise.
Moreover, Congress needed to be convinced that land
management served its already-articulated objectives in
Western development and revenue generation. The conservation
principles needed to be presented in a manner that conformed
to already-defined objectives. New objectives could be
proposed only if they did not conflict with those already
established.
In the 1890's, the conservation ideal began to take hold
through the dynamic personality and relentless efforts of its
natural leader and spokesman: Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot was
a forester by training. While educated at Yale, he gained
his practical experience in Germany and France. He brought
back to the United States the forestry skills perfected in
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Europe and, after a brief period managing a private forest in
North Carolina, was convinced that current silviculture
(forest cultivation), watershed management and fire control
methods could be applied to the public timberlands to prevent
the widespread disease, flood and fire problems there. [30]
Pinchot's objective, and one that has been the driving force
behind professional land management efforts ever since, was
to manage the public lands to achieve, as he put it, "the
greatest good of the greatest number in the long run." [31]
Conservation of resources, he argued, was the "basic material
problem of mankind." [32] Conservation was the efficient,
sustained use of public land resources to serve the nation
for all time. Bernard Fernow, Pinchot's predecessor as Chief
of the Division of Forestry, described it as the efficient
use of the interest from public land resources while never
having to dip into the capital. [33] Pinchot, Fernow and
their colleagues were so convinced of the appropriateness of
conservation principles that they referred to it as "a
question of right and wrong."n [34]
In 1897, Congress passed the Forest Management Act. The
Forest Management Act was the first legislative mandate for
land management rather than disposition or unmanaged
reservation. It gave the Secretary of the Interior power to
"make such rules and regulations and establish such services
as will insure the objects of [the] reservations, namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
therein from destruction." [35] Future reserves could be
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established "to improve and protect the forest within the
reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply
of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States." [36] The Act was a tremendous victory for
Pinchot and his colleagues who argued that "legally there is
no obstacle to the introduction of the most practical and
approved ways of handling forest lands." [37]
But, the wheels of government turn slowly. Passage of
the Forest Management Act in 1897 and Pinchot becoming Chief
of the General Land Office's (GLO) Division of Forestry in
1898 did not pave the way for the widespread and unhindered
application of professional forestry to the public lands. It
took time for Pinchot to overcome the obstacles posed by the
already existing GLO and its staff of law clerks "trained in
the legal details of land disposal but thoroughly unfamiliar
with forestry or the west":
Trained as lawyers, they had no large views of the
possibilities of forest management, but adhered
strictly to narrow interpretations of law and
emphasized formal procedures rather than results. The
custom of political appointments to the General Land
Office hampered the selection of technicians.
Politicians considered the position of forest
supervisor as a patronage plum, for example, and
bitterly criticized the General Land Office when it
selected trained men for the post. [38]
But, Pinchot persevered. He mobilized professional foresters
and forestry associations behind him, including those in the
private sector. Pinchot immediately instituted fire control
programs and the selective cutting of timber in the forest
reserves. His successes encouraged large private timber
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corporations that had much to gain by a managed and sustained
timber industry and he thereby gained their backing. For the
first time, the Division of Forestry was staffed by
professional foresters. [39]
Pinchot found a natural ally in Theodore Roosevelt whose
efforts had helped preserve Yellowstone National Park.
Roosevelt, one historian wrote, joined those political causes
in which he found "personal relevance." [40] Because
Roosevelt was a conservationist, the conservation ideal made
historic strides during his administration. To no
insignificant degree, this progress was due to Pinchot's and
Roosevelt's close friendship. (This, of course, was neither
the first nor the last occasion when a social problem was
addressed because of the personal interest or need of a
powerful political actor. [41]) Pinchot's diaries recount the
many occasions when he and Roosevelt discussed conservation
and strategized its implementation. [42] Pinchot's favorite
account was when he, Roosevelt and the French Ambassador
eluded secret service men and "stripped to the buff" to go
swimming in Washington's Rock Creek Park. [43]
Pinchot and Roosevelt were fortunate to be pressing
these concerns at a time when social reform was rampant and
Congress was receptive to the widespread "gospel of
efficiency." Roosevelt saw much to be gained by the new
theories of public administration that were developing at the
time. He believed that the executive office was the "direct
representative of the people at large" and therefore it was
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the executive's responsibility "to guide the public and
Congress toward that resource policy best for the entire
country." [44] Roosevelt sought a more efficient federal
administration. But, he realized that "to make it so is a
task of complex detail and essentially executive in its
nature; probably no legislative body, no matter how wise and
able, could undertake it with reasonable prospect of
success." [45] He perceived administrative decisionmaking
divorced from the political dealings of Congress to be the
only way to achieve efficient and rational land planning.
One historian has attributed Roosevelt with inverting the
traditional relationship between the executive and Congress:
Now the subdivisions of the executive had assumed the
task of studying and resolving the big problems. The
President was expected to give priorities, then focus
Congressional attention on an issue at a time; in
other words, provide and direct a rather precise
legislative program. The President initiated, and
Congress, if it wished, could veto. [46]
Pinchot was fortunate in Roosevelt's dedication to the
conservation movement. Pinchot could suggest policies or
legislation and Roosevelt would see to it that it became a
reality. During the Roosevelt administration the forest
reserves increased by 148 million acres to total 194.5
million acres. [47] In fact, Roosevelt's enthusiasm in
establishing forest reserves caused Congress to pass a law
requiring Congressional authorization for all future
reservations. Roosevelt had no choice but to sign this
measure into law because it was attached to a much needed
appropriations bill. However, in the few hours before he was
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forced to sign it, Roosevelt established sixteen new national
forests. [48]
But, the Pinchot-Roosevelt alliance alone could not have
imposed the dramatic change then occurring with respect to
the public lands. Much of their initial success came from a
willingness to accomodate western interests and thereby avoid
an undoubtedly insurmountable obstacle to forest management.
Some of the proposed regulation, by that time, was actually
desired by western range and grazing interests. [49] By
taking public timber off the market, except where needed, the
forest reserves helped stabilize a severely fluctuating
timber market. [50] By systematically allocating grazing
permits the forest reserve range was better maintained and
stockmen were no longer competing with one another for the
same foraging areas at the expense of the quality of the
land. [51]
Other factors contributed to western acquiescence.
"Primary consideration" in all Forest Service regulations was
given to accommodating local interests. [52] Settlers were
still allowed to cut timber. The Forest Service "Use Book",
the 142 page precursor to today's more than 20 volume Forest
Service Manual, stated at the outset the basic tenet of the
Forest Service:
Forest reserves are for the purpose of preserving a
perpetual supply of timber for home industries,
preventing destruction of the forest cover which
regulates the flow of streams, and protecting local
residents from unfair competition in the use of forest
and range. They are patrolled and protected, at
Government expense, for the benefit of the Community
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and home builder. [53]
Moreover, the first eight regulations detailed in this "Use
Book" regarded "preferential treatment" for local users in
obtaining free use permits and generally protecting their
economic interests in use of the forest resources. [54]
Regulations regarding grazing in the national forests
emphasized the dual intent to "contribute to the well-being
of the livestock industry" and "protect the interests of the
settler against outside competition." [55]
With the national forest essentially reserved until such
time that its timber would be needed to meet local and
national demands, the Forest Service turned its attention to
assisting private companies in the management of their lands.
Forest Service staff were available, at private
expense, to develop long term timber management plans
sustained yield of timber from private forests.
cooperative programs included tree plantings, fire pr
and fighting and disease and pest control. [56]
One of Pinchot's major efforts during this time,
immediately adopted by Roosevelt when he became Pr
was to obtain the transfer of all land ma
company
for the
Other
evention
and one
esident,
nagement
responsibilities from the Department of the Interior to
Department of Agriculture. Pinchot argued that these tasks
logically belonged to the Department of Agriculture because
they were scientific in nature and based in the biological
sciences. Moreover, he argued that "no one could cut through
[the] entrenched inefficiencies" of the GLO that was
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"hopelessly involved in a maze of political appointments,
legalistic routine, and personal favoritism." [57] He
believed that a new agency would be the only way to fully
overcome the inefficiencies of the past and begin to
professionally manage the public lands. He argued that all
management responsibilities should be transferred because the
resources themselves were interrelated and thus integrated
administration would be the rational, efficient approach.
Furthermore, it would overcome the problems caused by
"interdepartmental conflicts which resulted when competing
resource users played one agency against another for their
own advantage." [58] Congress approved the transfer of the
forest reserves but not the Geological Survey, General Land
Office or Office of Indian Affairs to the Department of
Agriculture in 1905. That Act marked the birth of the US
Forest Service.
Progressive conservation was not pursued universally
with the same zeal and enthusiasm exercised by Roosevelt and
Pinchot. Roosevelt's successor, President William Taft, only
mildly supported and sometimes opposed Pinchot's efforts.
After the tremendous strides during the Roosevelt administra-
tion, progress in further institutionalizing the professional
conservation ideal came slowly. But, it nonetheless did
come. By that time conservation was, as one historian put
it, "a common element of political rhetoric." [59] President
Taft reportedly lamented after his election that, everyone
was in favor of conservation, whatever it was. [60]
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Preserving the Paradigm
The conservation movement was able to succeed at the
turn of the century for three reasons. First, a problem
existed. There was widespread fraud and abuse of the
resources contained in the public domain and, moreover, no
means within established administrative institutions by which
the federal government could control this abuse. Second, an
organized and influential profession provided a rational
solution to the problem. Conservationists had a U.S.
President enthusiastically supporting their efforts and they
had scientific documentation for their claims. Third, the
political and social climate at the time promoted efficiency
and management in government, precisely what the forestry
profession was advocating.
But, while these factors explain why the ideal succeeded
in 1900, they do not explain why it prevails in 1980. Several
factors have contributed to the continuing success of the
conservation paradigm. To a large extent this success
derives from the type of institution that Pinchot and his
colleagues were able to set into place at the turn of the
century. The Forest Service manages the national forests in
a highly flexible and discretionary administrative
environment. Pinchot argued for this flexibility in order to
maintain "the high standard of fidelity, honesty and ability"
needed to manage the forests as well as to better enable
Forest Service officials to function under such diverse
natural conditions. [61]
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Additionally, this institutional strength came from
strategic behavior on the part of Forest Service officials
throughout this century. While little legislation was
actually enacted following the establishment of the national
forests in 1905, the agency's powers continued to expand. As
one Forest Service law officer later remarked:
The vitalizing of this power through vigorous use was
the chief means whereby the Forest Service achieved
results in matters of grazing, water power, the
prevention of land frauds, etc. Comparatively little
conservation legislation was enacted during these
years. Progress came not through getting new powers
...but by using those we had. [62]
Part of these results came through stretching legislative
mandates and then receiving favorable rulings when taken to
court. Forest historian Harold Steen observed:
The Forest Service strategists understood well what
many refuse to accept, that courts by their decisions
do make law. By picking and choosing cases -- and
judges who were supporters of conservation --
...[they] were able to build up an impressive corpus
of common law to give substance to hard-won
legislative battles. [63]
Moreover, in contrast to today, judges at the time frequently
preferred not to rule in matters that they deemed best left
to administrative expertise. By not ruling, they validated
the Forest Service's action and set precedent for future
agency decisions. [64]
The institution alone, however, does not account for the
paradigm's strength today. The paradigm is not only a model
of action premised in conservation ideals, it also represents
the culture of the public forestry profession. As a result,
the profession itself has reinforced it through standard-
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setting for university level forestry education as well as
through the esprit d'corps of the agency. Throughout this
century there has been a revolving door between the Forest
Service, faculty in forestry schools, and leaders in the
professional forestry associations. Hence, the paradigm has
become entrenched in the profession's code of ethics and
standards of behavior and in Forest Service guidelines.
Additionally, the professional expertise model of
decisionmaking persists because it was not really challenged
until recently. Overall, the decades following establishment
of the Forest Service were a rather sleepy time for the
agency. It managed the forests as the early laws allowed and
waited for the day when the nation would need timber from the
public forests. This does not mean that the Forest Service
was without threats during this period. There were several
efforts to move the agency from the Department of Agriculture
to the Department of the Interior. These proposals were
always opposed by foresters and conservationists, fearing
that it would bring about the demise of professional, non-
political forestry. These efforts failed, however, when
Congress or the President's attention was pulled to more
pressing issues. [65] To a large extent, these threats
reinforced the paradigm as it increased tensions and name-
calling between the foresters in USDA and land managers in
DOI. [66] It helped sustain the esprit d'corps that Pinchot
believed was so critical to good forestry by pulling together
Forest Service staff as a team. Without this esprit d'corps
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there was no guarantee that loyalty to the agency's ideals
would prevail in the field; the temptations to succumb to
other pressures would be too great.
The greatest challenge to the paradigm has come recently
as Congress enacted several preservationist statutes. [These
statutes are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.] Congress
implicitly questionned the paradigm by supplementing
conservation objectives with preservation and non-commercial
objectives. But, while seemingly undermining the paradigm by
legitimizing and empowering preservation ideals, Congress at
the same time reinforced the paradigm by delegating extensive
administrative powers to the scientific experts deemed best
able to make these tough decisions.
The Grazing Lands
These dramatic changes in national forest management and
the concommitant success of foresters in institutionalizing
their professional land management paradigm were not mirrored
by land management practices for the rest of the public
domain. Land managers in the General Land Office adhered to
a different philosophy regarding the proper use and disposal
of public lands. Unlike the USFS, they believed that the
land users themselves were the best able to dictate
appropriate management measures.
The fate of the public domain apart from the national
forests had been debated time and again in Congress and the
courts since before the turn of the century. It was not until
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the Taylor Grazing Act passed in 1934 that the long period of
nonmanagement and mismanagement of these lands was brought to
a close. [67] The Act established grazing districts and fees
for grazing in the open range. Placed in charge of the new
Grazing Service in the Department of the Interior was
Farrington Carpenter, a Harvard Law School graduate. Unlike
Pinchot, Carpenter thought the issues to be addressed by the
Grazing Service were best left to the stockmen themselves. He
believed that federal officials who knew little about grazing
and had never visited the Western range should not make
decisions that affected grazing. He established district
advisory committees comprised of local stockmen to make
recommendations to the Grazing Service. Carpenter regarded
"practical range experience" to be the major qualification in
hiring the district graziers who would act upon advisory
committee recommendations. As a result, Grazing Service
field staff were dominated by ranchers and their sons, not by
professionals as in the Forest Service. Carpenter's policy
became known as "home rule on the range." [68] Because of
Carpenter's loose control, the inferred power and
independence of these advisory committees strengthened over
the years. When a BLM range survey in the early 1950s
determined that the allowable AUM (animal unit month) level
in one district should be decreased, the advisory committee
for that area was outraged:
The thing which bothers us the most is that the
[District Manager] made the cut against the advice of
and contrary to the wishes of the Advisory Board.
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These men are all experienced stockmen -- all are
operators -- they know the range capabilities -- they
are interested, even more than the Manager, in a long
time operation. Certainly it was never the intention
of Congress that this one bureaucrat should override
the considered judgment of the cumulated experience of
the members of the Advisory Board. The Manager and
his paid personnel should furnish the information and
the board should fix the policy.
If this is not the theory, it should be.
(emphasis added) [69]
Carpenter was not the only obstacle to range management
by professionally trained land managers. Because the range
management profession did not become well-organized until
after World War II, the Grazing Service was not able to
develop the professional advocates, staff and practices as
rapidly as was the Forest Service. As a result, it was not
until the 1950s that professional range managers began to
infiltrate the organization. [70]
In 1946, dramatic change occurred in the Grazing
Service. President Truman's Reorganization Plan Number 2
merged the GLO and Grazing Service to form the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM). Marion Clawson was appointed as the BLM's
first Director. [71] In the stockmen's eyes, Clawson was
"worse than a conservationist; he was an economist who
believed the BLM could and should operate as a professional
land management agency." [72] He was able to transform the
BLM during his seven year tenure (1946-53) to a professional
agency staffed with trained grazing managers and irrigation
specialists. [73] By the early 1960's, Clawson's influence
could be seen in the increasingly professional influence
throughout the agency's hierarchy. Still, the influence of
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local interests (particularly in setting grazing fees and
allocations) as opposed to professional judgment, continues
to distinguish Forest Service from BLM land management. [74]
A New Era In Public Land Management
After World War II the role of the US Forest Service
also changed dramatically. Ever since the Forest Service was
established in 1905 to manage the forest reserves, its role
had been primarily "custodial." [75] It managed the national
forests essentially as reserves and sold little timber to
private companies so as not to depress timber prices. Its
activities during this period have frequently been described
as "90% fire fighting." [76] But, the demand for public
timber supplies increased markedly during the economic
expansion following the war. The demand was further increased
because private companies had failed to manage their
resources for a sustained yield and, as a result, private
inventories were decreasing. [77]
With the postwar economy booming, private enterprise
viewed the public land management agencies to be obstructing
needed growth. Efforts were made during the Eisenhower
administration to shift responsibility for the public domain
to private interests:
...stockmen announced their goal of transferring
public rangelands to private ownership, while the
forest industry strongly advocated a prohibition
against additions to the national forests and even a
few schemes to transfer some federal timberlands into
private ownership. [78]
But, critically, these efforts were countered by those of
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environmental and preservation groups that had broader
visions of the uses to which national forest lands should be
dedicated:
The Forest Service had been one of the darlings of the
preservation-oriented conservationists because of its
criticisms of private timber companies during the
decades of private timber regulation conflicts. When
the service indicated its plans to open the national
forests to increased logging by those same companies,
conservationists [sic] turned on the agency, opposing
its timber policies and advocating increased
recreational programs and preservation of wild and
primitive areas. [79]
Congress attempted on many different occasions to
address this growing conflict between different users of the
same public lands. It passed legislation clarifying its
intent regarding what were legitimate land uses and how these
lands should be managed. But, as is characteristic of the
legislative process, these acts were necessarily broad in
scope, giving only general guidance to land management
agencies. Moving from broad policy statements to
implementation in site specific cases is no simple task. The
land management agencies now must not only try to develop
programs that satisfy the objectives of one particular act
but must, in so doing, accommodate numerous other policy
objectives from often conflicting legislative mandates.
Consistent with the paradigm, they do so in a manner that
provides the greatest, sustainable return, considering the
expanded agenda of legitimate uses.
Throughout this time, the land management agencies
fought against policies or programs that would diminish
administrative discretion (translated to efficient,
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professional planning) and allow single uses to dominate.
The first major battle during this time was over the
Wilderness Act of 1964. 80] This Act was viewed as a threat
to the professional standards established by the Forest
Service. It was not that the Forest Service did not believe
in wilderness. Indeed, it had administratively designated
several wilderness and primitive areas over the years. But,
the foresters believed in wilderness on their terms, when it
would not interfere with the efficient use of commercially
valuable timber resources. This was a very different
conception than that of the preservationists. The Wilderness
Act, though, would take the authority to designate these
areas from the Forest Service and give it to Congress.
Congress would undoubtedly succumb to political pressures and
be unable to make the professionally correct decisions.
Thus, the gains made towards efficient and rational planning
would be lost. 81]
While fighting the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service
also advocated a multiple-use mandate, one that would
acknowledge the many uses for which national forest lands
should be managed and thus free the agency from the demands
of commercial interests:
The act has frequently been criticized as an
abdication of Congressional responsibility over the
national forests because it is fairly vague and allows
the service to make discretionary judgments among
competing uses (for example, "...with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various
resources... ). It should really be viewed in the
context of the 1950s -- as a defense against extreme
commodity user demands and as a codification of the
37
Service's historic conservation mission to promote, as
Pinchot put it, "the greatest good of the greatest
number over the long run." [82]
With the Multiple-Use/Sustained-Yield Act [83] comfortably in
hand, the Forest Service lightened its opposition to the
Wilderness Act, which then passed four years later. The BLM
similarly fought for a Multiple-Use mandate that it finally
obtained in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976. [84]
The Wilderness Act was but the first legislative mandate
to remove some Forest Service discretion over the uses to
which the national forests would be put. The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, too, gave Congress the final authority to
designate rivers within this system. [85] The National
Environmental Policy Act [86], Endangered Species Act [87]
and National Forest Management Act [88], created additional
steps in already established administrative processes and, in
so doing, provided access for input into and means for
questioning decisions made. More importantly, they each gave
standing to appeal and sue to many non-commercial interest
groups that before were unable to obtain "affected party"
involvement. [This consequence, critical to the public land
management problem today, is discussed more thoroughly in
Chapter 3.] Gradually, the administrative discretion enjoyed
by public land agencies to make decisions based upon
professional judgment began to erode. By the late 1970's,
power had become fairly well distributed among the many
users. And, more importantly, this power was consistently
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being exercised to undermine administrative decisions. This
"shared power" has become "shared impotence." 89]
Professional land managers are now in a new era of
public land management, one in which the conservation ideal
and hence the management paradigm are no longer sufficient to
maintain their discretion. As new objectives -- objectives
contrary to the conservation ideal -- are being legislatively
mandated, the paradigm is falling short. It is not directing
land managers in how to make decisions when non-commercial
uses such as wilderness preservation, wildlife protection,
and recreation are given the same status as the traditional
commercial forestry and mineral uses. The professional
scientific management paradigm fails because it is premised
on use. Professional judgment reflects conservation values,
not non-commercial and preservation values. And, while land
managers continue to apply their long-established
decisionmaking processes designed to achieve Pinchot's
"greatest good of the greatest number in the long run," their
efforts are unsuccessful.
There is seldom agreement on what outcome actually
represents this "greatest good." For example, an area strip-
mined for coal is no longer available for recreation, timber,
scenic amenities or wildlife habitat. Similarly, an area
preserved as wilderness or set aside as a national park is no
longer available for most commercial development activities.
Which use or combination of uses provides the ideal "greatest
good" is not obvious and can be argued differently depending
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upon one's perspective.
Regardless, the conservation ideal remains today to be
the objective sought by the public land agencies. Analyses
of the Forest Service in 1960 and again in 1980, made the
same observations about the Forest Service dedication to its
mission: obtaining "the greatest good for the greatest number
in the long run." In 1960, Herbert Kaufman commented that
the competing demands confronting the US Forest Service "have
given forest officers a sense of engagement in a crusade on
behalf of the public interest. Their duties are elevated
from routine forest management to safeguarding the economic,
and perhaps even the military security of the nation ....They
are placed squarely in the tradition of Gifford Pinchot."
[90] In 1980, Paul Culhane commented on "the amazing
consistency with which ranger interviewees mentioned
'multiple-use' and Pinchot's 'the greatest good of the
greatest number in the long run' as the guiding principles in
their work....and helps explain the Forest Service's
tenacious commitment to the principles of progressive
conservationism and multiple-use." [91] The same principles
now guide the BLM, too. While much power still rests with
local advisory committees, the increasingly professional
orientation of the agency led to its 15-year battle for
multiple-use legislation, finally acquired in 1976. In 1980,
Paul Culhane wrote that "the BLM has become almost
indistinguishable from the [Forest] Service in one critical
respect: as professionally trained resource managers, BLM
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officers have a strong commitment to the principles of
multiple-use management and progressive conservation." [92]
The Case of Oil and Gas and the National Forests
The phrase "public land management" is all-encompassing.
Under its rubric falls watershed and wildlife management,
timber sales, mineral leasing, wilderness preservation,
recreation provision, and range management, to name but the
obvious. To study each issue area in the context of this
analysis would be both time-consuming and unnecessary.
Instead, a single, representative issue area -- oil and gas
leasing and permitting -- is analyzed in order to understand
the problem currently posed by public land management, and
thereby how the administrative decisionmaking process might
be reformed.
The process under which decisions are made governing
where and how oil and gas exploration and development may
occur on public lands was established in 1920 as a result of
the efforts of progressive conservationists. Like other
public land policies at that time, the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920 [93] was a response to undesirable mineral development
practices and was intended to improve conditions by regaining
federal control. The oil and gas leasing and permitting
programs developed by this Act were meant to overcome the
then pervasive fraud, wasteful production practices, and
monopoly control over these resources. The objective of this
new policy was to make energy production on public lands more
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orderly and efficient by controlling the rate of production.
The appropriate decisionmakers were deemed to be the
professionals then staffing land management agencies. [94]
When the Mineral Leasing Act was passed in 1920,
Congress established a process by which the oil and gas
resources contained beneath the public lands were to be
leased and extracted. For more than 50 years this process
did precisely that with very little problem. But, as with
other public land decisions, the political environment within
which oil and gas exploration and development decisionmaking
occurs has changed since the 1920's. Now these decisions
must be considered in concert with many other, often
conflicting, natural resource objectives. Decisions that
previously would have taken a month or two under the leasing
process are now taking years to make. Decisions that
previously would have involved only the Bureau of Land
Management or the US Forest Service and a single lease
applicant, now involve the Secretary of the Interior,
Congress, the courts, numerous interest groups, individual
citizens and even the President. But, oil and gas
decisionmaking continues to be guided by the 1920 Act in the
context of the land management paradigm devised during the
progressive era of conservation. And, as with other issues,
decisions regarding oil and gas are frequently unable to
withstand the attacks levelled against them.
While the mineral leasing laws apply equally to BLM and
National Forest lands, this study concentrates on US Forest
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Service decisionmaking because it is over national forests
that the clash between competing resource users is most
intense. There was a time when the national forests were
used almost exclusively for timber, watershed protection,
wildlife management, agriculture, grazing and recreation. In
fact, the extensive literature on the US Forest Service
seldom mentions oil and gas or other minerals. [95]
Suddenly, though, in the late 1970's oil and gas leasing
became classified as "one of the most sensitive concerns that
the Forest: Service deals with." [96] It is a controversy
that the New York Times describes as "complicated, even
nasty...no matter which side wins, the outcome is likely to
be irrational." [97] It is a controversy that leads a US
Forest Service Supervisor to comment that "a lot of people
are watching to see just how bloody we get as a result of
this thing. But, whichever way we go, I'm afraid we'll end
up in court." [98] It is a controversy that leads the
National Audubon Society's vice-president to proclaim that
"we prefer to work together in harmony...but, if war is
forced upon us we will fight back!" [99] Despite repeated and
varied attempts by the USFS to quell the controversy
generated by oil and gas decisions, decisionmaking remains at
an impasse. Why the change? Why is the process established
by the Mineral Leasing Act no longer able to yield decisions
that are accepted and implemented intact as they were in the
past?
Simple Explanations But No Simple Solutions
There are many explanations offered for why the oil and
gas controversy exists and persists. The oil and gas
industry places the blame on environmentalists as well as on
government regulation. It calls environmentalists "elitists"
intent on "locking up" public lands for the select few at the
expense of the general and needy public. [100] Government
regulation is chastized for placing obstacles in the way of
needed energy development.
The oil and gas industry feels "double-crossed" by a
leasing process that, on the one hand, encourages the
development of domestic energy resources while, with the
other hand, places "one hurdle after another" before them and
thus limits the exploration and development activities that
can occur. The industry believes that "federal leasing means
no leasing." [101] Critics refer to a "regulatory swamp"
where "permitting and leasing delays...have held up drilling
as much as 5 years." [102] They are frustrated with
"environmental rules [that] stifled development in many
areas, wilderness studies [that] discouraged activity and
threatened to lock up millions of acres, and leasing delays
[that] discouraged exploration in some of the best onshore
areas." [103]
Environmental groups echo industry displeasure with the
administrative decisionmaking process. They criticize leasing
decisions that threaten established land-uses and non-
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commercial resource values. Moreover, they are critical of
how these decisions are being made: "Never in recent history
have conservationists felt so frozen out of decisionmaking on
public lands." [104] Environmentalists, in turn, point their
fingers at industry. Industry, they argue, is forcing this
confrontation by its efforts to develop pristine wilderness
and treasured national forest areas. They believe that
industry has contrived an "energy crisis" to rape and ruin
America's wild lands. If left untethered, they argue,
industry will develop the last remaining wild places.
Environmentalists perceive it to be their responsibility to
help curb this "blind progress." [105]
Given their dissatisfaction with the formal
administrative decisionmaking process, the oil and gas
industry and environmental groups are both encouraging the
Secretary of the Interior and Congress to take action to end
this impasse. The nature of the problem evades such simple
solutions, though. During the Carter Administration it was
thought that deferring the controversial leasing decisions
would stifle the conflict. Carter's Secretary of the
Interior Cecil Andrus found himself in court as a result of
this inaction. [106] Under the Reagan Administration,
industry believes that it has the upper hand. Robert Nanz,
vice-president of Shell Oil Company, calls for the opening
and development of public lands. He asserts that "Congress
and the administration have the power to get all this done
quickly." [107] But, Reagan's Secretary of the Interior
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James Watt's management objective to "open wilderness areas"
[108] has likewise landed him in court. [109] Congress has
had no better luck. Its rapid action to prohibit leasing in
Montana's Bob Marshall Wilderness Area led it to court. [110]
Regardless of who tries to put the issue to rest or who
benefits by the decision made, the outcome is predictable.
Like the formal administrative process, these avenues for
influencing decisionmaking seem unable to resolve the
pervasive conflict and thereby make viable decisions.
Administrative Decisionmaking At An Impasse
That oil and gas exploration and development decisions
generate conflict has become an undeniable fact. But, even
though this conflict is acknowledged and anticipated, even
the administrative decisionmaking process is unable to
provide direction on how to manage and resolve it.
Consequently, federal land managers are unsure about how to
fulfill their responsibilities in making oil and gas
exploration and development decisions. Decisionmaking has
become confused, at best. For example, contrast how
decisions were made in three different US Forest Service
regions during 1981:
In New Mexico, lease applications were filed for the
Capitan Wilderness area. The Regional Forester in the
Southwestern Region viewed the leasing decision to be an
insignificant one, involving no environmental impact and
therefore requiring no public notification or environmental
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assessment. [111] The leases were issued. But, when
representatives of the Sierra Club discovered that the leases
had been issued, they were outraged. The environmental
organization immediately went to Congress to protest the
decision. Their efforts resulted in a bill being introduced
in Congress to withdraw all wilderness lands from oil and gas
leasing. The Sierra Club additionally filed suit against the
US Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management and Secretary of
the Interior to revoke these leases. [112]
In Montana, lease applications and seismic testing
permit applications were filed for the Bob Marshall
Wilderness Area. The Regional Forester in the Northern Region
viewed the decision to be so significant that he denied the
leases and permits. [113] When the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, an industry interest group, sued the US Forest
Service to overturn this decision, Congress immediately
invoked an emergency provision of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 to withdraw these lands from oil and
gas exploration. The Mountain States Legal Foundation then
filed suit against the Congressional committee that made this
decision. [114]
In Wyoming, the Rocky Mountain Region Regional Forester
took what he viewed to be a more balanced approach to
decisionmaking. In response to lease applications in the
Washakie Wilderness Area, an environmental impact statement
was developed and the conclusion reached that 87% of the area
should not be leased while 13% could be leased. This balanced
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decision, rather than pleasing all sides, has both industry
and environmental groups dissatisfied and preparing
administrative appeals and lawsuits to overturn the decision
once finalized. [115]
In each case, no matter how the decision was perceived
(as extremely significant or inconsequential), no matter who
would benefit from the decision (environmentalists or the oil
and gas industry) and no matter what type of analysis was
completed (no assessment to a full environmental impact
statement), the outcome was the same: conflict resulted and
the debate was carried on to the courts, Congress or the
administrative appeals process for further review. None of
the decisions was able to accommodate the concerns of each
group to their satisfaction. Hence, each decision prompted
opposition rather than acceptance and support. Each case
involved considerable expense to all parties involved.
Conclusion
Conflict in and of itself is not inherently bad. In
fact, sometimes it is good: it keeps federal officials alert,
helps define issues, promotes checks and balances in agency
decisionmaking, encourages creative solutions to problems,
and ensures that the many interests at stake will be heard.
[115] It is not conflict, per se, that is of concern in the
case of oil and gas or other public land issues. It is the
outcome: the inability of administrative decisionmaking
processes to resolve the inevitable conflicts and hence make
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decisions that are viable. A process that is not decisive is
a process ill-suited to the problem it is meant to address.
Before new policies or programs are generated or new
charges levelled, the problem currently encountered in making
public land management decisions must be explored and
understood. In the context of oil and gas, what is the
nature of the problem posed by public land management? What
are the consequences of the current decisionmaking process?
What can be done to improve the decisionmaking process and
overcome the now inevitable and costly conflict? Only by
understanding the problem currently posed by decisionmaking
can the public land management paradigm be updated and
administrative decisionmaking processes revised accordingly.
The next four chapters analyze the policy problem posed
by public land management in the 1980's. They place one
issue area -- oil and gas exploration -- under the microscope
to determine why the conflict cannot be resolved by current
administrative processes and what the consequences are of
this failure. Chapter 2 first describes the physical oil and
gas exploration and development process. What does this
process involve and thus what is at stake in these decisions?
What mitigation measures can be used to minimize
environmental impacts? It then describes the decisionmaking
process established by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 that
is followed by public land managers in making these decisions
today.
Chapter 3 analyzes the land management paradigm in
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practice in the context of oil and gas leasing and
permitting. It explores the political dimensions of what is
undeniably a very political process. It identifies three
critical pathologies that contribute to the paradigm's
demise: the process is not sufficiently informative or
convincing, it is divisive and it is not decisive.
Chapter 4 determines why the paradigm now fails when,
for so long, it was very successful. It discusses the
changing public sentiment regarding the appropriate use and
management of public lands in the context of a changing
social and political climate. It describes several natural
resource statutes that have expanded the objectives to be
satisfied in land management and why the paradigm is not able
to accommodate them.
Chapter 5 asks why this mismatch between policy problem
and process persists. It reviews the findings and arguments
of other students of public land management who have
identified this problem and proposed solutions. Moreover, it
highlights USFS efforts to remedy the situation. It
pinpoints where these proposed and attempted reforms have
failed.
Finally, Chapter 6 takes the lessons of Chapters 3-5 and
describes the elements of a process that might address these
failings. It presents eight steps that the Forest Service
and Secretary of Agriculture might follow to accommodate the
public land management problem of the 1980's.
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CHAPTER 2
THE OIL AND GAS LEASING AND PERMITTING PROCESS
That oil and gas exploration and development on public
lands is controversial is partly a function of the physical
process by which it occurs and partly a function of the
administrative process by which decisions are made governing
where and how this exploration and development may occur. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a context for the
analysis that follows it. It describes what is involved in
oil and gas exploration and development and hence what is at
stake in these decisions. It provides a background
understanding of the oil and gas leasing and permitting
decisionmaking process and the detailed analysis that it
requires. This chapter presents the decisionmaking process
on paper; the following chapters illustrate it in practice
with an eye towards where and why the two differ and how
reform might be achieved.
The Mineral Leasing Act: A Brief History
The same conservation sentiment that led to national
forest management policies at the turn of the century gave
rise to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. [1] Consequently,
the Act dealt with matters of efficiency in production and
was little concerned with the implications of energy
exploration and development on other valued surface
resources.
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Originally under the Placer Law, [2] the unique
characteristics of oil and gas and other nonmetalliferous
minerals (coal, potash, phosphate, potassium, sodium) were
not acknowledged. By applying the same disposal and
development policies to oil and gas as were applied to
hardrock minerals, extensive overproduction and waste of
petroleum resources resulted. In his lengthy review of
federal oil policy through 1925, John Ise described this
mismatch:
The Placer Law provided that any individual might file
a location on 20 acres of mineral land, or an
association of eight or more persons might file on
eight claims aggregating 160 acres, and by expending a
certain amount each year in "assessment work" and by
finally making a discovery, might secure title to the
land on payment of $2.50 per acre. The law was not
adapted to the exploitation of oil and gas for several
reasons: in the first place, it gave prospectors no
definite rights until discovery; in the second place,
it required the performance of assessment work
regardless of the need for oil; in the third place, it
provided for the disposition of tracts too small for
efficient operations, and so made it necessary for the
oil operators to use dummy entrymen to get large
enough tracts." [3]
Entry under the placer laws gave no legal right to the
entryman until after a discovery was made. But, because of
the extensive and very obvious development activity involved
in oil and gas exploration, prospectors were not able to
conduct operations in the clandestine manner necessary to
ensure that, if a strike were made, they would be the first
to file the discovery. Rumors of a potential strike would
spread like wildfire with many "professional" entrymen then
converging on the same area to hopefully become the lucky
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first prospector to strike petroleum and thereby gain rights
to the area's resources. [4]
Because of the waste, overproduction and fraud that
plagued this system, President Taft announced, in September
1909, the emergency withdrawal of federal petroleum lands
from all forms of entry and disposition until legislation
could be enacted to promote efficient disposal practices. [5]
Taft's proclamation commenced a ten year debate about the
proper ownership and disposal of these lands. Two issues
divided congress during this period: First, should the
federal petroleum lands be transfered to the states or should
they be retained in federal ownership? Second, should
exploration be regulated by a leasing system that kept
surface resources under federal management or by a disposal
program? [6] This ten year delay in obtaining legislation,
during which the withdrawn lands remained inaccessible, would
likely not have been permitted had overproduction on private
lands not diminished any need or desire at the time to open
the public lands to production. [7]
As with the earlier land management statutes, enacting
the mineral leasing laws could not have been achieved without
first accommodating the powerful western interests. The act
provided 37.5% of lease royalties to the states. [8]
Additionally, as with the timber management practices
advocated twenty years earlier by Gifford Pinchot, efficient
oil and gas exploration and development practices were
desired by the oil and gas industry. The inefficient and
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uncertain practices promoted by the Placer Law only made
private production from public lands all the more difficult.
It was to the private industry's advantage to have uniform
exploration and production practices and they encouraged this
regulation. [9]
The Mineral Leasing Act passed in 1920. It was enacted
with a single, overriding intent: to prevent waste in
producing petroleum resources on the public lands. The House
Committee overseeing hearings on the Act in October 1919
reported: "It is conceded that there has been waste, and
this bill is predicated upon that, and its object is to avoid
waste...". [10] Furthermore, the House Report on the bill
presents the Act's intent as "to provide an enlightened
method for the disposition of such mineral rights...reserving
to it [the federal government] the right to prescribe rules
and regulations against wasteful practices." [11] The Act
and its amendments govern how private firms can acquire
leases and permits to public land resources and then conduct
exploration and development on them. Initially, regulations
governed well-spacing and drilling practices to control the
rate of production. Later amendments permitted regulations
to limit production and to unitize pools. By requiring the
unitization of single pools, the secretary of the interior
gained authority to prevent the inefficient pumping of oil or
gas by several lessees with leaseholds sitting atop the same
pool. By requiring them to unitize -- to combine their
leases to form a single production operation -- drilling
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would occur at a more efficient rate, thereby promoting
greater resource recovery. [12]
In enacting the mineral leasing laws, Congress gave
little thought to the environmental concerns that several
decades later would dominate debate. As one analyst of the
mineral leasing laws commented:
...concern was focused on then popular matters such as
the monopolistic and unfair competitive practices of
the oil giants, Federal versus private ownership and
development of natural resources, and conservation in
the economical sense of prevention of waste.
Accordingly, the legislative history depicts a law
under which protection of the public interest is
primarily intended to apply to economic and not
environmental considerations. [13]
It was not until 1947 that one of its provisions was
construed more generally to protect other natural resources
besides oil or gas. At that time Interior Secretary Julius
Krug used his authority to require unitization limiting the
number of wells drilled in order to protect wildlife and
scenic resources in Jackson Hole. This "Krug Memorandum,"
and Jackson Hole Stipulation enforcing it, have since been a
standard attachment to all leases in the area designated by
Krug. [14] In other areas, the Bureau of Land Management or
US Forest Service generally condition leases in order to
mitigate impacts to surface resources.
Decisionmaking Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
Decisionmaking over where and how oil and gas
exploration and development may occur on public lands is
guided by the complex process established under the Mineral
63
Leasing Act. This process is complex because of the
complexity of the exploration and development process itself.
At the outset of exploration it is impossible to know what
oil and gas resources will be found and thus what further
activity, if any, may follow. Consequently, the process by
which decisions are made is incremental, with more extensive
federal review and involvement occurring as more extensive
development is proposed.
Oil and gas exploration and development occur in a
succession of four interdependent stages: Preliminary
Investigation, Exploratory Drilling, Development and
Production and, finally, Abandonment. Whether one stage even
occurs is dependent upon the findings of that stage preceding
it. Each subsequent phase is more involved and costly than
the one preceding it. Each is more threatening to the
environment than that preceding it. And, each requires more
extensive federal involvement than that preceding it.
No single decision determines where and how oil and gas
exploration and development may occur. No single federal
agency controls the decisionmaking process. [See Figure 1]
Before an oil and gas company or individual can conduct
preliminary surveys of surface and subsurface indicators of
an area's oil and gas potential, a special use prospecting
permit must be obtained from the surface land management
agency (US Forest Service or Bureau of Land Management).
Before any exploratory drilling may occur, an oil and gas
company or individual must obtain the lease from the Bureau
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FIGURE 1
The Four Stages of Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
in the National Forest System
and Required Federal Approvals at Each Stage
Stage Federal Requirements
Preliminary Investigation:
Geophysical Analysis
Seismic Testing
Exploratory Drilling
Development and Production
Abandonment
no approvals needed if no
surface impact involved
Special Use Prospecting
Permit required from USFS
District Ranger
Lease to the area must
first be acquired from the
BLM subject to USFS
Regional Forester's review
and recommendation
Permit to Drill must be
acquired from the Minerals
Management Service (MMS)
subject to USFS Regional
Forester's review and
recommendation
License from MMS subject
to USFS Regional Forester
review and recommendation
Bond released if USFS and
MMS conditions satisfied
upon agency review
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of Land Management to the tract being explored. If the tract
to be explored is on acquired lands rather than public domain
lands, the lease must be obtained from the US Forest Service
(or other federal agency with full responsibility for the
lands). A lease confers the right to develop the oil and gas
resources beneath a tract of land but does not permit
exploratory drilling. Before any exploratory drilling may
occur, the lessee must obtain a permit to drill from the
Minerals Management Service. Should exploratory drilling
lead to a discovery, the lessee may not develop the field
until a license for development and production is obtained
from the Minerals Management Service.
While all leases, drilling permits and development and
production licenses must be acquired from agencies within the
Department of the Interior (DOI) (Bureau of Land Management,
or Minerals Management Service), DOI decisions are generally
based on recommendations from the Forest Service when
national forest lands are involved. The Regional Forester (in
charge of one of the nine Forest Service regions) has
responsibility for making all lease, permit and license
recommendations. However, his decision is always subject to
initial review by the District Ranger and the Forest
Supervisor for the national forest under application in his
region. The only exception to this progression is for
wilderness areas, primitive areas, recreation areas and
irrigation districts, all of which require the Forest Service
Chief's review and final recommendation to the appropriate
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DOI agency. [15]
The remainder of this chapter describes the four oil and
gas exploration and development stages, the associated
environmental impacts, and the federal role during each
stage.
STAGE I: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Oil and gas resources are elusive. They are hidden
beneath the earth's surface and there is no way of telling
precisely where they are hidden and in what quantities but by
drilling. There are ways to determine where oil and gas
might exist, however, in order to give some idea of where
exploratory drilling should occur. This preliminary
investigation -- "defining a prospect" -- can involve two
steps: surface geophysical analysis and seismic testing.
Surface Geophysical Analysis
Surface geophysical analysis is the first step in
defining a prospect. Using on-site surveys and aerial
photographs of various exposed geological formations combined
with information about exploration in nearby or similar
areas, an initial prospect is defined and the probability
that oil and gas might be found is narrowed. [16] Surface
geophysical analysis is conducted by an oil and gas company
interested in obtaining a lease or already holding a lease
and interested in developing its potential. As long as
surface geophysical analysis involves no disruption of
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surface resources, it requires no permits or government
review. [17]
Seismic Testing
Seismic testing often follows surface geophysical
analysis to give an oil and gas company more detailed
information about the potential oil and gas resources of an
area and consequently whether or not expensive exploratory
drilling should even be undertaken. In seismic testing a
straight line is mapped through an area with promising oil
and gas potential. Shockwaves are then generated along this
line. The shockwaves are used to map deep strata formations
to indicate where potential oil and gas "traps" (oil or gas-
bearing formations) may lie. The shockwaves echo back from
the different geologic layers and are recorded by a series of
sensitive geophones. These readings along a line are then
combined to produce a profile of the subsurface geology. [18]
Seismic testing can be conducted in one of three ways.
One involves heavy trucks carrying "thumping" or vibrating
devices that pound the ground to generate shockwaves. The
"thumping" method involves dropping a three ton steel slab
several times along the predetermined test line. This steel
slab is attached by chains to a crane on a special truck.
[19] The vibrator method employs four large trucks equipped
with a vibrator pad that is about four feet square and is
mounted between the front and rear wheels. These pads are
lowered to the ground and then electronically triggered by
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the recorder truck. Like thumpers, the vibrators are then
moved a short distance forward to continue testing along the
line. [20]
Using trucks, though, obviously requires roads or
relatively flat and easily passable terrain. In roadless
areas, shockwaves are generated by either surface or
subsurface blasting with dynamite. Crews conducting this
type of seismic testing in roadless areas use helicopters or,
infrequently, horseback, for access. [21] Seismic crews are
"leapfrogged" from one site to the next; while one crew is
setting up a "shot" along a line, another is cleaning up from
the last blasting. A "shot" consists of ten 5-pound sticks
of dynamite suspended, on average, every 20 feet. Seismic
crews average between 50 and 100 shots per day. For
subsurface blasting, "shot holes" are drilled to between 50
and 200 feet deep. [22]
Before an oil or gas company will undertake a seismic
survey costing between $18,000 per mile for surface blasting
and $50,000 per mile for subsurface blasting, [23] it is only
logical that it would possess the leases to the area tested.
On some occasions, a private seismic testing firm will
conduct the testing and then sell their results to individual
firms or industry associations. For example, the well-
publicized conflict over oil and gas exploration in Montana's
Bob Marshall Wilderness centered on a proposal by
Consolidated Georex Geophysics (CGG) to conduct seismic
testing there. CGG did not possess any leases to the area
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but was doing the exploratory work because several oil and
gas companies were interested in obtaining leases there.
[See Chapter 4 for more information about the Bob Marshall
Wilderness dispute.] Since testing results are proprietary,
crews may blast the same or slightly altered lines several
different times but for different oil and gas companies. [24]
Usually, though, a firm will not make this expense without
some assurance that it has control of the mineral rights
should a promising prospect be defined. Therefore, leases
are usually acquired before seismic testing is begun and long
before any decision about eventual drilling can be made.
Unlike surface geophysical analysis, seismic testing
does disturb surface resources and wildlife. Seismic blasting
can start forest fires. [25] Since most seismic testing must
occur during the summer or fall seasons when weather permits,
there is conflict with other backcountry users. [26] Frequent
helicopter trips generate noise that disturbs wildlife and
diminishes the backcountry experience for recreationists.
[27] Additionally, there is a risk that backcountry users or
cattle ranchers will unknowingly cross shot lines when
blasting is about to occur. [28] Sometimes blasting
contaminates groundwater supplies. [29] These impacts,
however, are all short term; little evidence of seismic
testing remains one year later. [30] A special use
prospecting permit must be acquired from the surface land
management agency before seismic testing may be conducted.
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Federal Requirements: Special Use Prospecting Permits
A special use prospecting permit must be acquired from
the surface land management agency before surface disturbing
preliminary investigation activities may be conducted. The
USFS and BLM control prospecting on lands within their
respective jurisdictions.
For national forest lands, this permit application must
be filed with the USFS District Ranger responsible for the
area to be surveyed. This application explains the planned
survey methods, location, timing and whatever project
information
proposal.
environmenta
land uses,
also determ
permit to
established
between the
clarify or a
Various
permit to 
resources.
is needed by the District Ranger to evaluate the
[31] The District Ranger completes a brief
I1 analysis to determine what conflicts with other
if any, may arise. This environmental analysis
iines what stipulations should be placed on the
protect surface resources, wildlife and other
or planned land uses. Informal consultation
applicant and the District Ranger may occur to
Imend the proposed prospecting activity. [32]
conditions may be placed on the prospecting
)revent or mitigate potential impacts to surface
These conditions vary depending upon the
particular area and project plans. Should a proposed shot
line run through a wildlife calving area or migration route,
the surface land management agency may hold back a permit
until calving or migration seasons are over. [33] Other
measures often include avoiding all live streams by at least
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100 feet; [34] no activity during the Memorial Day,
Independence Day and Labor Day high recreation periods; [35]
no seismic activity during the grizzly bear denning period
(October 15 - April 30) or bald eagle nesting season (March 1
- July 31); [36] specific locations of helicopter landing
sites and flight corridors; [37] and, preventing blasting
when extreme fire danger exists. [38]
A prospecting permit does not confer any rights to the
minerals discovered nor does it give preference rights to the
permittee in obtaining leases for the lands surveyed. The
terms of the permit specify precautions to be taken by the
permittee in protecting surface resources, preventing forest
fires and restoring the lands to their original state. [39]
The permittee must post a performance bond to ensure that all
stipulations will be met and reclamation undertaken once the
testing is completed. A US Forest Service representative will
periodically inspect the project to approve bond release and
terminate the permit. [40] The District Ranger is directed
to approve the proposed project if it "does not create
unacceptable impacts on the surface resources or unreasonably
conflict with other uses." [41] These permits are seldom
denied but no prospecting permits are issued for lands
expressly withdrawn from the operation of the mineral leasing
laws. [42]
The Federal Leasing Process
As mentioned, an individual or oil and gas company is
not required to possess leases before conducting preliminary
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geophysical exploration in an area. But, should this
analysis indicate a structure worth exploring further, leases
must be acquired before an exploratory drilling permit will
be issued. Oil and gas leases are issued through three
different systems, depending upon where the leasable tract of
public land is located. When a tract of land has never
before been leased and does not contain known oil or gas
resources, it is leased non-competitively over-the-counter to
the first qualified applicant. When leases have been issued
before but have since expired, been canceled, terminated or
relinquished, they are issued non-competitively through a bi-
monthly lottery called the Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leasing
System. Finally, when leases are for tracts of land within a
Known Geologic Structure (KGS) containing oil or gas, they
are issued through a competitive bidding process. Each of
these three processes is described below.
Over-the-Counter Leases
Leases issued for the first time in an area with
unproven geologic reserves are known informally as "wildcat"
leases. These leases are issued over-the-counter to the
first qualified applicant. Any U.S. citizen can file an
application for an oil and gas lease as long as he or she is
not a minor and does not already hold leases for more than
246,080 acres in the state in which the applied for lease is
located. [43] The filing process is simple. All a
prospective lessee must do is review the land plats for the
73
BLM District or National Forest of interest in order to
determine which tracts have not yet been leased. The lessee
then chooses the tract(s) that interest him and files a one-
page application for each. [44] A lease tract must, at
minimum, comprise 640 acres; it cannot exceed 2560. [45] A
$75 filing fee must accompany each application and, should
the lease be granted, a $1 per acre annual rental fee must be
paid. (The Department of the Interior has proposed raising
the rental fee to $3 per acre for the last five years of the
lease term.) [46] The lease term is ten years. It is non-
renewable.
Lease applications are always filed at the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) District Office for the state in which
the lease tract is located. The BLM has full responsibility
for leasing public domain lands for oil and gas resources
under the Mineral Leasing Act, as amended. It is charged
with evaluating each lease application and attaching any
conditions to a lease that are deemed necessary to protect
the "national interest" in oil and gas exploration and
development. If the lease is for BLM lands, the application
is reviewed in the same office as filed. In its review, the
BLM ensures that the land has not already been leased or been
withdrawn from the provisions of the mineral leasing laws.
The BLM also confers with the Minerals Management Service to
ensure that the tract is not within a known geological
structure. If the lease is available, the BLM must then
fulfill the requirements of the National Environmental Policy
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Act before it may be issued. Usually a "Finding of No
Significant Impact" (FONSI) is made and no environmental
impact statement undertaken. (Only one environmental impact
statement has ever been done for an oil and gas leasing
decision.) [47] The lease is then issued with the
appropriate stipulations and attachments.
When a lease application is filed for land under US
Forest Service jurisdiction, the BLM forwards the application
on to the Regional Forester for his recommendation. [See
Figure 2] The Regional Forester is responsible for making
the final recommendation to the BLM but it is usually made
after review and evaluation by both the District Ranger and
Forest Supervisor. The USFS ensures that the lease has not
been issued or withdrawn. It usually satisfies NEPA's
requirements by developing an environmental assessment and
concluding with a FONSI. The USFS generally, but not always,
posts a public notice of its intention to lease. Some
national forest headquarters also send notices to groups and
individuals on their mailing list as well as to the local
newspapers. There is seldom any consultation with the lease
applicant. Public comment resulting from the posted notice
may be considered in assigning stipulations to the lease.
[48] Upon completing its review, the Regional Forester
submits his recommendation to the BLM. The BLM has final
authority for issuing or denying a lease. In fact, though,
few lease denials are ever recommended to the BLM and the BLM
has traditionally adopted the USFS recommendation. [49] Only
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I I
when the BLM decision is contrary to the USFS recommendation
must the BLM complete an additional environmental assessment
before rendering its decision. [50]
All lands under the control of the federal government
are public lands. Within this large category, though, are
two types of land that are treated somewhat differently by
the mineral leasing laws. Public domain lands are those that
have always been under the federal government's jurisdiction.
Acquired lands are those lands that have been given to or
purchased by a federal agency. With regards to mineral
leasing, acquired lands are governed by the Acquired Lands
Leasing Act of 1947. [51] Essentially, this act extends the
provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to acquired
lands but gives the surface resource management agency full
control over leasing and exploration and development
decisions. Thus, when the BLM receives a lease application
for National Forest acquired lands, this application is
forwarded to the Regional Forester for his consent (or
rejection) rather than for his recommendation. [52]
Stipulations govern what activities the lessee may
undertake and vary depending upon where the tract is located.
Some stipulations are standard and are attached to all leases
issued. BLM Form 3109-3 -- "Stipulation for Lands Under
Jurisdiction of Department of Agriculture" -- is attached to
all leases for national forest lands. This stipulation
governs surface use and restoration by the lessee in
conducting exploration and development activities. [53]
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Other stipulations are specific to a particular BLM or USFS
region or leasable tract. For example, "No Surface
Occupancy" (NSO) stipulations are attached to leases in
wilderness areas or areas with fragile surface resources.
(Less than one percent of all leases have this NSO
stipulation.) [54] Specific wildlife protection stipulations
are attached to leases when important calving, denning,
nesting or migration areas might be affected by exploration
or development activity. Some stipulations govern the time
periods during which exploration or development may occur.
[55] Others govern specific areas within a leased tract that
may or may not be developed because of especially sensitive
surface resources. [56] Some stipulations are conditioned on
potential future events (ie. a proposed wilderness
designation). NTL-6 -- "Notice to Lessees and Operators of
Federal and Indian Onshore Oil and Gas Leases" -- is the US
Geological Survey's Conservation Division (now the Minerals
Management Service) attachment to all leases issued. NTL-6
specifies the requirements that must be fulfilled by the
lessee before exploratory drilling or field development and
production may be undertaken. Its 15 pages describe how a
preliminary environmental review and final environmental
analysis should be conducted. It outlines the steps to be
taken in applying for a permit to drill and provides
guidelines for preparing surface use and operating plans to
accompany an application for a permit to drill. It also
specifies how wells should be abandoned and the surface area
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reclaimed. [57]
The Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leasing System
Originally, when leases expired, were canceled,
terminated or relinquished, they would have been restored to
the surface land management agency (US Forest Service or
Bureau of Land Management) and become available for leasing,
once again, over-the-counter. But, in 1959 the Simultaneous
Oil and Gas Leasing System was established to facilitate
leasing of previously issued tracts of land. The BLM had
encountered considerable interest in previously issued leases
and had difficulty determining who, in fact, was the "first
qualified applicant" when these leases were returned to its
hands. Unable to control the "altercations" that often arose
between those claiming to be first in line, the BLM developed
a new system for issuing these leases. This system is
commonly referred to as "the lottery" since all applicant's
filing cards are placed in a bin and then drawn for each
available tract. [58]
As with over-the-counter leases, the BLM informs the
USFS when it is going to post previously leased tracts on
national forest lands for the next lottery. The US Forest
Service can then supplement the listed leases with any
additional stipulations deemed necessary to protect surface
resources. The USFS again makes a public notice of its
intent and conducts an environmental analysis. 59]
The lottery is held bi-monthly (January, March, May,
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July, September, November) on the first day of the month.
The list of available tracts are posted in the Bureau of Land
Management State Offices one month before the drawing.
Applications can then be filed for any tracts (but no more
than one application can be filed per tract) until the 15th
of the month. [60] Filing is a simple process. The BLM
provides the necessary filing card and the only information
necessary is the applicant's name, address and signature. A
$75 filing fee must accompany each application. [61] A
drawing is held for those tracts receiving more than one
application. For tracts of land in the energy rich west, it
is not uncommon to have several hundred applications per
tract. [62] Approximately 7,500 leases are issued annually
through the lottery, with the BLM receiving almost 4 million
applications for these leases. [63] (These figures are for
1980 and will undoubtedly change now that the filing fee is
$75, increased from $10 in 1981.)
Known Geologic Structures
Leases for tracts of land within a known geologic
structure (KGS) are issued competitively at the discretion of
the BLM. The process followed is very similar to that used
in offshore oil and gas leasing. The tracts to be leased are
selected and then placed on the auction block. Tracts are
not more than 640 acres in size. Leases are issued to the
highest "responsible qualified bidder." [64] This analysis
is centered on conflict over non-competitive leases. Land
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management decisionmaking is proving most difficult and
controversial for non-KGS leases; uncertainty is greater and,
unlike KGS areas, exploratory drilling has frequently not
occurred there previously. Hence, proposed exploration in
non-KGS areas is more likely to threaten other land uses or
relatively pristine areas.
STAGE II: EXPLORATORY DRILLING
Should seismic testing indicate that a promising
geologic formation does exist, exploratory drilling plans
begin. Exploratory wells are commonly referred to as
"wildcat" wells because of their unknown potential.
Nationwide, about one in sixteen wildcat wells produce
significant amounts of oil or gas. However, only one in one
hundred forty wells produce enough to succeed financially.
[65]
Each wildcat well requires a cleared and levelled 3 to 5
acre site. The site accomodates a drill pad, a 100 foot
derrick, a 100' by 100' reserve pit for drilling muds, and
the more general operating facilities such as generators,
fuel and water storage tanks, trailers, pipe racks, toilets
and either a water well or surface water pump. [66] Wildcat
wells are drilled to an average of 10,000 feet. [67]
Exploratory drilling requires that access roads into the
wellsite be constructed or upgraded should they already
exist. These are generally 14 to 20 feet wide graded roads.
[68] There is growing interest in using helicopter rather
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than road access in cases where the terrain is difficult to
pass or when special surface resources would be harmed
(especially in wilderness areas). Helicopters have never yet
been used in the continental US, however. [69] Helicopter
access is more than three times as expensive as road access;
costs average $160,000 per airlift mile for each well versus
$50,000 per mile for roads. [70]
Exploratory drilling activities last from one to two
years. Commonly, 2 or 3 wells will be drilled during this
exploratory stage. Costs average $9.8 million for a dry well
and $11 million if a discovery is made. [71] Should
helicopter access be used, these figures increase to $15
million for a dry hole and $18 million for a discovery. [72]
Given the extensive surface resource effects, a permit
to drill must be acquired from the Minerals Management
Service before a lessee can begin constructing an exploratory
well.
Federal Requirements: Applications for a Permit to Drill
A permit must be acquired before a lessee can conduct
exploratory drilling. An Application for a Permit to Drill
(APD) details the lessee's plans and is submitted to the
Minerals Management Service (MMS), a new Department of the
Interior agency. Established in February 1982, the MMS has
the same staff, offices and responsibilities as the former US
Geological Survey's Conservation Division. [73] This APD
indicates where the exploratory drilling will occur, how
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access roads will be located and developed, where and how
mudpits and other drillsite facilities will be constructed
and where additional wellsites may be located. Site
reclamation plans once exploratory drilling is completed must
be included in this APD. [74]
Environmental impacts associated with exploratory
drilling are obviously dependent upon precisely where the
exploratory well is to be located; a wellsite on flat desert
terrain will pose different problems than one located in a
high mountain meadow. Consequently, although it has full
responsibility for decisionmaking, the MMS forwards the APD
on to the surface land management agency (US Forest Service
or Bureau of Land Management) for its review and
recommendation.
The USGS and USFS developed a detailed "Cooperative
Agreement" in 1977 that lists the responsibilities of each
agency in responding to an APD. In this agreement it is made
clear that the USGS (now the MMS) is solely responsible for
issuing permits and is "the sole representative with respect
to direct contact with the lessees and operators in matters
related to oil and gas." [75] Nonetheless, considerable
consultation does occur between the lessee and operator and
the USFS while project plans are being developed and
exploratory drilling activity being conducted. [76] A
preliminary environmental review occurs even before an
operator's plans are finalized and the APD submitted. [See
Figure 3] This review identifies potential conflicts with
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other land uses or resources and impact mitigation steps that
might avoid these conflicts. The purpose of this review is
to assist the lessee and operator in developing project plans
and directing initial surveying and staking activities before
they occur.
Once the lessee and operator's project plans are
completed, they are filed with the MMS and USFS in the formal
APD. A field inspection with MMS and USFS officials and the
lessee's operator and contractor(s) occurs in approximately
seven working days. The proposed wellsite, access roads and
other surface use areas are reviewed at that time. [77]
Specific environmental impact mitigation measures may be
discussed during this trip and the operator's plan amended
accordingly. [78]
Within 10 days of the field inspection, the USFS must
submit its recommendation to the MMS. MMS officials then
complete an environmental assessment on the proposed
drilling. Seldom is an EIS deemed necessary for exploratory
drilling projects. (The first EIS on an APD was completed in
early 1982.) [79] Unless USFS and MMS officials disagree
about the need for an EIS, the permit will be issued at this
time. No more than 30 days should have transpired between
APD receipt and permit issuance. [80]
When the US Forest Service receives the forwarded APD
from the MMS, it usually posts a public notice of its review
of the proposal. Public comment resulting from this notice
may raise considerations in its review and proposed
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conditions on the eventual
Additionally,
requires all oil
Spill Prevention
While the lessee
plan with the EPA,
it not be provided
hazardous material
SPCC plan. [82]
In addition
the Environmental Protection Agency
and gas lessees and operators to prepare
Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) plans.
or operator is not required to file this
EPA officials may request it and, should
immediately, fine the operator. Should a
spill occur, the EPA will then review the
to fulfilling this EPA requirement,
operators must also comply with Department of Transportation
and Interstate Commerce Commission requirements. [83]
State and Local Involvement
State and local requirements of lessees and operators
vary depending upon the state and locality. Most states
require notification and a monthly report should a well prove
productive. Some states have environmental protection
requirements that must be fulfilled. Local and county
governments become involved when access, zoning or rights-of-
way issues arise. [84]
STAGE III: FIELD DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
The impacts associated with exploratory drilling are
extended and compounded should a discovery be made and
development and production be warranted. An average oil and
gas field is 640 acres with well spacing of 40 acres for oil
and 160 acres for gas. Generally, this implies that four gas
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permit. [811
wells or sixteen oil wells, maximum, can be located in one
field. [85] Each wellsite again requires a 3 to 5 acre
cleared and levelled drill pad with a 100' derrick, 100' by
100' fenced reserve pit, and the general operating
facilities. [86] Once the wells have been drilled, the
derrick will be replaced with a system of 20' high
"horsehead" or "grasshopper" lifts to pump the oil and gas.
[87] Field development requires "in-field" access roads,
pipelines, and utility lines from wellsite to wellsite and
temporary housing and associated structures for field
workers. Additionally, pipelines and transmission lines into
the field must be constructed. Onsite oil and gas storage
tanks are required. [88] Eventually, injection wells will be
constructed to promote secondary or tertiary recovery of oil
and gas resources. [89] If helicopter access is required, a
staging area must be constructed outside the field as well as
landing sites within the area. [90] Roads must be maintained
and snow removed during the winter season. [91] In some
cases, a "sweetening" plant must be constructed when "sour
gas" (Hydrogen Sulfide) is mixed with the natural gas. [92]
The average life of a producing field is 30 years -- the
range is 15 to 50 years. [93] The life of a specific field
depends upon the size of the discovery.
Production is an expensive undertaking. On average, the
cost of developing a field is $2.5 million per well. Once
developed, production costs include $3 million to drill each
additional production well, $10,400 per mile annually to
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maintain access roads, $96,000 per well annually to operate
the producing field, $15 million per mile for powerlines and
$750,000 per mile for pipeline construction. [94]
Before a lessee can develop the field, a license must be
acquired from the Minerals Management Service.
Federal Requirements: Licenses for Development and Production
Should exploratory drilling lead to discovery of oil and
gas resources in commercial quantities warranting production,
the operator cannot simply proceed to develop the field.
First, a license must be obtained from the MMS. The review
and evaluation process for this license is similar to that
for an APD. The operator submits an operating plan that
details how field development will proceed, what construction
activities will occur and where and how reclamation will be
completed. [95] This plan is forwarded to the USFS for
review and recommendation. Consultation between the MMS,
USFS and the operator will likely amend the operating plan to
mitigate environmental impacts and avoid surface resource
conflicts if possible. [96] The MMS then completes an
environmental assessment and, frequently, an environmental
impact statement with associated public hearings and
involvement before rendering its final decision. As with
exploratory drilling activities, the operator must post a
performance bond before undertaking development and
production. Both USFS and MMS officials will periodically
inspect the operations to ensure that all conditions are
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being fulfilled and all stipulations adhered to. [97]
STAGE IV: ABANDONMENT
Abandonment begins immediately once production is
completed. The well is plugged and capped. Generally, an
above surface pipe "monument" is required that lists location
and name of well. This requirement can be waived by the
MMS, particularly when surface resource concerns warrant it.
[98] All equipment, utility lines, pipelines, powerlines, and
field facilities are removed. The disturbed surface area is
re-contoured and revegetated as closely as possible to its
original condition. [99]
The Appeals Process
Decisions by federal agencies, even if the decision is
merely a recommendation by the USFS to the BLM or MMS, may be
appealed by any group or individual affected by the decision.
There is a 30-day appeals period following each leasing,
permitting and licensing decision. [100] The appeal must
state how the particular individual or group is affected by
the decision and the specific complaint with how the decision
was reached. [101] An appeal is always filed with the next
superior official in an agency's hierarchy. For example, a
leasing recommendation is made by a Regional Forester. An
appeal of this recommendation would therefore be filed with
the USFS Chief in Washington, D.C. If the recommendation is
upheld by the Chief, it can be further appealed to the
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Secretary of Agriculture. Should the Secretary of
Agriculture again uphold the decision, the USFS
recommendation is forwarded to the BLM District Office. A
group or individual can protest this recommendation to the
BLM District Officer. If the recommendation is accepted and
a decision made accordingly, this decision can then be
appealed to the BLM Director in Washington, D.C., and then to
the Department of the Interior Board of Land Appeals [102]
and, finally, to the Secretary of the Interior. [103] If the
individual or group is still not satisfied, a lawsuit can
often be filed and the federal agencies taken to court. At
least two years would be consumed in this process. [104]
Conclusions
The development and decisionmaking processes described
above appear, on paper, detailed and extensive but,
essentially straightforward. At each stage, the different
land managers review an application to determine what
response is appropriate. Consistent with the conservation
ideal, the objective of this process is efficiency in
production. Although the mineral leasing laws do not
acknowledge other surface resource values, these concerns are
addressed in land agency reviews. The administrative
decisionmaking process is consistent with the land management
paradigm; it assumes that the decisions to be made are
amenable to scientific review and analysis. But, as the next
three chapters illustrate, the process is very different in
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practice. It is extremely political and, moreover,
ineffective. Even though analysis is exacting and all
apparent bases are covered, decisions reached are frequently
disputed. As the next three chapters indicate, the problem
posed by oil and gas exploration on public lands has changed
markedly since the mineral leasing laws were enacted and the
decisionmaking process established. But, because the process
has not changed in concert, oil and gas leasing and
permitting decisionmaking is at an impasse in many national
forests.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICS OF OIL AND GAS LEASING AND PERMITTING
On paper, the decisionmaking process described in the
last chapter appears detailed but straightforward. In theory,
it is a rational process involving professional land managers
reviewing proposals, assessing impacts associated with these
proposals, evaluating several alternatives and, only then,
rendering a decision. The mineral leasing laws direct land
management officials to consult with each other as well as
with lessees, operators and contractors proposing exploration
and development. Such consultation is consistent with the
professional, scientific land management paradigm. It
assumes that, with sufficient information about a proposal, a
land manager will be able to make a "wise" decision; one that
efficiently utilizes public land resources and, in so doing,
satisfies the public's interest in land management.
In practice, the process plays out a much different
story with an expanded cast of characters. Lessees,
operators and land managers are not the only voices heard
when leasing and exploration decisions must be made.
Frequently, other groups become involved in Forest Service
decisionmaking. These groups raise additional, often
conflicting concerns, and thereby considerably complicate the
Forest Service decisionmaking process.
Each Forest Service lease or permit decision allocates
national forest resources. Thus, some decisions benefit some
99
user groups at the expense of others. Because there is a lot
at stake in each decision, all affected interests inevitably
try to influence decisionmaking. The result, as will be seen
in this chapter, is a very different and considerably more
politicized process than that envisioned when the mineral
leasing laws were enacted.
The Many Publics Involved in Oil and Gas Decisionmaking
Whether or not a group organizes and how actively it
tries to influence oil and gas decisionmaking, depends upon
what it has at stake in the particular decision. Because of
the ongoing wilderness reviews and forest management planning
processes, [1] industry and environmental groups are
especially well-organized and knowledgeable about the US
Forest Service and how it makes decisions. Furthermore,
these wilderness review and forest planning processes have
generated considerable interest in and knowledge about the
particular areas proposed for oil and gas exploration.
Often, oil and gas exploration and development threatens
established public land uses and wildlife and wilderness
attributes. As a result, national and regional environmental
organizations take a great interest in oil and gas issues.
These groups actively follow and participate in the
administrative decisionmaking process and, when all else
fails, pursue other avenues for achieving more favorable
outcomes. In November 1981, The Wilderness Society was
monitoring oil and gas lease proposals in 28 Wilderness
Areas, 25 proposed Wildernesses, 12 BLM Wilderness Study
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Areas and 16 USFS Further Planning Areas in the six Rocky
Mountain States (Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and
New Mexico). [2] When proposals to either lease or permit
exploratory drilling are being considered by the USFS,
environmental organizations voice their concerns and make
recommendations to the USFS. They participate in whatever
formal public hearings are held and monitor decisionmaking
informally through communication with Forest Service staff
involved in the analysis and decisionmaking. The
involvement of environmental organizations is persistent,
especially when decisions have national or regional
significance because they will be precedent-setting, or will
affect an area of particular scenic, ecological or
recreational importance. Environmental group involvement
seldom ends when a decision, is made should that decision run
counter to what they perceive to be the appropriate outcome.
Different groups and individuals value the resources at
stake in oil and gas exploration and development differently.
Each group assesses the risks and the benefits associated
with a decision differently. As a result, rarely do these
groups agree on what decision the Forest Service should make.
Environmentalists are concerned about protecting the
scenic and ecological resources contained in the public
lands. They fear that energy development will destroy these
resources forever. William Turnage, Director of The
Wilderness Society, offers one explanation of the
environmental view:
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In Europe there was a long cultural tradition;
societies that have been in place for tens of
centuries have their great monuments, their great
cathedrals, the symbols of their civilization.
America is a much newer nation, a nation of people who
are deeply attached to nature. It's formed our
character. And to us, our cathedrals, the monuments
of our civilization, are the National Parks, the great
Wilderness Areas, the wild rivers, the eagles of
Alaska. Those are the things that make Americans
different and special. And we've learned more than
any other people in the world to take care of those
things, and preserve those things. [3]
Brock Evans, vice-president of the National Audubon Society,
concurs: "Of course we need resources, of course we need
minerals and energy and all those sorts of things...But, more
important, more apropos, is the question of do we need it
from these precise spots, these last little places
remaining?" [4] Regardless of the resource potential of some
lands, environmentalists argue that exploration and
development simply should not occur. To them, the benefits
to existing and future generations of preserving these lands
intact outweighs the opportunity costs of the fuel resources
foregone, regardless of how extensive they might be.
Like national environmental groups, oil and gas industry
associations closely monitor precedent setting and policy
level decisions. They routinely participate in site-specific
cases having a broad impact as well as in federal policy
development and legislative activity. While industry
associations do not themselves apply for oil and gas leases
and drilling permits, they do have a stake in these decisions
through their memberships. The Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas
Association (RMOGA), for example, has 650 member oil and gas
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corporations in the Rocky Mountain region. Since its members
file lease and permit applications and otherwise actively
pursue oil and gas exploration and development on public as
well as private lands, RMOGA files administrative appeals or
lawsuits in those cases that will affect its membership
generally. [5] Similarly, industry interest groups such as
the Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) and the Pacific
Legal Foundation (PLF), advocate development interests in
important cases, just as environmental interest groups
support preservation objectives. [6]
Predictably, industry groups approach oil and gas
exploration and development differently from the
environmentalists. Nonetheless, Kea Bardeen, attorney for
the Mountain States Legal Foundation, does not believe MSLF's
concerns to be in opposition to those of preservationists:
The fact that we don't go around advocating wilderness
protection all the time doesn't mean that we don't
believe in Wilderness, that we would like to see it
all levelled ....it's extremely important. But...
wilderness values and mineral values are not
necessarily incompatible. And that's because...[we]
don't see wilderness as having to be totally pristine
for all time. [7]
To preservationists, energy development is not compatible
with The Wilderness Act ideal of an area "untrammeled by man,
where man is a visitor who does not remain." [8] They
believe that wilderness, once raped, can never be restored to
its virgin state. [9] To industry interest groups, though,
energy development is short-term and reversible. Perceiving
the quality of wilderness differently, industry groups assess
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the costs and benefits of exploration and development
differently. In contrast to preservationists, they conclude
that the costs to society are much greater if oil and gas
exploration is prohibited. Thus, these groups argue that
development, not preservation, best promotes the public
interest.
Not all groups frame their arguments in terms of the
"public interest." Some groups have more parochial interests
at stake in these decisions. For example, outfitters
protested exploratory drilling in Wyoming's Gros Ventre range
because they feared it would scare away wildlife and,
thereby, the hunters they guide through these mountains for a
living. [10] Similarly, ranchers who graze their cattle in
the national forests argue against the seismic testing with
dynamite that criss-crosses many Western forests. This
testing threatens both the cattle and the stockmen who
unknowingly cross over shot lines when blasting is about to
occur. [11] These differences in values are therefore not
limited to exploration and development in Wilderness Areas.
Controversy is generated by proposals in heavily used
backcountry areas, recreation areas, or areas deemed to be
exceptionally scenic or wild. Oil and gas exploration and
development proposals are apt to incite protest in almost any
area that has already established land-uses and users. Now
that industry interest in the resources contained in public
lands is intensifying, proposals more frequently conflict
with established users. As will be seen, these users include
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big game outfitters, ranchers using public lands for grazing,
local communities and others concerned with maintaining the
status quo or promoting a use different from that proposed
for a particular area. Unlike the environmental and industry
associations discussed above, these groups do not ordinarily
keep their eye on USFS oil and gas exploration and
development decisions. In general, these decisions are of
little consequence to them. But, when a proposal is made
that will potentially affect their concerns they then
organize around that specific issue to protect their
interests. These groups perceive an immediate stake in the
decisions made; one that will affect their daily lives.
When the National Cooperative Refinery Association
(NCRA) first proposed an exploratory well in Cache Creek
Canyon outside Jackson, Wyoming, it would have likely
appeared a reasonable proposal to an outsider. A dirt road
already went up the Canyon and other development activities
had occurred there in the past. [12] An exploratory oil well
did not seem out of place. But, Jackson Hole residents were
outraged. They questionned the proposal on the grounds that
it would diminish the quality of life in Jackson Hole, tax
the town's streets and public services and detract from the
area's exceptional tourism and recreation opportunities. [13]
Teton County Commission Chairman Bill Ashley protested:
To us it doesn't make any sense to screw up prime
recreational areas with roads and other impacts of oil
and gas exploration unless it's as a last resort. In
this area, oil and gas and even mining and timbering
are somewhat incompatible with the high priority given
to recreation and wildlife. [14]
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The Jackson Hole Chamber of Commerce echoed a similar
sentiment, justifying its opposition to the well: "people
visit Jackson Hole first to see the area and second to enjoy
it...the Chamber's purpose is to cater to these desires, not
detract from them." [15] Jackson Hole residents valued Cache
Creek Canyon as their "backyard;" it was a critical part of
their character. [16] To them, the costs of losing this
amenity were far greater than any oil and gas that might be
discovered there. NCRA, on the other hand, believed that the
potential oil and gas resources there did warrant exploration
and possible development and that, once completed, the area
could be restored to Jackson Hole's standards.
The Process in Practice
Because of the many competing values at stake in oil and
gas leasing and permitting, the seemingly technical and
straightforward process outlined in the last chapter is, in
reality, highly politicized. This marked contrast between
theory and practice can only partly be explained by the
stakes involved and because these many groups are organized
in supporting different decision outcomes. In practice,
three pathologies afflict the process. And, these three
pathologies politicize the process by giving a substantive
basis for the claims of conflicting interests without
providing a means for accommodating their concerns:
First, the process is not sufficiently informative or
convincing. Forest Service analyses, no matter how thorough
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and seemingly objective, do not indicate what decision should
be made; a "right" choice is elusive. Moreover, because no
decision can be proven to be the correct one, the process is
not convincing to those groups who perceive a different
outcome to be more appropriate than that reached by the
Forest Service.
Second, the process is divisive. It separates different
interest groups into adversarial camps and encourages
strategic behavior among them. It provides no means for
bridging the obvious chasm between them and hence only
exacerbates the political conflict over the decision that
must be made.
Finally, the process is not decisive. Even when the
Forest Service ultimately makes a "decision," the "decision"
rarely ends the controversy. On the contrary, the decision
merely begins the next phase of the real decisionmaking
process.
The remainder of this chapter illustrates these three
pathologies and their consequences. Drawing from several
controversial cases, this analysis pinpoints where the actual
process diverges from theory and to what end. The cases
highlighted involve national forests along the Rocky Mountain
Range in northern Wyoming, Idaho and Montana. These cases
are not unusual; onshore oil and gas leasing and permitting
decisions are proving controversial from California's Sierra
Nevada Mountain Range to the Green Mountains of Vermont.
Leasing and permitting decisions that in the past took one to
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two months to make, now take up to ten years. Particularly
hard hit are those national forests sitting atop what is
known as the Western Overthrust Belt along the Rocky Mountain
Range. The Overthrust Belt extends 2,200 miles from Alaska
to South America. As described in the oil and gas industry's
newsweekly, it is "a geologic masterpiece with thrusts and
structural complexities that have boggled the minds of
explorationists for years." [17] With exploration and
development technology becoming more sophisticated, the
mysteries of the Overthrust Belt are slowly being solved.
Since discovery of Utah's Pineview Field just seven years
ago, oil and gas industry efforts have concentrated on the
U.S. Intermountain Region of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah
and Colorado. Interest in obtaining leases and permits in
this area is intense. The USFS estimates that it manages
9,000,000 acres within this area. Of this 9 million, 5.5
million acres have already been leased and the remaining 3.5
million are under lease application. [18]
Numerous leases are involved in the cases highlighted or
mentioned in this analysis. Seven hundred leases are at
stake in Montana's Bob Marshall Wilderness. [19] Two hundred
leases were involved in Wyoming's Palisades area. [20]
Decisions on one-hundred thirty-five lease applications have
yet to be made for the Washakie Wilderness in Wyoming's
Shoshone National Forest. [21] Two-hundred fifty-seven
leases, covering 180,000 acres are still outstanding in
California's Los Padres National Forest, some having been
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filed as long as ten years ago. [22] 130 lease applications
are under consideration in Vermont, covering the entire Green
Mountain National Forest. [23] In national forests along the
east coast, 4800 leases were outstanding in February 1982.
[24]
Final decisions on these lease applications have been
delayed for up to ten years. These decisions have either
been appealed by dissatisfied user groups or the Forest
Service has deferred decisionmaking on them out of concern
for other surface resource values that might be harmed by oil
and gas operations. Given that the Bureau of Land Management
issues approximately 12,000 leases total for all public
domain lands each year, these outstanding leases for the
national forest system are not an insignificant concern for
federal officials. In 1980, Senator Henry Jackson, chairman
of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
wrote then Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus to find out
what was causing the delays and how extensive they actually
were. Andrus responded:
Appeals of BLM State Office oil and gas decisions
cause immense delays in lease issuance. There is at
present a 6-9 month backlog of protests on appeal
before the Interior Board of Land Appeals. In
addition, all action toward lease issuance is
suspended for 120 days following an IBLA decision in
anticipation of an appeal to Federal Court. While
some delay is unquestionably necessary in the event
that a legitimate protest or appeal is filed, the
present adjudicatory process is being abused. [25]
Andrus went on to describe the extent of the delay, using
just one of the nine BLM state offices as an example:
72 percent of the 7400 oil and gas lease applications
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backlogged for more than one year [in the Wyoming
State Office] are tied up in other agencies, mostly in
the Forest Service, and most of these as a result of
the RARE II wilderness review process. [26]
Andrus expressed concern for these delays and suggested to
Senator Jackson that more manpower and resources be allocated
to the BLM leasing program.
1980 was an election year and Cecil Andrus was succeeded
by current Secretary of the Interior James Watt. Watt, a
Colorado attorney, had been president of the Mountain States
Legal Foundation, an industry interest group advocating
greater energy exploration on public lands. He immediately
set out to rectify problems he attributed to the
environmental sympathies of his predecessor. But, Watt
encountered formidable obstacles to speeding up the leasing
and permitting process. His efforts further politicized the
issue and made it front page news across the country.
Notwithstanding his efforts, leasing and permitting decisions
remain ensnarled in administrative appeals and Forest Service
reviews. The problem cannot be remedied by the efforts of a
Secretary of the Interior, even though the Secretary, on
paper, has final authority.
As seen in the remainder of this chapter, the
administrative decisionmaking process is at the root of the
current impasse over oil and gas leasing and permitting. The
three pathologies that afflict the process -- it is not
sufficiently informative or convincing, it is divisive and it
is not decisive -- make the decisionmaking task interminable.
Neither the actions of powerful political actors or the
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expertise
that are
involved.
balanced.
of professional land managers can produce decisions
accepted and supported by all the key groups
Power over these decisions has become well-
I. The Process is Not Sufficiently Informative or Convincing
When the BLM or USGS forwards a lease or permit
application to the Forest Service, Forest Service officials
respond by preparing an environmental analysis of the
proposal. This analysis covers the specific aspects of the
proposal, potential impacts on surface resources and,
finally, ways in which these impacts might be mitigated. One
point of an environmental assessment (EA) is to determine
whether or not a full environmental impact statement (EIS)
should be prepared as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act. [27] In theory, this process appears
straightforward. It mirrors the type of analysis the Forest
Service conducts in almost all of its decisions. In
practice, this analysis does not sufficiently inform
decisionmaking; it is not obvious upon completing
environmental assessment what the agency should do.
an
The Limits of Technical Expertise
Leasing and permitting evaluations are not made in an ad
hoc manner. The extensive Forest Service Manual spells out
in great detail the procedures to be followed by District
Rangers, Forest Supervisors and Regional Foresters in
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analyzing a proposal and making final recommendations and
decisions. Unfortunately, however, these guidelines call for
considerable judgment on the part of Forest Service
officials. The guidelines are necessarily broad and flexible
because each decision involves different types of areas and
resources.
In response to a lease or permit proposal, the federal
government must either reject the application, accept it as
submitted, or accept it subject to certain conditions.
Forest Service officials reviewing a lease or permit
application must decide whether or not to accept it and, if
so, what conditions, if any, should accompany the lease or
permit. In making these decisions, the Forest Service Manual
lists ten factors that must be considered:
1. Statutory authorities.
2. Existing and planned uses.
3. Dedications.
4. Impact on surface resources.
5. Damage to watershed.
6. Degree of surface disturbance and difficulty in
restoration.
7. Special values, such as wilderness character,
archaeological sites, cultural resources, and
endangered wildlife habitat.
8. Term of the lease and probable nature of
operations.
9. Economic considerations, such as relative values of
minerals and surface resources and scarcity of and
demand for minerals.
10. Range of alternatives available for operations and
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land uses and for environmental protection.
[28]
But, how much damage to the watershed is permissible, or
what degree of surface disturbance should be allowed is
entirely up to the discretion of the field officer.
Furthermore, this same subjective judgment must be exercised
in determining "the relative values" of oil and gas resources
and surface resources; judgment must be exercised because the
oil and gas resources at stake are of unknown quantity and
type. Moreover, how a Forest Service field geologist is to
determine "the scarcity of and demand for minerals" and then
consider these data in decisionmaking is not prescribed.
This question has been debated without resolution for decades
by experts throughout the world. As a result, should a
Forest Service official decide that an area's fuel resources
are critically important and that the loss of surface
resources is negligible, relative to the value of these fuel
resources, another individual can easily argue to the
contrary. For example, when the Forest Service and USGS
decided that exploratory drilling for oil and gas should
occur in a Wyoming area recommended for wilderness
designation, Bill Cunningham of The Wilderness Society
argued:
Most of Wyoming is already available for oil and gas
exploration without objection from conservationists.
There is simply no need to risk the loss of
irreplaceable wild places, such as the Gros Ventre,
for a costly, uncertain quest for nonrenewable
resources. [29]
Even a consideration as innocuous as "statutory
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authorities" requires judgment on the part of Forest Service
officials and hence allows for criticism and opposition by
those disagreeing or who are adversely affected by the
decision. To a large extent, debate over leasing in the
Palisades area of Wyoming and Idaho centered on the Forest
Service's authority to enforce stipulations that it attached
to the leases. Similarly, debate still rages over the
authority of the US Forest Service and US Geological Survey
to deny a drilling permit for environmental reasons in the
proposed Gros Ventre wilderness area. Department of the
Interior Solicitor Lowell Madsen ruled that the APD could not
be denied, [30] and his ruling was quickly challenged by
environmentalists and local residents. Phil Hocker of the
Sierra Club argued that all the Interior Department needed to
do to deny an APD was to find that approval is not in the
public interest. [31] He also noted that in a separate case
involving the Palisades Further Planning Area, federal
attorneys were arguing that approval of APDs is not
mandatory, and that disapproval is valid where justified.
[32] An editorial in the Casper Star Tribune queried:
What awesome force could so suddenly make helpless
yesmen out of our resource stewards, so suddenly and
utterly strip them of their traditional values and
will to balance conflicting interests?
Why, it was no less a power than a non-binding legal
opinion of an inhouse lawyer...That opinion hasn't
ever seen the inside of a courtroom and they've given
up. [33]
The task force adopted Madsen's opinion and completed the
environmental analysis accordingly. Now the agencies are in
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court.
The Forest Service Manual guidelines describe those
instances where a prospecting permit or lease may be denied:
A [prospecting] permit may be refused if the degree of
disturbance will be excessive and result in
unavoidable serious impacts on other resources. [34]
Oil and gas leases may be denied when the Forest Service
Environmental Assessment indicates that oil and gas activity
in a particular area would:
(1) seriously interfere with other resource values,
(2) be incompatible with the purpose for which the
area is being used or administered, or (3) permanently
destroy or render useless the land for the purposes
for which used or dedicated....(or) when the value of
the land, and its resources, for the purpose for which
it is being used outweighs the foreseeable benefits
that would be derived from extraction of the mineral
resources, and the existing use cannot be adequately
protected by stipulation. [35]
Oil and gas leases may also be denied when an area has been
withdrawn from the mineral leasing laws. But, specifically
withdrawing a particular area in order to preclude leasing is
discouraged:
There should be relatively few requests for
withdrawals from operation of the mineral leasing
laws, because the land and surface resources
ordinarily can be protected by proper stipulations, or
because detrimental leasing can be prevented by
recommendations or refusal to consent to applications.
[36]
The guidelines explicitly state what conditions warrant a
withdrawal:
Withdrawal may be requested if mineral leasing would
(1) be incompatible with the purpose for which the
land is dedicated, used, or reserved from use; (2)
destroy or damage the values sought to be preserved;
(3) hamper, restrict, or render useless the plans,
programs, or functions for which the land has been
utilized; (4) nullify major accomplishments and
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investments; or (5) create intolerable hazards or
unjustified risk on lands having or planned for
special purposes or programs, such as city watersheds,
experimental forests, developed recreation areas, and
archaeological sites. [37]
Again, as with land withdrawals, the guidelines make it clear
that "wilderness designation shall not be sole justification
for decisions against leasing, permitting or licensing." [38]
Forest Service field staff have broad discretion in
decisionmaking under these guidelines. They must make a
judgment about when a proposal "seriously interferes" with
other land uses and surface resource "values." They must
determine when existing uses "outweigh" the benefits of
mineral extraction, or when disturbance might be classified
"excessive" and its impacts "serious." Under these
guidelines, any of a number of different decisions are
possible on a single proposal; none is more correct than
another. One District Ranger might deem a proposal to be
disastrous; another might view it to be inconsequential. A
Ranger living in a community adamantly opposed to a proposal
might reflect these pressures in his decision; a Ranger in a
district far from the beaten path may be more easily
influenced by the applicant's concerns. [39]
The Forest Service acknowledges that judgment must be
exercised in decisionmaking. In fact, the process provides
for review by various agency officials of decisions and
recommendations made by their subordinates. Each official is
authorized to amend the decision or completely overrule it
when his judgment indicates otherwise:
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After completion of the EA, or EIS if required, the
Forest Service officer responsible for its completion
will forward it, through channels, to the official
responsible for the Forest Service decision. Each
preparing and reviewing line officer will recommend an
alternative, concur with or change previous
recommendations, and provide an explanation for that
position. Proper stipulations will be provided for
each reasonable alternative, even though it is not
recommended, in case the responsible Forest Service
officer or the BLM does not concur with previous
recommendations. [40]
In other words, the decisions to be made are admittedly
judgmental. None can be analytically proven correct.
Just as these Forest Service line officers can exercise
judgment in reviewing and adjusting a subordinate's decision,
so too can those groups and individuals potentially affected
by a decision. A lessee applying for an exploratory drilling
permit may perceive his operations to be totally compatible
with existing surface resources and pose little threat to an
elk calving area or nearby stream. An environmental group,
on the other hand, may perceive the same proposal to
potentially devastate a previously pristine area. Both sets
of values are legitimate. But, depending upon the specific
decision rendered, one or the other perceives its concerns to
be unaccommodated. The issue is not that their concerns have
not been aired or that the Forest Service has not
acknowledged them. Rather, the final decision neither
directly reflects their input nor convinces them the the
contrary outcome is more appropriate. For example, when a
USFS/USGS interagency task force determined that drilling
could occur in the proposed Gros Ventre wilderness, Bill
Cunningham of The Wilderness Society immediately questionned
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their analysis:
The EIS statement that the drilling in Little Granite
would "affect very few people" is patently false. The
Gros Ventre is one of our nation's most important
unprotected wilderness areas in terms of vastness in
size and natural beauty and diversity. This and
future generations of Americans have a stake in the
preservation regardless of whether they actually set
foot in the area. [41]
Because of the range of different values involved, the Forest
Service is unable to objectively represent each one in
decisionmaking. Hence, those who perceive their concerns to
be unaccommodated oppose the decisions made.
Assessing the "Relative Values" of Resources
Although Forest Service officials must exercise judgment
in making oil and gas leasing and permitting decisions, they
do not take this responsibility lightly nor minimize the
importance of each decision. Precisely because judgment is
involved, they are thorough in their analyses, acquiring
data, developing alternatives, assessing impacts and
potential mitigation measures and, only then, making a
decision. Several different approaches have been used by
Forest Service officials to assess the "relative values of
minerals and surface resources." Some have used numerical
ranking schemes while others have used less exacting relative
rankings of alternatives. Consider, for example, the
Palisades leasing decision.
Before making their leasing recommendation for the
Palisades area of Wyoming and Idaho, the USFS Supervisors in
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the Targhee and Bridger-Teton National Forests completed
their environmental assessment on the proposed leasing. From
their own analyses as well as from comments received in three
public meetings, the Forest Service study team selected five
alternatives and five decision criteria with which to
evaluate these alternatives. The alternatives were:
1. deny all leases
2. defer a decision until a later time
3. lease all of the Palisades area
4. lease a portion of the area that was not
environmentally sensitive (11%) and defer a
decision on the remaining 49% [40% of the Palisades
area had previously been leased]
5. lease the less sensitive 11% and lease the
remaining 49% with no-surface-occupancy allowed
[42]
The five "evaluation criteria" used were:
1. protection of wilderness values
2. identification of energy resources
3. compatibility with all natural resources
4. consideration of potential changes in the socio-
economic environment
5. compliance with Forest Service direction and
authority [43]
To determine their preferred alternative, the Forest
Service team rated each of the five alternatives against each
of the five criteria using a numerical scoring system.
Alternative 5 (49% NSO) received the highest score with 10
and Alternative 1 (deny all leases) was second highest with a
score of 9. [44]
Assigning a particular numerical value to an alternative
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depended upon the particular evaluator's perspective. A
Forest Service official obviously applies his professional
knowledge and experience in his ratings. But, members of the
Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society and other environmental
organizations assigned different values and thereby reached
different conclusions. What the Forest Service argued
"protected...wilderness values" the Sierra Club argued
threatened these same values. In recommending leasing in the
Palisades area, the Forest Service contended that oil and gas
exploration was "compatible with all natural resources." [451
The Sierra Club argued that a road and drilling rig in a
roadless area were hardly compatible with the existing
wilderness and wildlife resources of the Palisades. [46]
In selecting Alternative 5 as its "preferred
alternative," the USFS found that it:
is responsive to the key issues raised by the public
since it balances the intense opposing concerns of
environmental groups and the energy industry; is an
action alternative. Refusing to lease or deferment of
leasing would be unresponsive to National energy needs
and would fail to comply with Forest Service policy
and direction; and, allows the land surface management
agency (FS) more time to properly assess the adverse
impacts on resource values and to formulate realistic
mitigation measures to more effectively offset these
impacts.... (and) to prepare for the administrative
impact that may result should a significant resource
be identified. [47]
But, this finding assumed that "opposing concerns" would also
view the decision as "responsive." Additionally, it assumed
that the Forest Service retains the authority and the power
to control future actions under the leases issued.
Environmental organizations disagreed with both assumptions.
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They voiced their concerns at public meetings, in writing to
the USFS EA team and in person to USFS staff in the Targhee
and Bridger-Teton National Forests. [48] When their concerns
had not been addressed to their satisfaction, they took the
agency to court.
Much of the controversy over leasing in the Palisades
area was created by uncertainty; uncertainty about whether or
not development on the leaseholds would ever occur and, if it
did, whether or not the stipulations would be enforceable.
This would lead one to believe that uncertainty would be
diminished and analysis greatly facilitated when a specific
drilling proposal is submitted to the Forest Service. As seen
in the Cache Creek/Little Granite Creek cases, though, the
disputes remain and are perhaps heightened. Again, there
often is no agreement on what the boundaries of analysis
should be at the outset nor on what the conclusions of this
analysis indicate should be decided.
The Forest Service and Geological Survey jointly
prepared an EIS on two exploratory wells in Cache Creek and
Little Granite Creek outside Jackson, Wyoming. The draft
document, released in August 1981, painted a bleak picture
of the development impacts in either area:
For Cache Creek it concluded:
Should field development occur in the Cache Creek
watershed it would likely produce high impacts on
recreation, wildlife (particularly elk), and local
culture for many years (20 years or more)....The
potential for contamination of surface water would be
increased....A major elk calving area would be
eliminated....Visual qualities would be severely
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compromised....Noise from development drilling and
vehicles, the road system, and landscape disruption
would make the area unattractive to many forms of
recreation. [49]
For Little Granite Creek it concluded:
The Little Granite Creek road alternative...would
create moderate to high impacts on riparian
vegetation, fisheries, wildlife, visual esthetics, and
wilderness attributes of the Little Granite drainage
....Reclamation of the road would be particularly
difficult because of the steep terrain and unstable
slopes traversed...scars would persist for many years
along the mile of road directly below the wellsite...
Field development...would produce high impacts on the
present wilderness character of the area for 20 to 30
years. [50]
To determine what action should be taken given these
impacts, the USFS/GS interagency task force analyzed two
alternatives for each proposal: two different access road
routes for Cache Creek and one access road and the use of
helicopters rather than roads to reach the wellsite in Little
Granite Creek. The draft EIS also discussed the implications
of full field development, should it someday occur, for each
proposal. These alternatives were evaluated in the draft EIS
using nine criteria:
1. Determine the area's potential to contribute to the
Nation's energy needs.
2. Recognize the lease rights of NCRA, Getty, and
other members of the Bear Thrust Unit.
3. Provide for visual quality objectives of the area
as defined in the Cache Creek-Bear Thrust mapping
evaluation.
4. Protect water quality, aquatic habitat, and
riparian zones, both onsite and in access
corridors.
5. Minimize adverse effects on wildlife, basically by
recognizing diverse habitat needs and protecting
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big-game populations.
6. Maintain traditional recreational use of Cache
Creek drainage.
7. Minimize man's intrusion into the recommended Gros
Ventre Wilderness in the exercise of mineral
exploration and development activities.
8. Feasibility of reclaiming disturbed areas to
natural conditions at the cessation of activities.
9. Minimize impacts on the community of Jackson
(overload of community facilities, noise, hydrogen
sulfide, and other safety factors). [51]
The task force supplemented this list of evaluation criteria
with an additional objective that "alternatives must be
practical, economically feasible, and provide a balance with
respect to environmental protection and exploration." [52]
The task force then studied the impacts associated with
each proposal on 19 "elements:" soils, air quality, noise,
surface water, ground water, vegetation, wildlife, fisheries,
recreation, wilderness, cultural resources, visual resources,
population, local culture, economics, employment, housing,
community services and contribution to nation's energy needs.
[53] These impacts were rated either "high," "moderate" or
"low," using a dot system to visually compare alternatives.
With this data in hand, each alternative was evaluated
against the nine criteria using a rating scheme:
Each Government scientist (FS and USGS) working on the
EIS was asked to rate the magnitude of the impacts of
alternatives for his specialty, according to these
three levels. "Low" impact assumes very little change
from status quo conditions; "moderate" implies some
change to the extent that these changes would alter or
destroy critical/key habitat or highly valued
activities, produce intense community conflict, be
obvious to anyone, or offensive to anyone, as the case
may be...the impact ratings were thoroughly reviewed by
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experienced USGS or FS personnel to assure a sense of
reasonableness and consistency. [54]
As might have been predicted, the Forest Service analysis was
immediately called into question. Phil Hocker of the Sierra
Club criticized the task force's evaluation method:
The dot-system used for evaluation of alternatives is
too simplistic to be credible. Subjective judgements
are hidden in the assignment of dots, which are not
supported by the text of the dEIS, the supplemental
studies, or fact. The bias of the authors of the dEIS
has affected the construction of the naive charts
shown. [55]
Because he had no faith in the process used to analyze
alternatives, Hocker immediately questioned its conclusions.
He criticized the cursory attention given to eventual full
field development should oil or gas be found in significant
quantities. He listed several alternatives that he thought
were plausible but that were not discussed in the draft EIS.
He also questioned whether or not the action satisfied the
intent of The Wilderness Act as the authors contended. He
concluded:
The draft EIS under review is "so inadequate as to
preclude meaningful analysis," and a retraction and
issuance of a new draft or multiple drafts is
required (40 CFR Part 1502.9(a)). The scope of the
draft is imprecise and appears to shift within the
document. The draft omits important alternatives, and
includes others which are inconsistent with policy
positions taken in the study. The draft adopts a new
Federal policy on lease administration and uses this
new policy to justify other positions within the
study; however, the sweeping impacts of adopting such
a policy are not studied, as is required (40 CFR Part
1508.18(a)). Specific impacts are inaccurately
portrayed or omitted. The conclusions of the dEIS are
incorrect and insupportable. [56]
Hocker was joined by several other environmental
organizations in criticizing the EIS. Again, some suggested
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that there were other alternatives that should have been
analyzed but were not. Others reached different conclusions
using the same data acquired by the Forest Service-Geological
Survey task force. The task force had recommended "limited
approval" of the Cache Creek APD. They concluded for Cache
Creek that "approval could be limited to the initial APD
only, with the understanding that the government might pursue
a disapproval option subsequent to the drilling of the first
test well." [57] Earlier in the dEIS, however, they had
emphasized that "[u]nder the present legal structure, the
Federal oil and gas leasing program is geared toward
production only. A discovery automatically leads to
development rights under the system. There is no proviso for
one well only without special Congressional action." [58]
This discrepancy prompted anger from local residents and
national environmental groups who argued that the Forest
Service analysis was internally inconsistent. They argued
that the conclusion reached was not supported by the facts
and analysis preceding it. [59]
Similarly, for Getty Oil's Little Granite Creek
proposal, the task force concluded, even though helicopter
mobilization satisfied all of their criteria, to recommend
road access via Little Granite Creek:
The helicopter mobilization alternative fully
satisfies practically all of the evaluation criteria.
On the other hand, while the road alternative may not
fully satisfy as many criteria, it does fully or
partially meet all of the USFS/GS objectives. It
appears that with proper reclamation using techniques
currently available there would be no long-term
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effects from the Little Granite road other than
persistent road scars in the last mile below the
wellsite. (emphasis added) [60]
Sharon Nelson of the National Wildlife Federation
questioned the USFS/GS selection of the road access
alternative. She commented that the Jackson Hole Area Oil
and Gas Lease Stipulation that was attached to each of the
leases involved requires that the lessee "keep to an absolute
minimum the number of access, tote roads and other
travelways" and to "conduct operations in a manner that will
offer the least possible disturbance to wildlife on or
adjacent to the leased land." (NWF emphasis) [61] Given
these provisions, Nelson concluded:
The DEIS acknowledges that, with added expense, the
Bear Thrust exploratory well can probably be drilled
using only helicopter access. The language of the
stipulation does not provide for "practicable" or
"economical" or "reasonable" access. It stipulates
absolutely minimal road building.
If Getty cannot demonstrate ability to obliterate that
last mile...they cannot proceed with their operation
under this term of their lease, except via helicopter.
[62]
That judgment must be exercised in making these
decisions is hardly an earth-shattering observation.
Economists have long warned against the impossibility of
trying to maximize a decision along several dimensions
simultaneously. The policy analysis and planning evaluation
literature similarly discusses the difficulty of making
social choices when many objectives are desired. [63] Forest
Service officials acknowledge these shortcomings. But, they
argue that Congress has mandated that they make decisions by
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considering and weighing numerous factors. [64] While there
may be no precise formula to indicate a correct decision at
the end of analysis, Forest Service officials feel confident
that their professional judgment leads to decisions that
closely approximate the public interest." [65] Furthermore,
they argue that, while their decisions might have
shortcomings, who else could possibly make these decisions
any better? They are still the agency with forest management
expertise. [66] Seeing no other way to make these judgmental
decisions, agency officials systematically and thoroughly
study each proposal and, considering the information gathered
in this effort, use their judgment to make a decision. But,
because these analytical methods are flawed and, moreover,
subject to dispute, they are almost always called into
question by those who believe different factors should have
been considered or weighed differently.
Even Experts Disagree
Not only is there disagreement between the Forest
Service and environmental organizations about the type of
information needed for decisionmaking and the appropriate
conclusions to draw from each analysis, there is also
disagreement among federal and state agencies with land
management responsibilities and expertise. While the Forest
Service concluded that some development could occur without
impact in the Washakie Wilderness in Wyoming, [67] the
National Park Service concluded that this same activity
"would destroy the wilderness values of this wild, remote and
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indescribably scenic area...[and] will be detrimental to
Yellowstone National Park." [68] When the USFS and USGS
recommended that exploratory drilling occur in Cache Creek
Canyon and Little Granite Creek outside Jackson, Wyoming,
Roger Williams, EPA Region VIII Administrator, protested:
Exploration is only the first step in what could
become a major developmental process. While this
action is significant in itself, the policy
implications extend beyond just the proposed action.
Important precedents will be set for future oil and
gas EIS's.
The 5-7 miles of road construction needed would
drastically and irretrievably alter the area's
wilderness characteristics. The Gros Ventre is the
largest single de facto wilderness area in the lower
48 states. The Gros Ventre as wilderness provides
important watershed protection. It provides important
habitat for not only grizzly bears, but also eagles.
Due to its generally steep slopes and unstable soils,
the Gros Ventre will not fair well from a resource
development standpoint. [69]
Similarly, Idaho and Wyoming State Game and Fish Department
officials expressed concern to the US Forest Service about
leasing in the Palisades area: "The remoteness of the
Palisades Further Planning Area has made it a haven for
wildlife. Elk, and especially mountain goats, need
protection from human disturbance....The best solution to
protect wildlife is no further leasing...our recommendation
is no further leasing." [70] Nonetheless, the Forest
Service's environmental assessment concluded that "there will
be no significant adverse effects...due to oil and gas lease
issuance." [71] The agency recommended to the BLM that the
leases be issued.
Not only do "experts" disagree about the appropriate
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conclusions to draw from environmental analyses and hence
what decisions should be reached but, additionally, they
disagree about how much and what type of information is
needed before a wise decision can be made. One such
disagreement arose between the US Forest Service and US
Geological Survey over exploration permits in Wyoming's Cache
Creek Canyon. As described in the last chapter, the USFS
responds to an APD by preparing a preliminary environmental
assessment of the proposal. With this information, a
recommendation is developed and sent back to the USGS. The
USFS recommendation lists the agency's concerns with the
proposal and how permit approval might be conditionned to
offset potential impacts. Theoretically, the process takes
about ten days. The USGS then revises the applicant's
development plan to conform to USFS recommendations. But,
the Cache Creek APD took a different course.
Once the preliminary findings from the USFS
environmental assessment were available, Bridger-Teton
National Forest Supervisor Reid Jackson announced his
"precedent setting recommendation" [72] to the USGS -- that
an environmental impact statement be prepared before a
decision was made on the proposal. Reid Jackson commented
that the Forest Service's preliminary EA found that the
proposed well and access road "cannot be conducted in Cache
Creek, regardless of alternative methods, without impacts to
soil, water, aesthetics, potential wilderness, wildlife,
recreation and aspects of the socio-economic structure of
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Teton County." [73] Jackson called for an EIS on these
grounds as well as because the well was proving "highly
controversial" and that Council on Environmental Quality
guidelines call for an EIS under such circumstances. He
noted that of 200 letters received by then at the Bridger-
Teton National Forest headquarters, 170 opposed the well.
[74]
Jackson forwarded his conclusions and recommendations to
the USGS District Office in Rock Springs, Wyoming, in
January, 1978. Once back in the USGS' hands, the fate of the
proposal was uncertain. The USGS has full responsibility for
making drilling decisions and is not required to abide by the
USFS recommendation. [75] Traditionally, though, the agency
has respected the Forest Service's professional judgment.
The USGS had never denied a drilling permit for environmental
reasons and had previously prepared only one EIS on an APD.
[76] As a result, agency officials began what they termed an
"unusual" environmental assessment report (EAR); "unusual" in
the sense that the issues to be addressed in it, especially
whether or not to do an EIS on the proposed drilling, were
precedent-setting. [77] The proposal then faded from view as
the USGS conducted its EAR inhouse, without input from USFS
personnel or the Jackson Hole community.
Almost a year later, in December 1978, a letter from
W.A. Radlinski, acting director of the USGS, to USFS Chief
John McGuire was made public. In this letter, Radlinski
stressed that the USFS environmental assessment on the Cache
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Creek APD of a year earlier was "excellent," and expressed
his view that an EIS was unnecessary. He argued that an EIS
at the APD stage would be premature since it would not
provide any information that could help federal
decisionmakers make their decision. He indicated his belief
that an EIS would be more appropriate after exploration had
occurred and before development took place. Only then would
information regarding the oil and gas resource potential be
available with which to make an informed decision. [78]
On April 2, 1979, 15 months after Reid Jackson had first
recommended an EIS, USFS and USGS officials met together for
the first time to discuss the "unusual" EAR. Immediately
afterward, Jackson drafted a letter to the USGS participants
at the meeting. He pinpointed the Forest Service concerns
with the analysis and questioned key assumptions, the
estimates of those impacts discussed as well as environmental
impacts overlooked. The letter concluded that the EAR:
...does not state the environmental impacts as clearly
and directly as it might. We continue to remain of
the opinion that the impacts from this rank wildcat
well and attendant road developments would be
unusually severe. The statements in your EAR
regarding mitigation are overly optimistic and tend to
play down the impacts.
The EAR does not deal with the primary issues of the
Cache Creek well which were much broader than just the
impacts resulting from this single test well. Those
issues which are still very much alive have to do with
the question of the rate and order of oil and gas
prospecting and exploration in the Jackson Hole area,
e.g., is it necessary to drill the most
environmentally sensitive areas first to determine
what the oil and gas potential of the area is. [79]
In early July, 1979, the USGS released its "unusual" EAR
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in draft form for public comment. Public hearings were held
in late July and early August. The EAR discussed potential
impacts on water quality, recreation, and wildlife, in the
Cache Creek watershed as well as erosion and road
construction-related impacts. It also referred to the
obvious public opposition to the well, commenting that the
Town Council was most concerned about impacts upon the local
water supply and traffic through residential areas and that
the County Commission feared impacts upon the tourist
economy. The USGS still held to its contention that an EIS
at this stage of development would be "premature" and that
the test well should be drilled. The USGS concluded that
"one well in and of itself does not constitute a major
federal action." [80] While the well would cause some
environmental problems, most could be mitigated and the site
reclaimed if drilling were unsuccessful. They did conclude,
however, that Cache Creek would lose its status as a
benchmark station for water quality. [81]
The issue once again faded from view after the public
hearings. But, on January 17, 1980, more than two years
after NCRA's permit application had been filed, the Director
of the US Geological Survey agreed to prepare an EIS before
making any decisions about the proposed Cache Creek well. By
that time another APD had been filed for Little Granite
Creek, an area adjacent to Cache Creek. The public outcry
intensified. The agency had little choice; the Jackson Hole
community and several national environmental organizations
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had joined the Forest Service in demanding an EIS.
USFS officials were and are caught in the middle of an
unquestionably difficult situation. They have responsibility
for making leasing and permitting recommendations and
decisions almost daily, but there is no agreement between
public land users, the USFS and other federal and state
resource managers. These groups disagree about the boundaries
of analysis in decisionmaking, the specific alternatives to
be analyzed, the meaning of Forest Service Manual directives
and the conclusions that ought to be drawn from the findings
of analysis. Forest Service field officials wish they had
more explicit formulas to follow in decisionmaking. [82]
Since they do not, they compensate by being as systematic and
thorough as possible so that all affected user groups can see
that their interests have been considered. As has been shown
above, not all the groups involved are convinced.
The analysis conducted by the Forest Service in making
oil and gas leasing and permitting decisions is critical to
making an informed decision, but this analysis cannot alone
provide sufficient information with which to make a decision.
Assumptions must be made in selecting alternatives and
bounding the analysis, and judgment must be exercised in
reaching conclusions from the analysis. These judgmental
aspects of decisionmaking cannot be subsumed within technical
analysis. While the process may satisfy Forest Service
officials that all pertinent information has been considered
and convince them that the decision reached is the most
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appropriate, it does not similarly satisfy or convince other
affected groups or individuals. If the objective of this
process is solely to reach a decision, then it is successful.
But, if the objective is to be decisive, that is to make
decisions that are accepted and supported rather than
immediately contested and undermined, then the process fails.
Inevitably, many groups have preconceived notions about
what an appropriate decision should be long before the
analysis is completed. The decisionmaking process does not
convince these groups either that their preconceived notions
are "wrong" or that the decision reached is "right." Hence
it encourages criticism and, moreover, provides a substantive
basis for this criticism. The process does not provide the
opportunity for mutual inquiry to better understand the
issues involved and the merit of a variety of different
alternatives. Affected groups are not given an opportunity
to amend, support or reject their early notions. The process
does not convince these groups that the critical assumptions
and value judgments that in the end dictate which decision
will be reached, are the most acceptable. It is unlikely
that additional analysis would have convinced the Jackson
Hole community that permitting a well up Cache Creek Canyon
is the right thing to do. The values at stake simply do not
lend themselves to the type of technical analysis conducted
on this exploratory drilling proposal. But, should there be
a mutually acceptable alternative -- in the Cache Creek case
or in the dozens of other cases in which the Forest Service
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similarly finds itself -- the process is not structured to
determine what that alternative might be. In this sense, the
process is not as informative as it otherwise could be.
II. The Process is Divisive
When the National Cooperative Refinery Association filed
an APD for its leasehold in Cache Creek Canyon outside
Jackson, Wyoming, the initial reaction from the local
community was cautious and concerned but not immediately
negative. However, by the time NCRA withdrew its application
four years later, the community was, literally, up-in-arms
against drilling in Cache Creek. As one local resident
exclaimed during the revelry following NCRA's announcement
withdrawing its APD:
We told them we were gonna harass the hell out of
them. They were warned that there would be vandalism
and all kinds of trouble. People carry guns up here,
you know. [83]
The specifics of NCRA's proposal were only part of the reason
the community's opposition grew to be so adamant; the
administrative decisionmaking process provided no option but
to respond as they did.
As structured, the oil and gas leasing and permitting
process is divisive. It promotes distrust between parties,
it encourages adversarial behavior, it leads to extreme
position-taking and, ultimately, it ensures opposition to
whatever decision is rendered. While conflict over many oil
and gas proposals is inevitable, the process provides no
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mechanisms for anticipating this conflict and trying to
resolve the differences among affected parties. As a result,
the process exacerbates conflict and inhibits accommodation
of the interests at stake.
The Process Promotes Distrust
The "decisionmaker" in oil and gas leasing or permitting
cases is, obviously, the federal land manager. As a result,
the process is designed to generate information to inform his
decision. The relevant information from a lease or permit
applicant is contained in the official application. The
federal official obtains additional information by requesting
it directly from the applicant and by undertaking on-site
inspections.
The public, on the other hand, obtains its information,
second-hand, from the federal land manager. In many
respects, the federal land manager becomes the applicant's
spokesman, describing the proposal and its consequences in
public announcements and at public meetings. The process
provides no forum for direct communication between the
applicant and the public. As a result, any hostility or
opposition over a specific proposal, by design, is centered
on the federal agencies. When opposition to NCRA's well
heightened, the Jackson Hole Chamber of Commerce framed the
battle as one of the community against the government:
"people here think they can fight the federal government and
they do and they win." [84] Given this context, distrust of
administrative decisions is frequently built into the
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process; it is difficult for public groups and individuals to
divorce the proposal from the federal officials presenting
it.
When it first became public that NCRA had filed an APD
for Cache Creek Canyon, the Jackson Hole Community
(residents, town council, county commission, Chamber of
Commerce) questioned the proposal on the grounds that it
would diminish the quality of life in Jackson Hole, tax the
town's streets and services and potentially detract from the
area's exceptional tourism and recreation opportunities. [85]
At the outset, though, the governing bodies and Chamber of
Commerce adopted a "wait-and-see" stance despite the
immediate and vocal opposition of some residents. [86]
The Chamber of Commerce and town officials invited NCRA
to Jackson Hole to explain their drilling plans to the
community. But, NCRA refused. [87] They adopted a very low
profile throughout the process, apparently preferring to
leave all dealings with the community to the Forest Service.
And, since the process included no forum for bringing these
parties together, NCRA was able to keep its distance. This
posture was interpreted as arrogance by Jackson Hole
residents and prompted distrust of NCRA and, hence,
opposition to the proposed well. Moreover, it encouraged
opposition by the Chamber of Commerce, the one organization
in town most likely to support the company's proposal. The
Chamber's executive director attributed the group's eventual
strong opposition to the Cache Creek proposal to NCRA's
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attitude: "Refusing to communicate with the Chamber...really
made us mad." [88]
The Process Promotes Adversarial Behavior
In addition to promoting distrust, the process also
encourages adversarial behavior. The Forest Service is
charged with representing "the public interest" in
decisionmaking. As a result, the only rational response of
affected groups and individuals is to argue that their
interests coincide with "the public interest." And, that is
precisely how most arguments are framed in these disputes,
both at the policy level and in site-specific cases. For
example, over time, opposition to the Cache Creek well became
much more organized than when NCRA first filed its APD. The
Jackson Hole Alliance for Responsible Planning was
established in March 1979 and it served as an organizing
force against the well. The Alliance formed a "Blue Ribbon"
committee of influential community members to build community
opposition to the well. They also encouraged a coalition
with the Sierra Club, Chamber of Commerce, town council and
county commission. The Alliance's philosophy from the start
was that land use planning in Jackson Hole should complement
rather than detract from its scenic and natural system
attributes. Their argument throughout the process was that
Jackson Hole and Northwestern Wyoming was a "national
interest area" and, for that reason, should be protected from
incompatible development activities. [89]
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When Getty Oil Company proposed drilling an exploratory
well in Wyoming's Little Granite Creek area, the Sierra Club
opposed the oil company's plans. The environmental
organization argued that Little Granite Creek was within a
recommended wilderness area and that permitting a well there
violated the protective provisions of The Wilderness Act and
thus was not in the public interest. [90] But, the Forest
Service approved the well, arguing that it had no authority
to deny a drilling permit to a leaseholder. [91] Sierra Club
representative Phil Hocker protested the agency's decision,
arguing that one of the stipulations attached to the leases
gave the agency authority to deny drilling: "a finding that
approval is not in the public interest is adequate to justify
disapproval....The Jackson Hole Stipulation and Krug
Memorandum requirements supplement the fundamental authority
reserved to the Secretary of Interior to control prospecting
and development of oil leases 'in the public interest'." [92]
Hocker argued that the Forest Service decision had failed to
represent "the public interest." As a result, the Sierra
Club took the Forest Service to court.
In addition to arguing that their position best
represented "the public interest," each group also alleged
that its adversaries are making nothing but self-interested
demands. For example, when lobbying against wilderness
designation legislation, industry associations argue that
such actions support "extreme" special interest groups: "The
U.S. may lock up vast areas of land without knowing how much
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energy supply it gave up in order to keep the acreage in
pristine condition. That's a valid basis for decision making
only to extremists who insist on their objectives regardless
of cost in terms of energy supply." [93] Similarly, Neal
Williams of the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association argues
that:
We cannot continue to study and analyze our public
lands for restrictive single-interest uses [ie.
wilderness] when there are so many worthwhile
competing uses. We cannot postpone responsible and
environmentally sound mineral exploration...we should
not impede development of our natural resources while
we import timber, fuel and strategic minerals, to the
detriment of our economy and balance of trade. [94]
Such arguments are not unique to industry representatives.
Michael Scott of The Wilderness Society responds similarly to
industry's allegations: "When we talk about wilderness, we
are talking about barely one percent of the total land mass
of the lower 48 states. How much oil and gas can be found in
so little land? I think we are simply dealing with
people...who are personally offended as a matter of
philosophy that there are areas they can't go into and
develop." [95]
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The Process Encouraes Strategic Behavior
Not only does the process deepen the chasm between the
traditional adversaries, it also encourages these groups to
behave strategically. Because the process puts potentially
affected groups other than the applicant on the defensive and
prompts distrust, it encourages all groups to seek other
means of protecting their interests (ie. it encourages them
to seek other avenues through which their power to influence
the final outcome might be greater).
When the USFS and USGS decided that a no-drill decision
for Cache Creek was beyond their statutory authority, the
Jackson Hole community concluded that their concerns could
not be adequately addressed in the administrative process.
The Jackson Hole Alliance came to the conclusion that the EIS
would be "little more than a justification for the
project...There is no administrative remedy now that we have
reached this stage of development." The Alliance was
"appalled that leasing had occurred without public input" and
now that an APD is filed "the decisions have already been
made and there is nothing in the administrative process that
the community can do about it." In their mind, involvement
in the administrative process had become "meaningless." [96]
When the administrative process failed them, the
community moved into a forum where they felt they had more
influence: Congress. Their approach was to encourage
Congressional action to exchange or buy back NCRA's leases.
They were convinced that they would be successful. Ralph
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McMullen, the Chamber's executive director, explained why:
We have people who know what to do and whom to
call...The people who move here often are powerful,
wealthy and influential. The locals know where to go
and our tentacles reach far. [97]
McMullen was convinced that the Congressional delegation would
be much more responsive to the Chamber's concerns than was the
USFS or USGS:
The Forest Service and Geological Survey are
bureaucracies and so they are not responsive to the
electorate...but the Congressional delegation is
republican and so are most of the Chamber's members...
they listen to us. [98]
The Chamber and the Alliance both felt they had a better
chance to influence decisionmaking through Congressional
channels than through administrative channels.
This strategy was encouraged by a seemingly favorable
response from their Congressional delegation. Given the
Jackson Hole community's united and forceful opposition to
the Cache Creek well, Wyoming's three-member Congressional
delegation [99] gave its support to the community. Senator
Alan Simpson reported that "all of us have grave reservations
about drilling in that area. I haven't found anyone in the
county who favors this, so we will pursue everything we can."
[100] Senator Malcolm Wallop declared that "we can generally
agree that it ought not happen. The delegation will try to
find any means available to it to prohibit the drilling in
Cache Creek." [101] The delegation assured Jackson Hole
residents that they "don't believe oil and gas drilling will
ever be a reality in Cache Creek Canyon." [102] With such an
encouraging response, there seemed little reason for the
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community to pursue the administrative process.
When opposition to drilling in Cache Creek Canyon flowed
over to Getty Oil's proposed Little Granite Creek well, Getty
officials tried to offset this community reaction. It
immediately presented itself to the community to help
residents and environmental groups understand and trust
Getty's proposal. Getty's attitude could not have differed
more from NCRA's. They were open, accessible and
acknowledged the environmental concerns at stake. They had
proven themselves to be trustworthy and responsible in other
interactions with the Bridger-Teton National Forest and
environmental groups in another drilling project in nearby
Fall Creek. Moreover, Getty had an "excellent" prospect,
much different from NCRA's questionable one. They were
willing to compromise in order to drill. [103]
Getty assured the town that its Little Granite proposal
would not be environmentally disastrous as the Sierra Club
contended and would be a financial bonus for the area. It
reported that seismic data and geophysical analyses indicated
a 44,900 acre anticline that could potentially hold $1
billion worth of oil and gas: 50 million barrels of oil or
300 billion cubic feet of natural gas. The State would
receive $375 million if Getty's projections proved accurate.
Teton County would receive one-third of whatever revenues
were generated. [104] Getty assured the town that it would
take whatever steps necessary to protect the large elk herds
as well as the other wildlife that Little Granite Canyon
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supports as calving and grazing grounds and migration routes.
They minimized the probability of encountering hydrogen
sulfide ("sour gas") and promised minimal impact on the
county's or town's cultural, social or educational services.
They assured that no drill rigs would ever be visible from
Jackson or the highways into town and that operations would
be quieter than usual because Getty would use muffled
generators and diesel-electric engines. [105] Getty's
representative emphasized the company's record: "Getty has
demonstrated, in Teton County and elsewhere, that drilling in
sensitive environments can be accomplished successfully."
[106]
Getty hoped that its strong public relations effort
would encourage a constructive dialogue with the
environmentalists, the Jackson Hole community and the USFS/GS
team. They hoped that they would be able to address most
concerns and still be able to explore and perhaps develop
their prospect. [107] This dialogue never evolved. There
seemed to be little incentive for the Sierra Club or Jackson
Hole community to negotiate; a Congressional solution to the
whole problem seemed imminent.
The Sierra Club was not willing to concede to drilling
in a proposed wilderness area because the drilling would be
precedent setting and make it difficult to prevent further
oil and gas exploration in other wilderness areas. There
seemed little reason for them to negotiate with Getty to
mitigate impacts if, in fact, a no-development option still
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existed. [108] While congressional action was not
guaranteed, it seemed likely. In November 1981, Jackson Hole
Alliance Director, Story Clark felt confident that "the gears
for a solution are already in the works." [109]
In late February 1982, this optimism was shattered when
the Wyoming Congressional delegation introduced its
wilderness legislation to Congress. The Wyoming Wilderness
Bill explicitly removed all designated wilderness areas in
Wyoming from any oil and gas or other mining activites. It
firmly set the boundaries of each wilderness area. To the
shock of the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the Wyoming
Wilderness Association, Jackson Hole Alliance and many
Jackson residents, the bill removed Little Granite Creek from
the Gros Ventre Wilderness, theoretically paving the way for
Getty's well. [110]
The Congressional delegation's bill hardly put the issue
to rest, though. By that time the dispute had been allowed
to build to the point that positions had become entrenched.
Hence, the Jackson Hole Alliance, Sierra Club and other
environmental organization, rather than responding favorably
to Getty's advances, began looking for other means by which
to oppose the well. And, as they found, the process is
vulnerable; there are many avenues by which individuals and
groups can influence decisions in the making and oppose
decisions that do not accommodate their concerns.
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III. The Process is Not Decisive
In 1962, the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission commented on the Forest Service's ability to
prevail in the midst of inevitable conflict over its
decisions:
The Forest Service does not stand alone in the face of
pressures from one direction. One Chief of the Forest
Service is alleged to have said, "I am supported by
the pressures which surround me." With skillful
manipulation, the various clientele groups tend to
cancel out each others' efforts. To the extent that
this occurs, the administrator is given greater
discretion to make decisions which he considers to be
in the public interest. [111]
But, by 1982 this perspective no longer applied. The Forest
Service might have discretion to make decisions deemed to be
in "the public interest," but these decisions are no longer
supported by the conflicting pressures acting upon it. In
1982, decisions not deemed appropriate can be opposed
effectively; they are not decisive.
Theoretically, a "decision" should be the final word on
a matter; as Webster defines it, a decision is a "conclusion"
or "a report of a conclusion." But, while Forest Service
officials would certainly prefer that their decisions fit
this definition, frequently they do not. Because the stakes
are so great, groups whose concerns have not been
accommodated by a decision inevitably oppose that decision.
And, because the decisionmaking process is unable to
conclusively determine which outcome is the appropriate one,
these groups have grounds on which to make strong arguments
against a decision. If an oil and gas leasing or permitting
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decision is not influenced in the making, there remain many
different ways to potentially undo that decision once made.
Consider, for example, a case involving Montana's Bob
Marshall Wilderness Area. After four years and four
decisions the fate of the permit and lease applications filed
for the Bob Marshall are still up in the air. The first
decision was made when the Region I Regional Forester decided
to deny a prospecting permit for the area. But, this
decision was appealed by the permit applicant to the Forest
Service Chief. The Chief disagreed with the Regional
Forester's assessment and sent the application back to him to
be reconsidered. [112] A second decision was then made when
the Regional Forester reconsidered his original decision and
again ruled against the applicant. [113] But, the applicant
again appealed. In the meantime, environmentalists concerned
about the Bob Marshall's wilderness characteristics turned to
Congress. A third decision was made when the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs evoked an emergency provision
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 to
withdraw the wilderness area from the mineral leasing laws.
[114] But, once again, the dispute was not resolved. The
Mountain States Legal Foundation and the Pacific Legal
Foundation sued the Congressional committee, alleging that
the committee's action was unconstitutional. [115] The
fourth decision was made when the federal judge in this case
ruled that the committee's action was constitutional, but
only so long as the secretary of the interior set the time
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limit of the withdrawal. [116] The judge thereby forwarded
responsibility for the "final" permit decision to the
secretary.
After four decisions and three decisionmakers, the fate
of oil and gas exploration in the Bob Marshall Wilderness has
yet to be "decided." The ball is now in Secretary of the
Interior James Watt's court. His decision has been
forestalled by an agreement with Congress affecting leasing
in all Wilderness Areas until September, 1983. [117] At that
time, if Congress has not legislatively protected the Bob
Marshall, Watt will become the fourth decisionmaker, making
the fifth decision. His decision will inevitably be
judicially opposed by either the applicant or environmental
groups. The final decision and the final decisionmaker have
yet to be identified.
No decision is immune from opposition. Informal as well
as formal policies are opposed. If unsuccessful at
influencing policies in the making, the policies will be
opposed when implemented. Opposition traditionally follows
existing administrative and judicial channels. But,
opponents are hardly limited to these avenues; there is much
room for an individual or group's creative instincts. If
success is not achieved in the administrative process then
opponents may turn to the courts, Congress, the state or
other governing bodies; guerrilla tactics cannot be ruled out
when conflict is permitted to develop to extremes. If
differences are not resolved when prospecting decisions are
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being made then the conflict flows over to leasing decisions
and then on to permitting decisions and eventually to
licensing decisions. In the end, however, just as in the Bob
Marshall case, no mechanism is available to resolve disputes;
no process exists to accommodate the interests at stake.
Consistent with the long-held land management paradigm, all
the steps in the process are designed to inform the
professional land manager's decision. Disputes fester and
escalate as the parties jockey for position in subsequent
rounds of appeal.
The Conservation of Conflict
Reviewing the Palisades leasing case is a tedious task.
Each stage is redundant; the issues argued are the same.
But, because the differences between several environmental
organizations and the Forest Service were not addressed --
because the environmental interests were not accommodated to
their satisfaction -- the disputes persisted. The case
proceeded through a succession of decisions that in the end
merely served as transfer points, as the dispute moved from
one forum to another. The process proceeds as if governed by
a natural law of "conservation of conflict:" the level of
conflict either remains stable or increases as decisions move
from one phase to the next. Seldom are attempts made to
resolve conflicts and hence defy this "natural" law.
149
Policymaking:
The FPA Stipulation and Guidelines Dispute
Because of the intensifying interest in the oil and gas
potential of the Western Overthrust Belt, the Forest Service
concluded in RARE II that, even though the Palisades area had
high wilderness value, no decision could be made about its
final status until more information was obtained about its
oil and gas resources. Thus, the Palisades area was
classified as neither wilderness nor nonwilderness but
instead placed into a third "further planning" category. In
the Final Environmental Statement on its RARE II wilderness
evaluation process the US Forest Service acknowledged its
dilemma:
Unless there is additional exploration for oil and gas
resources permitted in many areas allocated to further
planning, subsequent wilderness-nonwilderness
decisions will have to rely on data not much better
than currently exists.
Exploration by drilling to determine oil and gas
potential is essential in reaching conclusions in land
management or project plans that allocate roadless
areas.
For the above reasons, oil and gas exploration
(including drilling where adequate exploration
requires it) will be considered an integral part of
the further planning process. [118]
In justifying its allocation decision in this way, the USFS
was assuming that stipulations would protect surface
resources against environmental impacts should exploration or
development be proposed. Additionally, they assumed that the
Forest Service retains authority at later decision points
(ie. permitting and licensing) to control whatever activities
may be proposed. But, environmental groups questioned both
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assumptions and, therefore, the decisions reached.
The first task the Forest Service Washington Office
officials undertook was developing a special stipulation to
be attached to all leases issued in Further Planning Areas.
The national environmental organizations closely followed the
development of the FPA lease stipulation and FPA leasing and
management guidelines. They wanted to ensure that the
stipulation and guidelines were sufficient to protect the
area's wilderness character should oil and gas exploration
and development ever be proposed. [119] While the Washington
Office distributed drafts of the agency's proposed
stipulation and guidelines for comment before finalizing
them, these groups felt that their involvement was merely
"pro forma." They did not believe that the US Forest Service
Washington Office ever took their criticisms and
recommendations seriously. [120]
Sierra Club representatives criticized the proposed FPA
stipulation on several grounds, going as far as drafting
their own version that they felt would better assure
maintenance of wilderness values while final allocation
decisions were being made. They complained about the lack of
public comment or discussion of the stipulation before it was
promulgated and expressed frustration at their inability to
follow and participate in the process. They cited several
unanswered letters to the USFS Washington Office on the
matter. They urged the Forest Service "to either adopt the
Sierra Club proposed revision, or at least to initiate a
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consultation procedure leading to major changes in the
oil/gas administration of Further Planning Areas." [121] More
specifically, Bruce Hamilton criticized the requirement of
only an environmental assessment (EA) and not an EIS, stating
that it was a contradiction of explicit RARE II FES intention
and "would completely void the integrity of the Further
Planning Process." [122] But, the US Forest Service made no
changes in the FPA Stipulation in response to these
criticisms. Agency officials were confident that the FPA
stipulation was adequate and enforceable as originally
designed. [123] But, by failing to respond to the
environmental groups' contentions, the agency ensured that
the dispute would reappear when it came time to implement the
stipulations.
The FPA Stipulation was supplemented with new Forest
Service Manual (FSM) guidelines for managing the oil and gas
resources in FPAs. These guidelines were also developed in
the USFS Washington Office in consultation with those Forest
Service Regions facing oil and gas pressures. One meeting
was held in Washington in April 1980 to obtain input from
environmentalists and energy industry representatives. [124]
With respect to specific management of further planning
areas, the guidelines emphasized that "a primary reason for
allocating an area to further planning was the need to gather
additional data on which to base a wilderness, non-wilderness
decision. Therefore, mineral exploration is considered an
integral part of the further planning process but it must be
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conducted in such a way that a wilderness option is retained
or can be restored by reclamation." n 125] The Forest
Service's confidence in the ability of protective
stipulations to guard against surface resource impacts was
clear:
Controls available in regulations and lease terms are
generally sufficient to avoid environmental problems
and protect wilderness values. [126]
In addition, the Forest Service felt assured that there
remained other decision points where they could control lease
activities and perhaps rectify leasing errors:
While the prelease environmental analysis treats
general issues and concerns (such as preservation of
the wilderness option) that would seriously and
necessarily be affected by lease operations, the
operations stage is the time to address most concerns.
[127]
But, the national environmental organizations monitoring
the development of these guidelines questionned the US Forest
Service's assumptions that lease stipulations would
adequately protect surface resource values and that the USFS
possessed sufficient authority at later decision points to
control activities that proved threatening to wilderness
characteristics. [128] In early September, 1980, USFS Chief
R. Max Peterson distributed a draft of the FPA guidelines for
comment from those participating in the April meeting. [129]
Bruce Hamilton, Sierra Club Northern Great Plains Regional
Representative, immediately responded to the draft
guidelines, expressing concern that the issues raised earlier
by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups had not
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been "adequately addressed." He stressed that:
We remain convinced (1) that the FPA stipulation is
not adequate to preserve the wilderness option; (2)
that highly environmentally sensitive zones in FPAs
that can't be directionally drilled should not be
leased; (3) that leasing prejudices the land
allocation decision; and (4) that the Forest Service
does not have a workable plan for making a timely
unbiased land allocation decision in FPAs that are
leased. [130]
Hamilton questionned the logic behind further leasing of
national forest lands to determine their energy resource
potential, especially when a considerable amount of land was
already leased. [131]
On December 31, 1980, a policy "decision" was made when
USFS Chief R. Max Peterson finalized the Further Planning
Area guidelines. But, the debate about the proper management
of FPAs, especially with respect to oil and gas activities,
was not put to rest. The environmental groups continued to
question both the protection contained in the stipulations
and the ability of the Forest Service to legally enforce
these stipulations. They saw no reason to accept the
guidelines as a "fait accompli." They pursued their concerns
in the Palisades leasing decision, again raising the same
issues.
Policy Implementation:
The Palisades Leasing Decision
When lease applications were filed for the Palisades
Further Planning Area, the Region II Forester decided to
defer any decision until after the area's wilderness
evaluations were completed and its status decided. [132]
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But, deferring the leasing decisions in this manner was not a
costless option. With The Wilderness Act's December 31,
1983, leasing deadline rapidly approaching, inaction on the
outstanding leases could have potentially severe
repercussions for the oil and gas industry. The Mountain
States Legal Foundation (MSLF), a non-profit industry
interest group, sued the Forest Service to force it to make a
decision. [133]
MSLF filed suit in Wyoming District Court arguing that
the USFS inaction on the lease applications constituted:
(1) a withdrawal of the lands from the operation of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, without submitting
such withdrawal to Congress for approval as
required by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act; and,
(2) a rule or regulation of either or both of the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture which was
not promulgated as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. [134]
MSLF claimed that its members as well as the general public
would be "irreparably injured by the delay or prevention of
development of energy resources" in the Palisades FPA. MSLF
charged that the USFS' inaction would have "serious secondary
impacts, such as increased unemployment, possible energy
shortages and an increasing balance of trade deficit,
which...affects the public's individual rights including the
right of economic choice." [135]
USFS and Department of the Interior (DOI) attorneys
defended themselves in court by claiming that, although they
had "proceeded slowly" on these leases, they had not
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specifically withdrawn the lands in question. Rather, they
stressed that the Forest Service had been following other
statutory mandates, specifically that of The Wilderness Act
of 1964. The agency representatives expressed confidence
that by deferring leasing decisions they would be better able
to make the appropriate decision at a later time when more
information about the area's resources was available. They
argued that there were simply too many unknowns at that time
to confidently make a decision. [136]
But, on October 10, 1980, Wyoming District Court Judge
Clarence Brimmer ruled:
We cannot allow the Defendants to accomplish by
inaction what they could not do by formal
administrative order. By our decision herein, we do
not purport to require the Secretary of the Interior
to accept, reject, or even take action on the
outstanding oil and gas leases. We merely hold that
the action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture, in
failing to act on the outstanding lease applications
falls within the definition of withdrawal under 43
U.S.C. Section 1702(j) and the Secretary of Interior
is required to notify Congress of such withdrawal or
institute action on the applications. [137]
With this ruling, the Forest Service was forced to make the
leasing decisions, regardless of the potential impact on the
area's wilderness characteristics.
The MSLF case fueled the dispute over the proper
management of potential wilderness areas but did not resolve
it. It moved the Forest Service "out of the frying pan and
into the fire." It provided the agency with no guidance on
how to decide, given the competing claims of the Sierra Club
and the Mountain States Legal Foundation. But, it forced
them to make a decision.
156
Because the Palisades area was one of the first FPAs
with impending leasing decisions following Judge Brimmer's
ruling, any decision reached in the case would be precedent
setting. Now both national environmental organizations and
the oil and gas industry associations were watching the USFS
response closely. The Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society,
the Wyoming Wilderness Association and the Idaho
Environmental Council closely monitored all USFS activities
affecting the Palisades FPA. They had participated in the
agency's wilderness evaluations from the beginning and had
long advocated wilderness designation for the Palisades.
They had been pleased when RARE I concluded in a wilderness
recommendation for the Palisades; they were outraged when
RARE II resulted in a further planning status because of the
area's oil and gas potential. Their feeling was that the
area's exceptional wilderness qualities stood for themselves;
the area should be designated wilderness regardless of what
energy resources, if any, were located beneath it. [138]
In June, 1981, the Regional Forester recommended to the
BLM that the Palisades leases be issued. On July 7, 1981,
the Sierra Club filed an appeal of the Regional Forester's
decision to recommend oil and gas leasing in the Palisades.
The appeal immediately went before the USFS Chief. In their
50-page "Statement of Reasons in Support of Appeal" the
Sierra Club outlined and defended their (by this time all-
too-familiar) contention that:
Leasing in the Palisades, as permitted by the Regional
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Forester's decision, will not preserve the wilderness
option for the area. The decision commits the lands
to non-wilderness uses, and will result in damage to
the wilderness qualities of the Further Planning Area.
The decision does not meet the criteria for
environmental protection established by the RARE
program. Nor does the decision assure that the Forest
Service will obtain data on oil and gas resources
which RARE II indicates is necessary to carry out land
management planning. [139]
The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service decision did
not satisfy the agency's own objectives in decisionmaking; it
neither contributed to the agency's oil and gas resource
information base with which to make a wilderness-
nonwilderness decision nor preserved the wilderness option.
Consequently, the environmental organization sought to prove
that not only was the decisionmaking process flawed in that
it did not comply with NEPA's provisions, but also that the
decision itself clearly did not satisfy the USFS' own
objectives of resource mapping in FPAs while maintaining
wilderness values. The Sierra Club feared that the Regional
Forester's decision was a "heads they win, tails we lose"
proposition: Regardless of the actual oil and gas potential
of the Palisades, the wilderness option would likely be lost.
[140]
The Regional Forester responded to the Sierra Club's
Statement-of-Reasons point-by-point in supporting his
decision. He viewed the Forest Service decision to be
clearly justified by the Forest Service Manual guidelines.
Further, he emphasized that his decision did not commit the
Palisades to non-wilderness uses, but rather that it allowed
the Forest Service, while protecting wilderness values with
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clear stipulations, to obtain information about oil and gas
resources in the Palisades. The Regional Forester
acknowledged that there were many uncertainties involved in
making these decisions but expressed confidence that later
decision points involving specific development proposals
would provide better information and involve less
uncertainty. [141]
The Sierra Club, in turn, responded point-by-point to
the Regional Forester's response to their original statement,
again disagreeing with the USFS' assertions. They continued
to question whether or not the Forest Service actually
possessed authority at later decision points to control oil
and gas exploration and development activities as the
Regional Forester was asserting. It was an administrative
capability the Forest Service believed it possessed but one
that they had never exercised. The Sierra Club questioned
the Regional Forester's assertion that the leasing decision
was not a major federal action requiring an EIS. They argued
that waiting for an Application for a Permit to Drill (APD)
before doing an EIS was an "incremental" approach to
understanding and dealing with the issues and that "one of
the primary purposes of NEPA was the elimination of just such
bits and pieces decisionmaking. NEPA [required] a review of
a proposal as a whole, before commitments of resources [were]
made to it." [142]
After consideri.ng the arguments made by the Sierra Club
and other affected parties in appeals documents as well as at
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an oral presentation held in Washington, D.C., USFS Chief
Peterson reaffirmed the Regional Forester's decision on
December 31, 1980, and forwarded the Forest Service
recommendation on to the BLM. [143]
The Sierra Club continued to appeal, making the same
arguments, through the BLM decisionmaking hierarchy. Once
again, though, their efforts were in vain. Secretary of the
Interior James Watt personally intercepted the appeal before
it went before the Interior Board of Land Appeals. [144] On
May 28, 1981, after considering the Sierra Club's complaint
and the Forest Service response, Watt decided that the Forest
Service's recommendation was appropriate and issued the
leases.
The debate was not put to rest. While final authority to
make decisions under the mineral leasing laws does rest with
the Secretary of the Interior, his decisions are just as
susceptible to appeal as those of his subordinates. Two days
after Secretary Watt made his decision to issue the Palisades
leases, the Sierra Club filed suit in Washington D.C. U.S.
District Court against R. Max Peterson (USFS Chief), John R.
Block (Secretary of Agriculture), Robert Burford (BLM
Director) and James Watt. Not satisfied that their concerns
had been addressed by the Forest Service and BLM/DOI appeals
processes, and still convinced that their questions deserved
attention, the Sierra Club alleged the failure of the various
USFS, BLM and DOI officials to fulfill their obligations
under the National Environmental Policy Act. [145]
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In the conclusion to their "Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction" Sierra Club attorneys highlighted their long-
expressed and well-known concerns. Once again, the Sierra
Club questionned the assumptions supporting the Forest
Service's decision. Once again, it doubted that the Forest
Service had the administrative capability to significantly
control oil and gas activities once leases were issued. They
saw no link between the RARE II FES objective of obtaining
further information about an area's oil and gas potential and
this Forest Service decision. Finally, they once again
called for a full EIS, hoping that more extensive analysis
would make the consequences of the leasing decision more
apparent to the Forest Service. [146]
With the Sierra Club's lawsuit, the issues were moved to
a new arena, once again to be debated and judged. Now the
decisionmaker, instead of being the USFS Regional Forester or
Chief or the Secretary of the Interior, was a federal
district court judge. The arguments presented by each group
were the same; only the person listening was different.
On March 31, 1982, Washington D.C. U.S. District Court
Judge Aubrey E. Robinson ruled that the USFS did possess the
authority to enforce lease stipulations, even when these
stipulations may make exploration or development impossible:
The lessees may legally obligate themselves to lease
conditions that may result in the inability to explore
or develop; that is knowing risk the lessees wish to
take. [147]
More than six years after having been filed, the
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Palisades leases were issued. The final "decision" in the
case was made by a federal district court judge. Judge
Robinson's ruling gave a little to each party. The Forest
Service was not required to do an EIS because its lease
stipulations could effectively negate any development on the
leaseholds. Should one of the Palisades lessees now file an
APD, the judge's ruling left the door open for environmental
groups to question the actual enforcement of the
stipulations. While the leasing dispute seems resolved, the
underlying issues about exploration in national forest
roadless areas remain.
Where There's
The oil
vulnerable to
the customary
judicial revie
though. While
groups pursue
influence is
case:
A Will There's A Way
and gas decisionmaking process is extremely
delay and attack. The Palisades case followed
administrative appeals process, ending with
Vw. Not all cases are so neat and predictable,
administrative avenues are seldom ignored,
other paths of least resistance where their
greatest. Consider the Little Granite Creek
On Friday, April 2, 1982, the US Minerals Management
Service (MMS) announced its approval of Getty Oil Company's
Little Granite Creek APD. Within days, environmental
organizations announced their intention to appeal the
decision. Phil Hocker of the Sierra Club labeled the
decision "amazing and arrogant" given the strong public
opposition and testimony against the well. [148] A Wyoming
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Wilderness Association spokesman called the decision "a real
mockery of the democratic
administrative appeals fail,
environmental organization with
civil disobedience in order to
Little Granite Creek. Earth
announced that "we're prepar
line...we aren't going to rule
The local Jackson Hole
governor Ed Herschler for help.
yet become involved in the dis
early May, Governor Herschler
well and appealed to Secretary
"either deny the drilling appli
the approval action." [151]
expressed to him by Jackson
outfitters, interest groups,
process." [149] Should the
Earth First!, a radical
nationwide support, promised
prevent Getty from drilling in
First! spokesman Dave Foreman
ed to put our life on the
out anything." [150]
groups appealed to Wyoming
The State of Wyoming had not
pute. In a surprise move in
voiced his opposition to the
of the Interior James Watt to
cation or temporarily suspend
He cited "valid concerns"
Hole residents, sportsmen,
local representatives and
elected officials about "potential negative impacts on
wildlife resources and the area's recreation, hunting and
fishing and tourism industries." [152] He felt that other,
"less sensitive," lands should be explored before areas like
Little Granite Creek. He argued that the federal reviews had
not exhausted all possible alternatives. [153]
In mid-May, the US MMS regional director in Rock
Springs, Wyoming, signed Getty's drilling permit into effect.
A 30-day appeal period followed the signing before Getty
could proceed with its plans. [154] The Sierra Club promised
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to use "all legal means...to protect the Gros Ventre from
Getty's bulldozers." [155] Getty announced that it would
begin constructing the access road in late June, although
they still expected continuing opposition to their plans.
[156]
Less than a month later, four administrative appeals of
the MMS action had been filed. The Sierra Club filed an
appeal with the DOI Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) in
Washington. [157] The Wyoming Wilderness Association filed
two appeals: one with the US MMS in Rock Springs and one
with the USFS Regional Forester in Ogden, Utah. [158] And,
the Jackson Hole Alliance, in concert with the Jackson Hole
Outfitters Association, Jackson Hole League of Women Voters
and 62 prominent Jackson Hole citizens, filed a class-action
appeal with the US MMS Rock Springs office. [159] The
appeals questioned several different aspects of the decision
but all focused on the irreversible environmental
consequences of Getty's proposed 6.5 mile access road into
the wellsite. Other issues in the appeals included the area's
wilderness values, public opinion against the well, the
helicopter access alternative, and various administrative
procedures used in reaching the decision. [160]
Governor Herschler continued his opposition to the well.
He filed an additional administrative appeal, and asked the
Wyoming State Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (OGCC) --
of which he is chairman -- to review the proposal in order to
determine whether state jurisdiction was possible. [161] The
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Commission immediately began holding hearings under
"Commission Rule 236." This rule gives the OGCC responsiblity
for protecting the state's lands and waters from pollution
and environmental degradation due to oil and gas exploration
and development. [162] The purpose of the hearings was to
determine whether the state should prohibit any drilling,
place specific restrictions on development or allow Getty to
proceed unrestricted. Again, the proposed access road
provided cause for concern. The Commission members feared
that erosion from the road would pollute Little Granite Creek
which flows into the Hoback River and, finally, enters the
Snake River, a proposed wild and scenic river. [163] The
Wyoming State Game and Fish Department requested that the
Commission order Getty to use helicopter rather than road
access to prevent this possibility. [164] While state
jurisdiction under Rule 236 came under immediate fire from
Getty's attorneys and federal officials, OGCC Supervisor Don
Basko concluded that the Commission "probably does" have
authority to deny Getty a permit and thus he continued the
hearings. [165]
Opposition to Getty's well was not limited to the
administrative appeals and State OGCC hearings. Getty and a
seismic testing firm in the area incurred more than $56,000
in damage at its construction site where surveying stakes
were uprooted and expensive surveying equipment thrown into
the creek. [166] On July 4, Earth First! held a rally at the
Little Granite Creek trailhead, protesting Getty's proposed
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well. 400 people attended the rally and 100 of those pledged
to blockade Getty's access road should the oil company begin
road construction. Author Edward Abbey (whose book The
Monkey Wrench Gang inspired the founding of Earth First!)
implored the gathering to "oppose, resist and, if necessary,
subvert....Earth first, grizzly bears second, people third
and J. Paul Getty last!" In concluding, Abbey joked with the
audience to "please stop sending me those damned, dirty
survey stakes!" [167]
In late July, Secretary of the Interior James Watt
circumvented the MMS, USFS and IBLA to personally deny all
administrative appeals filed against Getty's permit decision.
[168] The move outraged the appellants. Attention turned to
the ongoing State OGCC hearings and the courts.
Additionally, the Sierra Club and the Wyoming Wilderness
Association began preparing lawsuits. The Jackson Hole
Alliance received, at no cost, the aid of the nationally
prominent Jackson Hole law firm of Spence, Moriarity and
Schuster in developing its lawsuit. [169]
The State OGCC vigorously pursued its hearings. It
arranged with Getty Oil to tour the proposed wellsite and an
additional site that had previously been drilled and
reclaimed to its original condition by Getty. It obtained
testimony from Getty and opponents to the well. It issued
subpoenas to ten federal officials to appear before the
Commission on August 10 to provide depositions. [170] The
federal officials refused to attend. They argued that the
166
permitting decision was a federal issue that had already been
ruled upon by Secretary Watt. [171] When the federal
officials did not appear, the OGCC canceled the hearing and
denied Getty's permit. [172]
The outcome of the Little Granite Creek case is
uncertain. As of this writing, opponents of the well are
waging the battle on two fronts. Three lawsuits have been
filed against Secretary of the Interior James Watt and
several other DOI officials responsible for issuing Getty's
drilling permit. Getty Oil Company is also a defendent in
these suits. The suits have been filed by Governor Ed
Herschler on behalf of the State of Wyoming, the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund for the Sierra Club and The Wilderness
Society and the Jackson Hole Alliance in conjunction with
eight Jackson Hole residents. The contentions in all three
suits are similar and hence the suits have been consolidated.
The causes of action include Forest Service violation of the
Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, federal and state
constitutional rights, violation of the public trust and
conflicting DOI rulings on lessees' rights to drill. The
Alliance is asking $5 million in punitive damage from each
defendent. [173] A September 6, 1983 jury trial date has
been set by Wyoming U.S. District Court Judge Clarence
Brimmer to hear the three, consolidated lawsuits. [174]
Opposition has also shifted to another front. Before
Getty can begin preparing its wellsite it must first build
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the 6.5 mile road into Little Granite Creek. But, before it
can begin constructing the road, Getty must obtain a road
building permit from the Forest Service. Bridger-Teton
National Forest Supervisor Reid Jackson approved the permit
in late 1982. [175] His decision was appealed, though, to
the Regional Forester in Ogden, Utah, who upheld Jackson's
decision. The appeal is now in Deputy USFS Chief Ray
Housley's hands in Washington, D.C. [176] Housley's decision
is imminent, after having been delayed several months by a
Congressionally-imposed moratorium on all oil and gas
activity. [177] Getty officials are confident that the road-
building permit will be approved. At that time they plan to
return to the State of Wyoming for final approvals there.
[178]
Conclusions
The cases discussed in this chapter by no means stand
alone. Numerous others are now beginning or are in process.
An appeal has been filed over recommended leasing within
Vermont's Green Mountain National Forest. [179] Lawsuits are
being drawn up by both industry and environmental groups over
proposed leasing in Wyoming's Washakie Wilderness. The fate
of Montana's Deep Creek Further Planning Area is in the hands
of a federal district court judge. The California
congressional delegation has appealed to President Reagan to
withdraw two California Wilderness Areas from oil and gas
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leasing; the California State Coastal Commission has promised
that it will prevent leasing if President Reagan fails to do
so. [180] In late August, 1982, Secretary of the Interior
James Watt announced that several leases had been issued
without his knowledge in a South Carolina Wilderness Area,
thereby violating his agreement with Congress to withhold all
leasing until November, 1982. [181] Environmental groups
have taken the Department of the Interior and US Forest
Service to court for issuing leases in New Mexico's Capitan
Wilderness Area.
Disputes over oil and gas leasing and permitting
decisions are not generated by capricious Forest Service
officials. The problem is not that the Forest Service
selects the wrong alternatives to study, evaluates them using
the wrong criteria or assigns the wrong values to different
outcomes. The problem is that there are no right answers.
Because these decisions are inherently judgmental, numerous
outcomes are legitimate. Likewise, any decision can be
subject to question and opposition. Because the process is
structured to develop technically defensible decisions when
such decisions do not exist, it ensures that decisions will
be opposed. The stakes are just too great to expect
otherwise.
The next chapter explores some of the factors that
contribute to public land management problems as they exist
today. Chapter 4 describes how the procedural and
substantive requirements of the Forest Service have changed
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since the mineral leasing laws were enacted. Additionally,
it addresses how the political environment of the 1960s and
1970s has changed the nature of public land management and
how the Forest Service has responded to this change.
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CHAPTER 4
WHY THE PARADIGM FAILS
As seen, oil and gas leasing and permitting in practice
differ considerably from their statutory counterparts. In
practice, the process is very political. It is not
sufficiently informative or convincing; it is divisive; and,
moreover, it is not decisive. In short, the process fails in
precisely those areas where, theoretically, it should excell.
Why does the land management paradigm within which
decisionmaking occurs now fail when it succeeded for so long?
Land management decisions are not purely technical.
They cannot be solely subject to scientific review and
analysis. They are inherently judgmental. But, on paper the
process hides the judgmental aspects under a cloak of
technical expertise. It assumes that scientifically trained
land managers will be able to acquire the appropriate
information with which to analyze specific proposals and then
reach outcomes that advance the public's interest. The
inherent value judgments are hidden in technical analysis.
But, like the emperor's new clothes, this technical cloak now
hides little and, in this instance at least, the masses are
not quiet about what they see.
National forest management has always been inherently
judgmental. Regardless, the Forest Service paradigm
prevailed for the first half of this century; these decisions
were long accepted to be scientific in nature and thus best
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left to professionals trained in scientific methods of
management and decisionmaking. The paradigm remained intact
because the Forest Service's professional judgment was widely
accepted and, moreover, trusted. Compared with the
alternative of unbridled industrial exploitation, the public
welcomed professional forestry as a godsend.
Today the judgment exercised by professional foresters
in managing public lands is no longer accepted; their
management processes are no longer trusted. Several factors
contribute to the changing environment of public land
management. First, the Forest Service task is now more
overtly judgmental than it ever has been in the past.
Congress has mandated numerous and competing objectives that
demand choices between legitimate yet conflicting outcomes.
Furthermore, these mandates are not all consistent with the
conservation ideal. Several are based in preservationist
notions about appropriate natural resource management. But,
because the paradigm is premised on use, it is not capable of
accommodating preservation values. Additionally, the
uncertainty involved in oil and gas leasing and exploration
has become more critical to decisionmaking. Second, the
public has lost faith in the Forest Service responsiveness to
its concerns. Increasingly, groups and individuals are
turning to Congress and the courts to obtain decisions that
are deemed more appropriate and more just; decisions that
accommodate their concerns. Finally, the numerous natural
resource statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s have not
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only legitimized their arguments but also distributed power
amongst many user groups with which to oppose decisions
deemed inappropriate. And, because the stakes have
heightened in the last two decades, this power is used to
oppose decisions that fail to accommodate a group's concerns.
Public Land Management in Transition
Today's US Forest Service task differs markedly from
that encountered when the agency was established at the turn
of the century. The agency's paradigm of scientific
management has always been subject to attack by some groups.
After World War II, though, support began eroding at a much
more rapid pace as other visions of appropriate public land
uses took hold and gained influence and power in
decisionmaking. As the cases discussed in Chapter 3
illustrate, the Forest Service now confronts a political
resource allocation task in addition to the traditional
scientific land management task to which it has long adhered.
But, while the problem framed by the public and Congress has
changed, the decisionmaking process applied by the Forest
Service has remained grounded in the same paradigm; one where
professionals are responsible for acquiring and assimilating
information and pronouncing efficient outcomes; and, one
where conservation, not preservation, of resources is the
end. The same paradigm is unable to accommodate both ends.
The scenario described in the last chapter did not exist
prior to World War II. Before that time, the US Forest
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Service served largely as custodian of the national forests,
using professional silvicultural and pest, flood and fire
control practices to maintain the forests. At the time there
was little demand for national forest resources with the
exception of timber and that was still marginal. The agency
concentrated on assisting private forest management and in
fire, pest and disease control in public and private forests.
Part of its responsibility was road-building to promote
firefighting, overseeing the forests and logging when it did
occur. What disputes did arise were the old ones between
preservationists advocating wilderness preservation and the
forestry conservationists advocating resource use. [1] But,
preservationists during this time had little influence in
Forest Service decisionmaking or recourse against decisions
they deemed inappropriate.
The Heart of the Paradigm -- Conservation -- Challenged
While preservationists had supported the early efforts
of Pinchot and the forestry profession to establish and
manage the public forests, they never adopted the
conservation philosophy themselves. At the time, the
conservationist's proposal was simply a more desireable
alternative to the non-management and disposal problems then
plaguing the forests. Moreover, it had more political and
popular support than did the preservationists' proposals.
But, a major difference in values continued to separate the
two groups and create tensions between them. Their
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disagreements were highlighted by the battle over damming the
Hetch Hetchy valley in California's Sierra Nevada Range.
This dispute destroyed the long friendship between John Muir
and Gifford Pinchot. Preservationists continued to try to
influence Pinchot and his successors to consider preserving
some national forests intact for the benefit of future
generations. But, the two philosophies were incompatible and
the preservationists efforts met with little success.
For much of United States history, wilderness was
something to be conquered and subdued. As one historian
described this early view:
The pioneers' situation and attitude prompted them to
use military metaphors to discuss the coming of
civilization. Countless diaries, addresses, and
memorials of the frontier period represented
wilderness as an "enemy" which had to be "conquered,"
"subdued," and "vanquished" by a "pioneer army." The
same phraseology persisted into the present century;
an old Michigan pioneer recalled how as a youth he had
engaged in a "struggle with nature" for the purpose of
"converting a wilderness into a rich and prosperous
civilization." Historians of westward expansion chose
the same figure: "they conquered the wilderness, they
subdued the forests, they reduced the land to fruitful
subjection." 2]
But, once the Forest Service was well-established, a minority
of federal land managers and private individuals and groups
again began advocating the preservation for non-commercial
purposes of several particularly scenic or ecologically
important areas. Arthur Carhart, the Forest Service's first
landscape architect, was assigned the task of planning for
recreation and summer home development in particularly scenic
national forest areas. But, he reported back to his
superiors that:
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the first logical step in any work of this type is to
plan for preservation and protection of all of those
things that are of values great enough to sacrifice a
certain amount of economic return for esthetic
qualities. [3]
This comment, coming in 1919, was one of the first intra-
agency indications that preservation might have definable
values that should not universally be disregarded in favor of
the quantifiable commercial land uses. It also conformed to
Forest Service policies regarding economic efficiency in land
management. But, it was not readily accepted.
Several years later, US Forest Ranger Aldo Leopold
pursued the issues Carhart had raised. Leopold's efforts led
to administrative classification of the first national forest
wilderness area, the Gila Wilderness in the Southwest. [4]
Forest Service Chief William B. Greeley not only approved the
Gila Wilderness designation but also encouraged further
designations in other national forests. He commented that
"the frontier has long ceased to be a barrier to
civilization. The question is rather how much of it should
be kept to preserve our civilization." [5] In 1929 Greeley
established Regulation L-20 under which national forest
"primitive areas" could be designated by the Chief. These
primitive areas were intended to maintain "primitive
conditions of environment, transportation, habitation, and
subsistence, with a view to conserving the value of such
areas for purposes of public education, inspiration and
recreation." However, exceptions to these purposes could be
authorized by either the Chief or the Secretary of
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Agriculture. [6]
But, preservationists were not appeased by this new
Forest Service policy. The Forest Service values in
preservation did not coincide with their own. In his review
and analysis of these early regulations, historian Michael
Frome questionned the true Forest Service intent:
The Forest Service, however, did not anticipate
reserving the primitive areas indefinitely from
commercial use. Many of the remote portions with
outstanding scenic and recreational qualities were
being kept from haphazard road-building and commercial
development until a time when more intensive study was
needed. It is also conceivable that the Forest
Service was trying to keep one step ahead of its
"sister agency," the National Park Service; by
demonstrating active concern for wilderness, it was
better able to block establishment of new parks out of
old forests. [7]
Perceiving a wolf in sheep's clothing, The Wilderness
Society was established in 1934 "to secure the preservation
of wilderness, conduct educational programs concerning the
value of wilderness, encourage scientific studies, and
mobilize cooperation in resisting the invasion of
wilderness." [8] Organization and pressure external to the
Forest Service was needed because national forest wilderness
areas were being threatened more than at any time in the
past. One of the organization's founders was Bob Marshall,
then Director of Forestry for the Department of the
Interior's Office of Indian Affairs. In that capacity he
initiated a series of memos between himself and then
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes about the potential
consequences of New Deal public works programs on undeveloped
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wilderness areas. Marshall's greatest worry was that roads
would soon traverse most undeveloped territory and he
recommended to Ickes that wilderness areas be set aside with
specific standards prohibiting development within their
boundaries. [9]
In 1937, Marshall continued his battles for wilderness
preservation as Forest Service Chief of Recreation and Lands.
His efforts, combined with continuing pressure from
constituencies such as The Wilderness Society, led to Forest
Service "U" regulations in September 1939. These regulations
were stronger than the old L-20 regulations and "established
a procedure for expansion of wilderness and for excluding
developments previously permissible in primitive areas." [10]
But, Forest Service administrative classifications under
these "U" regulations remained few and far between. Many
proposals encountered opposition from USFS officials who
perceived their responsibility to be one of managing the
public lands for multiple-uses, not preservation of a single
use. As a result, the remaining national forest wilderness
areas were gradually being consumed by other uses. In 1926,
Forest Service figures showed the national forest system
containing 74 roadless areas, each having at least 230,400
acres. The largest roadless area at that time was 7 million
acres in size. In total, the 74 areas covered 55 million
acres. But, by 1961, similar reviews indicated that only 19
roadless areas of 230,400 acres or more remained. The
largest at that time had dwindled to 2 million acres. All 19
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areas now totalled only 17 million acres. [11] Wilderness
areas are distinguished by their roadless feature. But,
roads are critical to timber and other commercial development
as well as to fire prevention and control. As these
pressures intensified, wilderness was destroyed as the
national forest road system exploded. Consequently, those
lands set aside as wilderness were most often those having
little or no value for other uses. As one historian of the
long fought battle over wilderness recounted:
The protected wilderness existed more by accident than
design. Most of its commercial resources, composed of
lands by-passed in the rush of settlement and
exploitation from east to west, were too poor to
utilize or too costly to develop. About one-fourth of
all acreage in reserved wilderness was composed of
mountain peaks, desert, sand dunes, lava flows, and
rock slides; about one-third was covered with brush or
with scrubby and other nonproductive forests; another
third was productive timberland, while a small
percentage was meadow, grassland, or water surface.
The timberlands contained 8 million acres of
productive wood sources -- only about 2 per cent of
the nation's total, or a sufficient volume to supply
national needs for two years. [12]
As demands for national forest resources exploded
following World War II, the Forest Service "U" regulations
proved insufficient to protect wilderness areas to the
satisfaction of preservationists. They perceived in the
Forest Service an emerging emphasis on timber production at
the expense of wilderness and other resource values. As a
result, what wilderness had been protected began succumbing
to commercial development pressures. Administratively
designated areas were split by roads and some areas were
logged. Critically, the Forest Service was also raising the
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ire of the general public as well as preservationists as its
clear-cutting practices increased. This increasing clamor
helped bolster the preservationists arguments and open
Congress' door. Michael Frome reviewed the events that led to
diminished confidence in administrative management of
wilderness areas and in the Forest Service in general:
Although citizen groups had long supported the Forest
Service as an agency concerned with scenic resources
and wilderness, they lost their place as a key part of
its constituency. The timber-first policy came to the
fore in response to several factors, one being the
political pressure of the timber industry, which,
having intensively cut its own private lands without
adequate concern for sustained yield, became reliant
on public lands, including the remaining virgin
forests, to keep its mills going. [13]
After World War II, the problem currently posed by
public land management emerged. The resource allocation
dimension of the Forest Service task came to the forefront of
decisions as conflicting demands for the varied national
forest resources increased. Timber demands were increased by
an industry that had both poorly managed the private forests
and needed expanded sources of timber to meet the burgeoning
demands of a post war housing boom. The amount of timber cut
from the national forests increased from approximately 500
million board feet (1-2% of total domestic production) in
1910 to about 2 billion board feet just before World War II
and more than 10 billion board feet by 1965. [14] Recreation
demands exploded from a population with increased leisure
time. There were approximately 5 million recreational visits
to the national forest in 1925 compared to 150 million by
1965. [15] An increasingly urbanized society demanded more
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opportunities for solitude and wilderness retreat. The
nation's economic productivity was increasing and hence so
was the demand for the mineral resources contained in the
public lands. The environmental awakening of the 1960's led
to demands for increased wilderness preservation, wildlife
protection and watershed management. It led to an increased
concern about mankind's responsibility towards and dependence
upon the natural environment. And, in the 1970's, demands
for domestic energy production increased and attention turned
to the previously neglected national forests.
Groups and individuals concerned with the non-commercial
scenic and wilderness resources were not satisfied with the
Forest Service's response to their demands. They believed
that too much emphasis was being placed on timber sales and
road-building to accommodate logging, all at the expense of
particularly scenic and wild areas. With their concerns
unaccommodated by the administrative process, these groups
shifted their attention to Congress.
The Congressional Response to Changing Demands
Initially, Congress responded cautiously. The first
problem raised was the age-old question of wilderness
preservation. Brought before Congress in the mid-1950's, The
Wilderness Act was not enacted until 1964. By then, the
clamor had intensified and, as might have been predicted,
Congress became more responsive. In fact, the environmental
awakening and, moreover, the social activism of the late
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1960's and early 1970's provided Congress with little choice.
As one analyst of the environmental decade commented:
Although Nixon was by no means an enthusiastic
supporter of the environmental movement, his signature
on NEPA was considered indicative of the fact that no
politician could afford to ignore the demands being
made by the movement. [16]
Similarly, Senator Edmund Muskie's adoption of the clean air
cause has been attributed by some political analysts as an
attempt to respond to a no-lose growing public concern, thus
gaining support for his presidential campaign. [17] The
environment was a cause to advance; the decade saw the
passage of several monumental environmental statutes that
have destroyed the original premise upon which the
traditional land management paradigm is based: conservation.
But, the issues placed before Congress were hardly
simple ones to resolve. They were not, as often portrayed,
obvious questions of good (the public interest) against evil
(industry and an unresponsive bureaucracy). Arguments for
more wilderness preservation meant less timber and minerals
development, both critical to a thriving economy. As is the
nature of the legislative process, compromise was necessary.
Because each constituency had its advocates in Congress,
legislation could seldom be enacted before it contained
something for each. The result is a collection of natural
resource statutes that contain obviously conflicting mandates
to public land managers. And, as seen in the cases in Chapter
3, because objectives compete, there is no technically
correct decision; almost any decision reached can be opposed
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on the grounds that it fails to address the objectives of a
particular statute.
Several natural resource and public land management
statutes affect the operation of the mineral leasing laws.
These are outlined below, highlighting those provisions and
requirements that make the Forest Service decision unclear
and give power to land user groups to question administrative
decisions deemed inappropriate. Particular emphasis is
placed on The Wilderness Act of 1964 because, at this time,
Forest Service implementation of this Act's provisions fuel
many disputes involving oil and gas exploration in the
national forests.
The Wilderness Act of 1964
Because the early USFS wilderness classifications were
administrative decisions, they could easily be undone. As a
result, preservationists feared that future administrators
might re-classify land in response to commercial development
pressures. In the eyes of preservationists, the
administrative classification system also suffered from one
other important defect; because it was haphazard, it did not
ensure that important wilderness areas would ever be
preserved. Consequently, preservationists moved their efforts
to the Congressional arena in the 1950's. They hoped to
encourage legislation that would both institutionalize and
systematize the preservation process as well as preserve
designated wilderness areas in perpetuity.
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The Forest Service opposed the Act, arguing that:
This bill would give a degree of Congressional
protection to wilderness use of the national forests
which is not enjoyed by any other use. It would tend
to hamper free and effective application of
administrative judgment which now determines, and
should continue to determine, the use or combination
of uses to which a particular national forest is put.
[18]
The Forest Service was joined by the National Park Service,
the two professional forestry associations -- the Society of
American Foresters and the American Forestry Association --
the forest products industry, the oil and mining industries
and grazing interests in opposing the act. Eighteen hearings
were held on the Wilderness Bill between 1957 when it was
first introduced and 1964 when it finally passed. The bill
was rewritten time and again before it was accepted by all
affected groups. [19] In September 1964, President Johnson
signed The Wilderness Act into law.
The Wilderness Act of 1964 [20] largely accomplished the
preservationists' objectives. In the Act, Congress declared
that:
In order to assure that an increasing population...does
not occupy and modify all areas within the United
States...leaving no lands designated for preservation
and protection in their natural condition, it is hereby
declared to be the policy of Congress to secure for the
American people...an enduring resource of wilderness.
For this purpose it is hereby established a National
Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of
federally owned areas designated by Congress as
"wilderness area." [21]
The Act automatically placed all administratively classified
national forest "wilderness," "wild" and "canoe" areas in the
new wilderness system. It instructed the Secretary of
196
Agriculture or Chief of the US Forest Service to review all
administratively designated "primitive" areas for possible
inclusion in the system. A ten year deadline was imposed for
reporting their findings to the President. The President was
charged with making recommendations to Congress regarding
which "primitive" lands should become "Wilderness." Congress
is the final decisionmaker on all Wilderness designations.
Similar instructions were spelled out for the secretary of
the interior with respect to roadless areas in the national
park system and national wildlife refuges. (In 1976, the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act -- commonly referred
to as the BLM "Organic" Act -- extended wilderness evaluation
and designation mandates to BLM lands.) [22]
Congress provided a very lengthy definition of the term
wilderness in order to guide the two Secretaries, the
President and eventually itself in making wilderness
designation recommendations and decisions:
A wilderness in contrast with those areas where man and
his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recog-
nized as an area where the earth and its community of
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain...wilderness is further
defined to mean...an area of undeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural
conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the
imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2)
has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primi-
tive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at
least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient
size as to make practicable its preservation and use in
an unimpaired condition; and, (4) may also contain
ecological geological, or other features of scientific,
educational, scenic, or historical value. [23]
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The Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture were in-
structed by Congress to manage Wilderness "to preserve its
wilderness character...wilderness areas shall be devoted to
the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific,
educational, conservation and historical use." [24] And the
Act clearly prohibited certain uses: "...there shall be no
commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any
wilderness area...no temporary road, no use of motor
vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of
aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no
structure or installation within any such area." [25] These
prohibitions were not absolute; exceptions were permitted
where necessary to administer the Act's provisions and manage
the wilderness area, as well as in the case of emergencies
which threatened the the health or safety of individuals.
But, while The Wilderness Act created a Wilderness
Preservation System that is much more extensive than its
proponents ever imagined, [26] it also permitted activities
within this system that run counter to the wilderness ideal.
The Wilderness Act was the product of nine years of
Congressional debate, negotiation and compromise. The major
concession made by preservationists -- and the concession
that finally led to the Act's passage -- was section 4(d)3.
This section permits mineral leasing in national forest
wilderness areas until December 31, 1983. This provision is
responsible for considerable conflict today about how and
where oil and gas exploration and development may occur on
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public lands. Section 4(d)3 specifically permits:
use of the land for mineral location and development
and exploration, drilling, and production, and use of
land for transmission lines, waterlines, telephone
lines, or facilities necessary in exploring, drilling,
producing, mining, and processing operations,
including where essential the use of mechanized ground
or air equipment and restoration as near as
practicable of the surface of the land disturbed in
performing prospecting, location, and, in oil and gas
leasing, discovery work, exploration, drilling, and
production, as soon as they have served their purpose.
[27]
The provision permits the Secretary of Agriculture to attach
"reasonable stipulations" to mineral leases, permits and
licenses in Wilderness areas "for the protection of the
wilderness character of the land." [28]
Initially, this provision posed little threat to
Wilderness; today it is creating havoc. Since the Wilderness
Act was passed in 1964, the Forest Service has followed an
unwritten policy of not issuing leases in Wilderness Areas.
Until recently this policy has gone unchallenged. [29] Today
it is under attack because of at least four changes in the
oil and gas exploration and development environment.
First, several major oil and gas discoveries have
attracted industry interest into new territories. Notably,
the discovery of Utah's Pineview Field in 1977 led to major
interest and further discoveries in what is now known as the
Western Overthrust Belt. Similar activity is occurring in
the Eastern United States along the Eastern Overthrust Belt
and in Michigan's Northern Lower Peninsula. As a result,
previously ignored USFS lands now look more promising to
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industry. [30]
Second, oil and gas exploration and development
technology has improved markedly. Industry is now able to
drill deeper to explore previously inaccessible yet promising
formations. Additionally, industry can now drill wells at
more acute angles. Where difficult terrain might have
impeded drilling in the past, the same formation can now be
explored directionally from a more manageable drill site.
Thus, the mountainous terrain above the Overthrust Belt
poses less of an engineering problem than in the past. [31]
Third, because of skyrocketing energy prices, areas
previously thought to be economically marginal or
inaccessible now warrant exploration. As a result, industry
is less likely to be discouraged by the more costly road
construction, more difficult terrain for wellsite
development, increased environmental safeguards and winter
weather obstacles in backcountry wilderness areas. [32]
Finally, political pressures to increase domestic energy
production are heightening. Federal land management agencies
are being discouraged by Congress from holding back lands
from leasing and exploration. [33]
Regardless of Section 4(d)3's legislative legitimacy,
preservationists still oppose energy or mineral development
in Wilderness Areas except if justified by national
emergency. They argue that the protective phrases of the Act
are too weak. [34] (Some wilderness areas contain leases
issued before their designation as Wilderness. Consequently,
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these leases have no protective stipulations attached to
them. The government lacks power to attach stipulations
after the fact without agreement of the lessee. Otherwise,
such an act would constitute a breach of contract on the part
of the government. Lessees, though, lack incentives to agree
to such conditions.) Preservationists also question the
rationale behind the phrase "restoration as near as
practicable" of mined or drilled lands. They argue that if
the land cannot be restored to its wilderness state then it
should not be intruded upon at all. [35] Finally,
preservationists note that the December 31, 1983 deadline
still permits exploration and production after that date.
Leases issued on December 31, 1983 are valid for ten years.
During that period, the lessee has a legal right to develop
the oil and gas resources, even though the leasehold is
located in a Wilderness. Hypothetically, lessees could hold
their leases for 9 1/2 years before submitting an application
for a permit to drill. If the permit is granted, the clock
is stopped until exploration and production, if warranted,
are completed. Consequently, oil and gas production in
Wilderness areas could easily extend well beyond the year
2000, long after the Act's December 31, 1983 deadline for
issuing new leases. [36] December 31, 1983 will hardly mark
the end to this debate.
Once wilderness preservation became law, the Forest
Service was forced to deal with these lands on Congress'
terms. But, Congress' message was still vague and left much
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to the Forest Service's discretion. The Wilderness Act,
couched in laudable but broad terms, left much undefined.
The two decades following its passage have been filled with
debate over whether or not specific areas fall under the
broad provisions of the act. Debate has raged over when an
area "generally appears" to be in its natural state with the
work of man "substantially unnoticeable." These
determinations are highly subjective; what is "substantially
unnoticeable" to one evaluator can be a glaring defect to
another. Debate has also centered on when an area contains
"features of scientific, educational, scenic or historical
value." [37] Again, making this determination requires
judgment about the relative values of an area; when do
commercial values outweigh scenic values? The Forest Service
view has differed from that of preservationists:
...the agency committed itself to impeccable
compliance with the letter of the law and fulfilled it
thoroughly insofar as the primitive areas and
wilderness areas are concerned. Its attitude toward
potential additional areas, or even to consideration
of any, is quite another story, one of consistent
resistance to proposals of new wilderness, endless
confrontations with citizen groups in virtually all
parts of the country, often ending with officially
sanctioned intrusion and commercial exploitation of
the contested regions so as to render the wilderness
"invalid." [38]
Disagreement over the Act's intent led to two massive
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I and RARE II)
programs by the USFS in which all national forest roadless
areas, not just the administratively classified "primitive
areas," were evaluated for possible inclusion in the
Wilderness system. [39] Because of a recent California
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District Court ruling that the Forest Service RARE II EIS is
inadequate, the Forest Service announced in February 1983 its
plans to scrap RARE II and commence a new, RARE III process.
[40]
While questions of wilderness designation and management
have dominated many oil and gas leasing disputes, other
statutes have an important role in Forest Service
decisionmaking. Combined, these acts increase Forest Service
discretion at the same time as increasing the influence over
decisionmaking of different public land user groups.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
The great rivers of this country represent vestiges of
a frontier America where waterways were the highways
to exploration and development. Today, these wondrous
resources have fallen victim to excessive
industrialization, abusive land use, and an overall
move to commercialize the recreational value of free-
flowing rivers....[they] are now in danger of
extinction. [41]
There are few remaining river systems in the United
States that are unencumbered from their headwaters to their
mouth. Responding to the unbridled development, particularly
for power generation, of the nation's few remaining free-
flowing rivers, Congress enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act in October 1968. [42] The battles leading to its
enactment were not as lengthy as those for the Wilderness Act
but they were fought by the same groups over the same
ideological issues. Like The Wilderness Act, the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act established a "Wild and Scenic Rivers
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System." Unlike the National Wilderness Preservation System,
though, there were three different components of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers System -- wild, scenic and recreational rivers
-- each receiving different levels of protection. Once
again, Congress expressed its laudable yet broad policy
objectives to be implemented by federal public land
management agencies:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States that certain selected rivers of the Nation
which, with their immediate environments, possess
outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or
other similar values, shall be preserved in free-
flowing condition, and that they and their immediate
environments shall be protected for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. [43]
In enacting this legislation, Congress was especially
concerned about rivers where "there is the greatest
likelihood of developments which, if undertaken, would render
the rivers unsuitable for inclusion in the national wild and
scenic rivers system." [44] Thus, the Act required the
designated federal agencies to make decisions in areas where
conflict between different resource demands was most intense.
In administering the Act, Congress mandated that all
federal agencies give "primary emphasis" to protecting the
"esthetic, scenic, historic, archaeologic, and scientific
features" of these rivers. [45] A protected river is to be
administered in such manner as to protect and enhance the
values that caused it to be included in said system." [46]
Congress defined Wild Rivers as:
Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of
impoundments and generally inaccessible except by
204
trail, with watersheds or shorelines essentially
primitive and waters unpolluted. These represent the
vestiges of primitive America. [47]
Scenic Rivers were defined as:
Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of
impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still
largely primitive and shorelines largely undeveloped,
but accessible in places by roads. [48]
Finally, Recreational Rivers were defined as:
Those rivers or sections of rivers that are readily
accessible by road or railroad, that may have some
development along their shorelines, and that may have
undergone some impoundment or diversion in the past.
[49]
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act withdraws one-quarter of
a mile of land on either side of a wild river from the
mineral leasing laws. [50] Scenic and recreational rivers
remain under the provisions of the mineral leasing laws but
subject to conditions imposed by the Secretaries of Interior
and Agriculture to safeguard the areas. Potential Wild
Rivers can still be leased but only with sufficient
safeguards to protect them should they eventually become part
of the System. [51] Because those areas where non-commercial
resource values conflict with oil and gas activities are the
few remaining wild areas on national forest lands, it follows
that these same lands, having not yet been exposed to
commercial development activities, will have relatively pure
rivers running through them. (The Snake River is a proposed
Wild River that caused environmental concern over leasing in
Wyoming's Palisades area and drilling in Little Granite
Creek.) Consequently, proposals to explore for oil and gas
in these areas inevitably are opposed by groups and
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individuals advocating a wild river's designation and
protection. Once again, the federal public land managers are
caught in the middle, forced to make decisions when the
objectives they are to satisfy clearly conflict. Once again,
broad standards such as "outstandingly remarkable" values are
subject to debate between those favoring and those opposing a
river's designation.
The Endangered Species Act
In 1973, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act.
[52] The provisions of this act have a role that surpasses
that of The Wilderness Act or the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
in oil and gas decisionmaking for public lands. The Act
provides for two categories of species: endangered and
threatened. Section 7 of the Act requires federal agencies
to take actions necessary to protect endangered or threatened
species habitat. Thus, the US Forest Service must evaluate
the effects of its oil and gas leasing or exploration
decisions on endangered or threatened species in what is
called a "biological review." Should their assessment
conclude that critical habitat may be modified or destroyed,
the agencies are required to consult with the US Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS). When consultation is required, the US
Fish and Wildlife Service's regional director completes a
"threshold examination" to determine what effect, if any, the
proposed activity will have on a listed species or its
critical habitat. No further consultation between the USFS
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and FWS is required if this examination indicates little or
no threat to the species. Should the proposed activity
jeopardize a species, however, the FWS renders a "biological
opinion" developed from information provided by the US Forest
Service. This opinion includes recommended modifications to
the proposed activity to protect the species. While the USFS
is not bound to comply with the findings and recommendations
in this opinion, failure to do so can lead to court action by
either the Fish and Wildlife Service or a private group or
individual. [53] Section 11(g) provides for citizen lawsuits
when an agency is not perceived to be fulfilling its
responsibilities.
Current case law has interpretted Section 7 of the Act
to imply "an explicit Congressional decision to afford first
priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species." [54] Hence, endangered species protection is to be
paramount in land management decisionmaking, even with
regards to the mineral leasing laws. Moreover, in one recent
case the judge ruled that "any contract which [the Secretary]
enters into (e.g., a lease) which requires a future action on
his part (e.g., approval of plans) will contain as an implied
term a condition that the Secretary will behave lawfully
(e.g., not violate the Endangered Species Act)." (emphasis
added) [55] In other words, under the Endangered Species Act
an Application for a Permit to Drill can conceivably be
denied even though a lessee holds the rights to an area's oil
and gas resources.
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As oil and gas industry interest has spread to the more
primitive and wild public lands, the role of the Endangered
Species Act in leasing and exploration decisions has become
more frequent. Exploration proposals in Montana's Bob
Marshall Wilderness have been opposed because they threaten
one of few remaining habitats of the endangered Grizzly Bear,
[56] Leasing proposals in a Wyoming wilderness study area
potentially threaten the endangered or threatened Grizzly
Bear, Bald Eagle and Peregrine Falcon. [57] Leasing
proposals in a California national forest threaten the only
remaining California Condor nesting area. [58]
The Federal Clean Air and Water Acts
Additionally, certain provisions of the Clean Air Act
[59] and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (as amended
by the Clean Water Act) 60] affect Forest Service oil and
gas leasing and exploration decisions. Many proposed areas
subject to mineral leasing disputes are in those undeveloped,
pristine backcountry areas that have been assigned "Class I"
status under both acts. This status means that existing air
and water quality levels cannot be "significantly"
deteriorated or degraded. [61]
Multiple-Usee Mandates and Procedural Requirements
In addition to considering the preservation mandates of
each of the previously described statutes, the Forest Service
must also fulfill the broader mandates of the Multiple-Use
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Sustained-Yield Act of 1960. [62] And, to ensure that
environmental concerns are considered in decisionmaking,
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969
[63] and National Forest Management Act in 1976. (64] Both
acts impose procedural requirements as a way of encouraging
an understanding of and planning for the long-term
consequences of particular decisions.
In the 1960 Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, Congress
established its policy that the national forests "shall be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." [65] The Act was
passed in the midst of debate over the Wilderness Act, still
four years shy of enactment. Regardless, Congress specified
that wilderness was consistent with its intent in the
Multiple-Use Act. Congress instructed the Forest Service to
manage "all the various renewable surface resources of the
national forests so that they are utilized in the combination
that will best meet the needs of the American people." [66]
It further required that this management be "harmonious and
coordinated...without impairment of the productivity of the
land, with consideration being given to the relative values
of the various resources, and not necessarily the combination
of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the
greatest unit output." [67] Similarly, in the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Congress declared it to be
the policy of the United States that:
the public lands be managed in a manner that will
protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical,
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ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water
resource, and archaeological values; that, where
appropriate, will preserve and protect public lands in
their natural condition; that will provide food and
habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals, and
that will provide for outdoor recreation and human
occupancy and use; and,
the public lands be managed in a manner which
recognizes the Nation's need for domestic sources of
minerals, food, timber and fiber from the public lands.
[68]
Additionally, in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
Congress again required harmonious decisionmaking:
in administering public land statutes and exercising
discretionary authority granted by them, the Secretary
[is] required to establish comprehensive rules and
regulations after considering the views of the general
public; and to structure adjudication procedures to
assure adequate third party participation, objective
administrative review of initial decisions, and
expeditious decisionmaking. [69]
Rather than bounding the decisions to be made, these
mandates only increased the number of objectives to be
satisfied by land managers with no direction given as to how
the inevitable conflict between objectives should be
resolved; how can these decisions be made "harmonious" when
what is at stake is so great and when decisions clearly
benefit some at the expense of others? How would the
conflict generated between different groups competing for use
of the same lands be resolved so that decisions will be
harmonious? Congress apparently thought that the answers to
these questions would come from involving the public in
decisions and from rationalizing the decisionmaking process.
To ensure that land managers consider the consequences
of their decisions on all facets of natural resource use, the
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Forest Service must comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires that federal agencies
complete environmental impact statements for any decisions
that "significantly affect the quality of the human
environment." [70] These statements must include
descriptions of the unavoidable adverse impacts of the
decision, alternatives to the decision, the short-term versus
long-term consequences for productivity, and "any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources"
resulting from the decision. [71] But, like the substantive
objectives of the natural resource management statutes,
completing these statements is also a subjective process.
Who defines what a "reasonable alternative" is? When is an
impact adverse and when is it actually a benefit? Lawrence
Bacow has discussed the inherent difficulties in fulfilling
NEPA's requirements: Which alternatives should be selected
from the potentially endless list? How should public
officials assess impacts when subjective judgments about risk
and acceptability must be made? How and when should public
input be obtained when problems are frequently too complex
for public understanding? Finally, how might environmental
and other interests be "balanced" when all are legitimate?
Bacow argues that the premise NEPA is based on -- "that the
'right' information is out there waiting to be gathered and,
once collected, it will help us find the 'right' solution" --
is invalid. He concludes that: "The fallacy in this argument
is that the source of conflict is over facts when it is
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usually a difference in beliefs or values." [72] Most of
these decisions require value judgments about what is at
stake and what is to be gained. Once again, technical
expertise provides limited direction in making such
decisions.
In addition, in the Forest and Range Renewable Resource
Planning Act of 1974 (as amended by the National Forest
Management Act of 1976) [73] Congress required that
comprehensive land-use plans be developed and periodically
revised for the National Forest System. Moreover, these
plans must be "considered with the land and resource
management planning processes of state and local and other
federal agencies." [74] In fulfilling this mandate, Congress
called for a "systematic interdisciplinary approach to
achieve the integrated consideration of physical, biological,
economic and other sciences." [75] Consequently, the USFS
must now coordinate oil and gas exploration and development
decisions with National Forest plans to help guide
decisionmaking even though plans themselves involve value
judgments about appropriate uses.
When Senator Hubert H. Humphrey introduced the National
Forest Management Act to the Senate floor he emphasized that
"this bill is designed to get the practice of forestry out of
the courts and back to the forests." [76] But, this
comprehensive planning effort and coordination with routine
administrative decisions has not made the land managers task
any easier; choices still must be made between different
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objectives. Furthermore, it only increased the number of
occasions when Forest Service officials must make value
judgments and, thereby, the number of occasions these
judgments can be called into question.
Mineral Leasing Reconfirmed
Just as the environmental activism of the 1960's and
early 1970's produced many environmental protection laws, an
energy crisis and a faltering economy in the late 1970's and
early 1980's created statutes and a political climate
favoring precisely the reverse. As might be predicted,
Congress responded to these new problems in like manner.
Confronting an industry backlash at its earlier environmental
excesses, Congress passed new legislation reinforcing the
importance of mineral and fuels production from public lands.
Two acts were passed in 1980, both hedging previous
environmental mandates without actually rescinding them.
In the National Materials and Minerals Policy Research
and Development Act of 1980, [77] Congress reinforced the
policies established in the mineral leasing laws. It
instructed the president to "encourage Federal agencies to
facilitate availability and development of domestic resources
to meet critical materials needs." [78] But, like past
mandates, this development was not to be encouraged at the
expense of all other resource values. Congress made it clear
that "appropriate attention" was to be given "to a long-term
balance between resource production, energy use, a healthy
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environment, natural resource conservation, and social
needs." [79] Congress was more direct in the Energy Security
Act of 1980. [80] It specifically instructed the Forest
Service to promptly process all oil and gas lease and permit
applications forwarded to it by the BLM or USGS. The agency
could no longer defer these decisions pending completion of
its long-term planning processes mandated by the National
Forest Management Act of 1976:
It is the intent of Congress that the Secretary of
Agriculture shall process applications for leases on
National Forest System lands and for permits to
explore, drill and develop resources on lands leased
for the Forest Service, notwithstanding the current
status of any plan being prepared... [81]
In these Acts Congress once again reinforced the extent to
which natural resource objectives compete and once again
shifted the tough decisions to the land management agencies.
As seen in the cases discussed in Chapter 3, the land
management paradigm that directed decisionmaking in earlier
times, fails when these more recent objectives must be
accommodated. The clash of the conservation and preservation
philosophies and the inability of the paradigm to reconcile
them is well-illustrated by the Bob Marshall dispute
discussed below.
Making Decisions When Objectives Conflict: The Bob Marshall
Case
The Bob Marshall ecosystem straddles 150 miles of the
continental divide in Montana. At its heart is the 1-million
acre Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, officially designated
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Wilderness in 1964 when the Wilderness Act was enacted. To
its north lies the 286,700 acre Great Bear Wilderness
(designated in 1978) and to its south is the 240,000 acre
Lincoln-Scapegoat Wilderness (designated in 1972). [82] The
Bob Marshall Wilderness has been described by
preservationists as "the quintessence of wilderness." [83]
Environmental groups following the wilderness designation
process believe it to be the crown jewel of the National
Wilderness Preservation System. [84]
In early 1979, Consolidated Georex Geophysics (CGG), a
Denver, Colorado, geophysical exploration firm, applied to
the USFS Northern Region for a prospecting permit to conduct
seismic testing in the Bob Marshall, Great Bear and Lincoln-
Scapegoat Wilderness Areas and on national forest lands
adjacent to these wilderness areas. CGG's plans included
detonation of 270,000 pounds of explosives along a 207 mile
seismic line. All access along the line would be by
helicopter and the testing was planned to last approximately
100 days. [85] At the same time as CGG's application was
filed, oil and gas lease applications for the three
wilderness areas began pouring into the district forester's
office, eventually numbering 700 by 1982. [86]
Announcement of the proposed seismic testing generated
immediate outrage from both local and national environmental
organizations. The Bob Marshall Alliance, a coalition of
local individuals and regional and national environmental
organizations, was established to oppose any oil and gas
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exploration or development intrusion into the wilderness
areas. [87] They referred to the proposed seismic testing as
"bombing the Bob" and exclaimed that it would be "like
slashing the face of the Mona Lisa." [88]
The proposed seismic study area sat atop the Western
Overthrust Belt and thus could prove to be a major source of
oil and gas. But, it was also a pristine wilderness area,
harboring one of the last remaining endangered Grizzly Bear
habitats. Facing this dilemma, Regional Forester Charles
Coston chose to make a decision based on a technicality. In
so doing, he did not have to decide which objective (resource
preservation or domestic energy production) should prevail in
the area. While CGG did not possess any leases in the
Wilderness areas, it intended to sell the information
obtained from seismic testing to several oil and gas
companies interested in obtaining leases there. [89] Because
CGG did not possess the leases, Coston ruled in April 1980:
It is my policy not to consider any proposal for
mineral activities within a national forest wilderness
unless the proposal is being specifically applied for
under the United States mining laws or law pertaining
to mineral leasing. [90]
Coston cited conflicts among "competing interests of multiple
resources" in making his decision. [91] He justified the
decision, commenting that "it seems only prudent when
discretion rests with the agency, that the conflict should be
avoided." [92]
But, Coston's decision hardly "avoided" conflict. While
environmentalists were jubilant, praising Coston's action,
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[93] CGG appealed the Regional Forester's decision to USFS
Chief Max Peterson. CGG was supported in its appeal by the
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), an industry interest
group, and the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association
(RMOGA). [94] The Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society and
the Bob Marshall Alliance immediately submitted their own
briefs to USFS Chief Peterson supporting Coston's decision.
One year later, in April 1981, USFS Chief Peterson sent
CGG's application back to Regional Forester Coston for
reconsideration. He cited the USFS responsibility under the
Energy and Minerals Security Act, as well as the Wilderness
Act, to not interfere with the operation of the mineral
leasing laws. He ruled that Coston's decision to deny CGG's
application because it lacked leases to the area was
inappropriate. Peterson told Coston that "the citizens of
the United States have an interest in assessing all values
lying in those wildernesses." [95]
Now Coston was forced to make a decision on the merits
of CGG's proposal. In late May, 1981, the regional forester
again denied CGG's permit, this time ruling that "seismic
operations conflict with significant wildlife, geologic,
scenic and recreation values." [96] Again, environmentalists
were jubilant. Again, CGG, MSLF and RMOGA began preparing
administrative appeals of the Regional Forester's decision as
well as lawsuits against the agency. [97] And, once again,
the Regional Forester's decision hardly put the issue to
rest. While CGG, MSLF and RMOGA prepared new administrative
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appeals and laid plans for a lawsuit against the USFS,
environmentalists pressured Congress to take action to
protect the Bob Marshall Wilderness. [98]
CGG's proposal placed Regional Forester Coston in a
corner. His position gave him responsibility for preserving
wilderness values as well as fulfilling the provisions of the
mineral leasing laws. In this case, however, it appeared
impossible to accomplish both. Regardless, Coston had to make
a decision. Whichever objective he fulfilled, he was doomed
to encounter opposition. No decision was obviously correct;
any decision could be supported as well as opposed on the
basis of federal natural resource and land management laws.
Coston's training as a professional forester did not help him
find a path out of this corner. He had to exercise his
judgment as to which resource values should prevail. CGG,
MSLF and RMOGA assessed this situation differently and took
Coston to court.
Why the Congressional Inconsistencies?
As seen, Congress has delegated broad responsibilities
and considerable decisionmaking discretion to professional
land managers. This legislation implicitly assumes that the
technical expertise of the land managers gives them the
ability to establish the "relative values of the various
resources" and thus equips them to reach decisions that "best
meet the needs of the American people." In so doing,
Congress reconfirmed the paradigm established consistent with
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the conservation ideal while in the same voice undermining
the ideal itself.
"Relative values" differ for different groups and
individuals. Technical expertise does not lead to a
decision; value judgments do. As a result, in making oil and
gas leasing and permitting decisions, the USFS must choose
which objective to satisfy. A Forest Service decision
supporting mineral exploration or development, for example,
might completely undermine an endangered species protection
or wilderness preservation objective. In like manner, a
decision to prohibit oil and gas activity in a specific area
runs contrary to expressed legislative and executive
objectives to promote domestic energy production. The
professional judgment exercised by the Forest Service in
making such choices can easily be questionned by groups who
value the resources at stake differently and who thereby
legitimately reach different conclusions.
While many blame Congress for the current stalemate in
land management, Congress in reality had little choice but to
act as it did. As a representative body, it is attuned to
the demands of many different constituent groups. The
difficult social choice problems placed on its lap in the
1960s and 1970s could only be resolved through compromises
that tried to accommodate all concerns. In so doing, Congress
was able to garner support, rather than opposition, for its
decisions. Congressmen last but short terms if they ignore
their constituencies and support unfavorable legislation.
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But, as seen, Congress' responsiveness only compounded the
difficulty of the land managers task. By legitimizing almost
every conceivable public land use without clear guidelines
for then choosing which use takes priority in a particular
case, the tough land use allocation decisions were tossed
back to the Forest Service like a hot potato.
The symbolic dimension of these Congressional mandates
cannot be ignored. [99] There is little cost to most
legislators in supporting wilderness designation, pollution
control, endangered species preservation, and watershed
protection. And, in fact, when much of society has become
disillusioned with the results of a technological era and its
ecological travesties, there is much to be gained by such
statements. Furthermore, there are few political costs to
making broad, seemingly reasonable demands for comprehensive
planning of forest resources. And, when the economy begins
faltering and the nation seems to be suffering at the hands
of OPEC, it would be more costly to ignore the situation than
to establish policies promoting domestic energy production
and thereby independence from foreign forces.
But, symbolic gestures by Congress are not the only
reason these natural resource objectives are vague and often
conflicting. There are real constraints on Congressional
action on specific issues, especially as complex as those
involving the public lands. [100] It would be infeasible to
expect Congress to specifically decide which wilderness or
river is preserved, which timber sale is offered or which
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endangered species is protected. The time, resources and
information needed to make these decisions would only burden
an already-overloaded Congressional agenda. Hence, our
system of government is structured with Congress setting
policy and the bureaucracy then implementing that policy.
Additionally, there are real political costs to making
these decisions Congressionally, even should Congress have
the time and resources. Because implementation occurs at the
administrative, not legislative, level, Congress does not
have to make site-specific decisions in which the bottom-line
costs and benefits of achieving its broad policy objectives
are exposed for all to see. Instead, this latter side of the
equation is passed on to the administrative agencies and it
is there that the tough decisions must be made. But, the
consequence is that Congress' broad policies have not
resolved the disputes between competing groups; they merely
shifted them back to the administrative arena where they
originated.
Because of these Congressional mandates, the Forest
Service finds itself confronting many competing policy
objectives. And, in each site-specific case, it must make
the political resource allocation decisions that Congress was
either unable or unwilling to make. Administrative
implementation of Congressional mandates is inherently
problematic. [101] Bureaucratic inaction or purposeful
misinterpretation of Congressional mandates frequently
undermines policies. Such inaction is seldom a problem in
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natural resource decisionmaking, though, for those groups
that fought for the legislation in the first place now fight
to ensure that it is implemented as they intended. These
groups behave like Eugene Bardach's "fixer." [102] But,
unlike Bardach's "fixer" -- the legislator responsible for
guiding a particular policy through the legislature -- these
public land policy "fixers" are external to the process.
Their voices and frequent lawsuits do not allow an
administrative agency to overlook or ignore those statutory
provisions that advance their concerns. As Steven Yaffee
discovered in his analysis of the implementation of the
federal Endangered Species Act:
Constituent support is one of the most effective
initiators of external pressures to force the
bureaucracy into action.
These groups...petition; they provide data; they
educate; they lobby; they threaten legal action.
Their actions account for many of the [endangered
species] listings that were finally made. [103]
Because the broad national resource mandates have legitimized
their claims, it has given public land "fixers" power with
which to question administrative decisions in the courts.
This distribution of power, combined with the willingness of
the courts to hear these cases, has dramatically changed the
environment within which current land management decisions
are made. But, just as in the administrative arena, the
courts have had difficulty responding to the competing claims
of equally legitimate parties.
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The Limits and Consequences of Judicial Review
In 1977, the Forest Service mistakenly issued leases for
a wilderness area within the White River National Forest. As
a result, no protective stipulations were attached to the
leases. When the error was discovered, Forest Service
officials had several options, none of which were attractive.
The Regional Forester decided not to do anything to rectify
the error, reasoning that the agency would be sued regardless
of what it did:
The possibilities as we saw them: we may be sued for
the error of agreeing to lease without special
wilderness character protection stipulations; we may
be sued for permitting operations on the lease without
a full EIS; we may be sued for agreeing to lease even
with protective stipulations; or we may be sued for
not honoring a contractual obligation of the United
States. I chose to honor the contract. [104]
Increasingly, the Forest Service is finding itself defending
its decisions in court. During and before the 1960's, the
Forest Service never had more than one, possibly two, court
cases questionning administrative decisions pending at a
single time. Today a forestry attorney in the Department of
Agriculture's Office of the General Counsel puts that figure
between one and two dozen. [105] This outcome of
decisionmaking occurs so frequently that agency officials are
resigned to its inevitablity. Because of the broad
legislative mandates under which the agency operates, almost
every decision made is susceptible to judicial review by an
adversely affected individual or group.
On the one hand, while there has been a decreasing
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confidence in the Forest Service and, indeed, administrative
agencies in general, on the other hand there has been an
increased reliance on the courts to review contested
administrative decisions. As U.S. Circuit Court Judge Harold
Leventhal commented, the courts have come to share "the
public sense of urgency reflected in the new [environmental]
laws." [106] More generally, in his review of the growing
role and consequences of courts in social policymaking,
Donald Horowitz observed:
...American courts have been more open to new
challenges, more willing to take on new tasks. This
has encouraged others to push problems their way -- so
much so that no courts anywhere have greater
responsibility for making public policy than the
courts of the United States. [107]
Hence it is not surprising to see the success with which
public land users have taken their cases to the courts in
hopes of redressing administrative wrongs. What better place
to take one's problems that to a "judge" who, by definition,
will address the fairness issues allegedly ignored by the
administrative branch. As Horowitz observed:
There is an undeniable attractiveness to the judicial
method. In its pristine form, the adversary process
puts all the arguments before the decisionmaker in a
setting in which he must act. The judge must decide
the case and justify his decision by reference to
evidence and reasoning. In the other branches, it is
relatively easy to stop a decision from being made --
they often effectively say no by saying nothing. In
the judicial process, questions get answers. It is
difficult to prevent a judicial decision. No other
public or private institution is bound to be so
responsive. [108]
But, while such reasoning places the judiciary on a pedestal
of responsiveness, it presents but a fraction of a much
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larger picture. Horowitz goes on to note that:
The fact that there are fewer participants in the
adjudicative process than in the legislative process
makes it easier for judges than for legislators to cut
through the problem to a resolution. But it is
precisely this ability to simplify the issues and to
exclude interested participants that may put the
judges in danger of fostering reductionist solutions.
[109]
Because judges are generalists and because issues are
necessarily simplified, the courts are not always the most
appropriate forum for resolving some social policy disputes.
In analyzing several court cases involving social
policy, Horowitz found that judicial review was inadequate
along several dimensions. First, adjudication is focussed.
It is centered on the rights or duties of different parties
and hence ignores discussion of alternative actions wherein
resolution of the underlying disputes might be achieved.
Second, it is piecemeal. It deals only with the case before
it. Third, it only takes action when cases are brought before
it. In this sense, it is a passive body; it does not
initiate action when needed. Fourth, adjudication focuses on
historical fact or "events that have transpired between the
parties to a lawsuit," not social fact. But, social facts
are those most often relevant to policymaking. Finally,
adjudication provides no room for planning. By nature,
"judges base their decisions on antecedent facts, on behavior
that antedates the litigation." But, in social policy, it is
critical to plan for the future given the knowledge garnered
from past experience. As a result, the courts address the
procedural, adjudicative issues but the larger substantive,
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policy issues are frequently sidestepped.
In the case of public land management, the courts are
encountering much the same problem as Congress -- how to
choose between legitimate yet competing claims to public land
resources. Just as there is no obviously correct decision to
the land manager, so too there is no obviously "fair"
decision to the judge. It is a question of "right vs.
right." Judges, like administrators, are also faced with
Congress' obviously conflicting mandates when ruling on a
case. Because legislated objectives clearly conflict, some
analysts argue that no Congressional intent actually exists:
...the new areas of [judicial] activity respond to...
new legislation so broad, so vague, so indeterminate,
as to pass the problem to the courts. They then have
to deal with the inevitable litigation to determine
the "intent of Congress," which, in such statutes, is
of course nonexistent. [110]
With such flexibility in determining Congressional intent, it
is only to be expected that many different perspectives have
been offered.
When the Izaak Walton League sued the Forest Service to
prevent mining in northern Minnesota's Boundary Waters Canoe
Area (BWCA), Minnesota's U.S. District Court Judge Philip
Neville decided to issue a permanent injunction against
future mining and mineral exploration there. The BWCA, a
part of the Superior National Forest, was designated as
Wilderness when the Wilderness Act was passed in 1964. Judge
Neville interpretted Congress' intent in this manner:
To create wilderness and in the same breath to allow
for its destruction could not have been the real
226
Congressional intent, and a court should not construe
or presume an act of Congress to be meaningless if an
alternative analysis is possible. [111]
He concluded that:
It is clear that wilderness and mining are
incompatible...If the premise is accepted that mining
activities and wilderness are opposing values and are
anathema each to the other, then it would seem that in
enacting the Wilderness Act, Congress engaged in an
exercise of futility if the court is to adopt the view
that mineral rights prevail over wilderness
objectives. Mineral development by its very
definition cannot take place in a wilderness area....
[112]
But, encountering a similar question of whether or not
the Forest Service should defer leasing decisions until
wilderness designation decisions were made, Wyoming District
Court Judge Clarence Brimmer issued a ruling directly
conflicting with Judge Neville's. In Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Andrus Brimmer ruled that decisions on the
leases could not be deferred:
It would surely be inconsistent with the intent to
keep lands designated as wilderness areas open until
December 31, 1983, that lands merely under
administrative study for a proposed wilderness area
may be effectively withdrawn from the leasing without
the consent of Congress. [113]
Brimmer commented that it is the Secretary of the Interior's
obligation "to provide some incentive for, and to promote the
development of oil and gas deposits in all publicly-owned
lands of the United States through private enterprise." [114]
In so doing, he interpretted Congressional intent in The
Wilderness Act's Section 4(d)2 in precisely the opposite
manner as Judge Neville.
In contrast, in a case involving a timber sale on
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national forest lands adjacent to a proposed wilderness area
but itself possessing wilderness characteristics, a Colorado
district court judge ruled that no commercial development
that might harm the area's wilderness attributes could be
allowed until after final wilderness decisions had been made
by Congress. He ruled that the Forest Service must "refrain
from acts...which will irrevocably change [the area's]
character until the President and Congress have...rendered a
decision." [115] The result of cases such as these has been
the development of a case law that is internally inconsistent
and that only shifts the dispute back to the administrative
agencies. The inherent conflict over the specific allocation
and management of national forest lands is seldom resolved.
As anyone, judges prefer to have some substantive basis
for ruling in a case. But, the extent to which Congressional
objectives conflict forces the courts to focus on procedural
issues and not question the professional judgment exercised
by the administrative agencies. For example, the US District
Court Judge ruling in Sierra Club v. Hardin expressed the
court's hesitation to question the substance of a decision
made by professional foresters:
Congress has given no indication as to the weight to
be assigned each value and it must be assumed that the
decision as to the proper mix of uses within any
particular area is left to the sound discretion and
expertise of the Forest Service....
Having investigated the framework in which the
decision was made, the court is forbidden to go
further and substitute its decision in a discretionary
matter for that of the Secretary. [116]
But, once again, ruling in this manner merely shifts the
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dispute back to the administrative arena. But, how else is a
judge with no land management expertise to rule?
Because most court rulings are made on a single
procedural issue, contradictory rulings now complicate
administrative implementation of natural resource statutes
and, moreover, leave the door open for further judicial
review of the decisions made. In oil and gas cases the
procedural issues raised generally fall into two categories.
The first involves administrative responsibility under the
National Environmental Policy Act and, more specifically, the
timing of environmental impact statements. The second
category questions the authority of the Secretary to impose
different conditions on leases issued.
In Sierra Club v. Hathaway the Sierra Club argued that
the land managers must complete an EIS before issuing leases
for geothermal resources. But, the judge upheld the
government's position. He ruled that no development could
occur under the leases without future decisions by the
administrative agency and hence that an EIS should be
prepared at that later time:
the lessee could not proceed beyond casual use until a
notice of intent or plan of operation had been
approved...the leasing decision therefore did not
represent a commitment of resources. [117]
This policy of deferring extensive environmental review until
specific operating plans are submitted has been adopted by
both the Forest Service and BLM. In a review of onshore oil
and gas leasing and exploration, the Government Accounting
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Office (GAO) reported:
With respect to oil and gas, both the Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management have adopted
practices which allow them to continue processing
leases without committing themselves to approval of
future development operations. They incorporate
stipulations...into some leases which give the agency
control over whether development will eventually be
allowed under the lease. [118]
But, USFS Chief R. Max Peterson qualified the GAO's
interpretation:
The discussion seems to overstate the control which
the agency maintains by stipulations. The intent of
the (Forest Service) in developing stipulations is to
retain a degree of control over operations to assure
compliance with law...such stipulations do not reserve
full control to prevent future development. We
believe the process of denying operations on the basis
of post lease environmental assessments is more
complex than implied. The issuance of a lease carries
the right to reasonable use and the post lease
assessment normally only considers the "how to." [119]
But, Peterson's qualification contradicts the Forest
Service argument in the Palisades case. The leasing dispute
in the Palisades FPA centered on the significance of the
decision and thus the need for an EIS. The Sierra Club
argued that the leasing decision was significant because it
made an irretrievable commitment of resources. But, the
Forest Service expressed confidence that its lease terms
would prevent environmental impacts if and when specific
exploration was proposed. Hence they argued that resources
were not committed by the leasing decision but would be when
an APD was filed:
While the prelease environmental analysis treats
general issues and concerns (such as preservation of
the wilderness option) that would seriously and
necessarily be affected by lease operations, the
operations stage is the time to address most concerns.
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The Regional Forester justified his decision to issue leases
without an EIS:
Mineral deposits are unique and completely unknown
prior to exploration and discovery. To assume that a
NEPA document will or can explicitly define all the
unknowns and uncertainties of an undiscovered mineral
deposit is unrealistic. The Palisades FPA-EA fulfills
the spirit and intent of NEPA and the selected
alternative allows for at least two additional NEPA
actions should use and occupancy be required within
the FPA. [121]
But, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, the judge
ruled that such uncertainty was precisely the reason EIS's
are required of federal agencies:
Section 102(c)'s requirement that the agency describe
the anticipated environmental effects of proposed
action is subject to a rule of reason. The agency
need not foresee the unforeseeable, but by the same
token neither can it avoid drafting an impact
statement simply because describing the environmental
effects of and alternatives to particular agency
action involves some degree of forecasting. And one
of the functions of a NEPA statement is to indicate
the extent to which environmental effects are
essentially unknown. It must be remembered that the
basic thrust of an agency's responsibilities under
NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of
proposed action before the action is taken and those
effects fully known. Reasonable forecasting and
speculation is thus implicit in NEPA.... [122]
While contradicting Forest Service arguments in the
Palisades case, Chief Peterson's qualification is supported
by a case involving BLM stipulations on oil and gas leases.
In 1978, Department of the Interior Solicitor Leo Krulitz
issued an opinion stating that the "wilderness
characteristics" of BLM wilderness study areas must be
preserved until final wilderness decisions were made. [123]
The BLM developed its Wilderness Inventory Handbook and
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interim management policies accordingly. Krulitz's opinion
and DOI's adoption of it led the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas
Association (RMOGA) to sue DOI and Krulitz to open these
areas to mineral development. RMOGA cited "irreparable
financial harm" to its 650 member corporations. [124]
Wyoming District Court Judge Kerr interpretted Solicitor
Krulitz's opinion and the resulting BLM guidelines and
Wilderness Protection Stipulation (WPS) to mean that "actions
which have even a remote possibility of impairing an area's
suitability for wilderness designation are not allowable
because the agency cannot permit the possible wilderness
characteristics to be destroyed before those characteristics
have been determined to exist." [125] Kerr referred to
leases issued under such procedures as "shell" leases because
companies holding them would be prohibited from conducting
any exploration under them:
The government argues that the inclusion of the WPS
with the lease informs the lessee that development may
or may not be allowed. Such an argument is a poor
excuse for the end result. Once again a lessee could
continue to pay rentals and not be allowed to develop
oil and gas.... Such a system of issuing "shell
leases" with no development rights is clearly an
unconstitutional taking and is blatantly unfair to
lessees.
A lease without development rights is a mockery of the
term lease. [126]
Judge Kerr concluded, ruling that the BLM must lease
wilderness study areas:
Energy and resource development are critical to this
country at this point in time, and the erroneous
interpretation of the law as given by the Solicitor is
not only clearly contrary to the law as enacted by
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Congress, it is also counterproductive to public
interest. [127]
But, other judges have ruled in precisely the opposite
manner. In the Palisades FPA case, Sierra Club v. Peterson,
Washington D.C. District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson upheld
the Forest Service contention when he ruled that an EIS was
not required because the stipulations attached to these
leases would sufficiently protect surface resources:
the lessees may legally obligate themselves to lease
conditions that may result in the inability to explore
or develop; that is knowing risk the lessees wish to
take. [128]
Judge Robinson termed Judge Kerr's earlier ruling in RMOGA
v. Andrus to be of "questionable validity." [129]
In Alaska v. Andrus, plaintiffs challenged an EIS
covering oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Alaska. They
argued that the alternative of attaching a termination clause
to the leases had not been considered. The court agreed with
the plaintiffs contention, arguing that such a termination
clause might provide "that the Secretary could terminate a
lease if environmental hazards, unknown or unforeseen at the
time of leasing, subsequently arose or were discovered."
[130] In so doing, the judge supported the argument that
lease stipulations are enforceable even if they prevent
development. The Interior Board of Land Appeals has ruled
similarly in at least two cases. [131]
But, in the Cache Creek and Little Granite Creek cases,
Interior Solicitor Lowell Madsen rendered an opinion directly
counter to those that support the enforceability of
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stipulations, no matter how stringent. Madsen ruled that a
lessee has "the exclusive right and privelege to drill" and
that if "the pending applications for drilling permits are
denied, the Secretary will have exceeded the scope of his
authority and will have rendered nugatory an inviolable
right...". [132] Madsen's opinion critically altered the
course of events in the Cache Creek and Little Granite Creek
permitting cases discussed in Chapter 3. Following Madsen's
ruling, the USGS/FS EIS did not contain a no drill
alternative.
These contradictory court rulings and legal opinions
have only served to exacerbate, not resolve, the conflict
over oil and gas exploration on public lands. Because of the
range of different opinions, they provide little guidance to
administrative agencies. Moreover, they encourage groups to
strategically select those courts where they believe they
will get a favorable ruling. Judicial review of these
administrative decisions involves considerable time and
resources on the part of all parties just to rehash old
issues rather than focus on the substantive issues of
concern. Moreover, to gain access to the courts these groups
must usually raise a procedural question. Frequently, these
procedural issues are not the same as the substantive issues
that directly concern the plaintiffs. And, since the
underlying disputes are not resolved, they merely flow into
the next forum where they can again be debated. An
unresolved leasing dispute inevitably arises again when an
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APD is filed. For example, should an APD now be filed under
the Palisades leases, disputes over whether or how
exploration may occur is guaranteed to occur; the judge's
ruling in this case has left the door open for this outcome.
A Problem Compounded by Uncertainty
Making decisions about how and where oil and gas
exploration may occur on national forest lands is made
difficult by the many competing objectives under which these
decisions must be made. But, these varied objectives are not
the only difficulty with which the Forest Service must
contend in decisionmaking. To make matters worse, these
decisions are shrouded in uncertainty. Not only is the
Forest Service unable to make a "measurably correct" decision
because objectives conflict, it is also not able to fully
understand the consequences of alternative decisions until
after they are implemented. Consequently, no decision can be
proven "measurably correct" at the time that it is made.
Likewise, any decision reached can be legitimately
questionned.
A lease confers the right to the oil and gas resources
located beneath a particular tract of land. A decision to
lease legitimizes oil and gas development as an appropriate
use of the leased lands even though it does not grant
permission to conduct exploratory drilling or resource
production. By conferring rights to lessees, it allows oil
and gas to become the predominant use should development be
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proposed. It follows, therefore, that leases should not be
issued for areas where oil and gas development is not deemed
an appropriate land-use. But, making this allocation
decision is not a simple task. Ideally, benefits derived
from the oil and gas produced must be compared with the
opportunity costs of the other resources and land-uses
foregone once development occurs. Determining what surface
resources are at stake in these decisions is relatively easy
since they are visible and easily mapped and inventoried.
Determining what oil and gas resources are there, if any, is
another matter. Making a leasing decision is like choosing
between the trip to Hawaii, the stereo and $10,000 in cash or
what is behind Door #3 in the television show "Let's Make A
Deal." The decisionmaker simply does not know what might be
gained for what is being given up. With oil and gas and the
public lands, though, the stakes are considerably greater.
The Many Dimensions of Uncertainty
Oil and gas resources are elusive. They are well-hidden
beneath the earth's surface and there is no way of telling
precisely where they are and in what quantities but by
drilling. Chapter 2 described the incremental steps taken in
exploring for oil and gas. Only as each step divulges
additional information about an area's resources can an oil
and gas company decide whether or not to continue exploratory
or development activity. But, like the oil and gas company,
the USFS does not know the implications of its decisions
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until after they have been implemented.
Even though oil and gas are located beneath public
lands, the federal government is not in the exploration and
development business. Instead, the government has put its
faith in the private market to determine when and where
exploration and development should occur. In order to avoid
a haphazard rush to develop these resources, a leasing system
was developed so that only an individual or single firm has
access to a particular tract of public land.
Because of the low lease application fee ($75) and the
low annual rental fee ($3/acre), the leasing process
encourages speculation by individuals hoping to make a large
return on a small investment. Leases are issued to the first
qualified applicant. This applicant is not always an oil and
gas firm. Most applicants have no intention of ever
conducting exploratory drilling. [133] Their hope is that an
oil and gas company will want to purchase their lease at a
high price conditionned with royalty payments should oil or
gas someday be discovered. Predictably, when an area such as
the Western Overthrust Belt is discovered there is a mad rush
by individual speculators to acquire leases there. [134]
When confronting a lease application, USFS field staff
have little information about what exploration or
development, if any, will ever occur on the leasehold.
Consulting with the lease applicant is seldom helpful as that
individual is frequently just speculating that someday more
information may indicate that exploration is warranted or
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that someone else (notably an oil and gas company) may want
to acquire his or her lease(s) and then undertake exploration
and development. Because the process is structured in a way
that encourages speculation, only 1 in 10 leases ever result
in exploratory drilling. Consequently, 90% of the USFS'
leasing decisions are inconsequential beyond generating
rental revenues for the public coffers. [135] Because a
decision to lease can have many different outcomes from no
exploration at all, to unsuccessful exploration, to full
field development, the Forest Service issues leases with
various stipulations attached and defer extensive
environmental review until later stages when more specific
proposals are made.
Even exploratory drilling does not reveal complete
information about the oil and gas resources beneath a
particular leasehold, though. The area now comprising the
Western Overthrust Belt was explored unsuccessfully several
times in the past. But, those exploratory wells were not
drilled deep enough to discover the oil and gas located
there. [136] Similarly, exploratory wells may sidestep and
just miss an oil or gas "trap." For this reason, exploratory
drilling often involves two or three wells and different
wellsites. [137] One hundred twenty-eight wells were drilled
in Alaska's Prudhoe Bay before a strike was made in what is
now North America's largest oil field. [138] Should a strike
be made, several wells must then be drilled just to estimate
the size of the discovery and thus whether or not field
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development is warranted. [139]
To make matters worse, because oil and gas are so well
hidden beneath the earth's surface, there is little agreement
on the resource potential of public lands. The oil and gas
industry estimates that federal public lands contain 70% of
domestic oil and gas resources while accounting for only 17%
of its production. [140] Environmentalists, on the other
hand, estimate that 78.5 percent of the producible oil and
83.5 percent of the natural gas are contained in non-federal
lands. They estimate that only 15.8 percent of the oil and
12.4 percent of the gas will be found beneath federal lands.
Moreover, environmentalists claim that wilderness and
potential wilderness in the 17 western states contain only
2.1 percent of the oil and 1.7 percent of the gas. [141]
Because of these conflicting claims about likely outcomes,
there is no agreement about what is at stake in these
decisions. The Forest Service does not know what oil and gas
resources are to be gained or lost by their decisions to
lease or not lease an area. There is no obviously correct
decision; any decision reached can be legitimately
questioned.
Decisionmaking is further clouded by debate over
national energy "needs." Is the oil and gas located beneath
national forest lands, regardless of how plentiful or scarce,
even "needed?" What are the consequences of not permitting
exploration and development? The vice-president of Shell Oil
Company calls for increasing development of the public lands
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"in order to alleviate the continuing declines of oil and gas
production in the U.S." [142] The managing director of
British Petroleum declares that "a declining supply of oil
appears inevitable because oil is simply not being discovered
fast enough." [143] The industry's newsweekly magazine
editorialized that "the Carter Administration is culpable in
several major areas of energy policy, but in our view the
most damning indictment is its failure to stimulate
exploration for oil and gas on high-potential federal lands."
[144] Another industry representative comments that "at a
time of energy and strategic minerals insecurity, it is of
questionable judgment to postpone developing needed resources
while awaiting the development of a forest management plan."
[145] Environmentalists, on the other hand, argue that there
are many renewable energy sources to satisfy America's energy
needs and that it is senseless to destroy other scarce
natural resources to obtain the last drop of oil. [146]
In addition to the disagreement about the need for and
potential of oil and gas exploration on public lands,
decisionmaking is complicated further by uncertainty about
the environmental implications of drilling. Environmentalists
contend that even exploration activities that lead to no
further development have undesired environmental
consequences. As a result, they argue that no leases should
be issued in areas having high surface resource values. [147]
Industry replies, though, that it is capable of
environmentally sound exploration and development. It
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believes that environmentalists are basing their fears on
past development but that times have changed:
The industry in recent years has made an enviable
record in environmental protection. Gone is the
hangover from earlier less sensitive days, before
oilmen and others learned to be more conscious of the
consequences of their activities on the world around
them. Industry has generally cleaned up its
act...Oilmen have done a particularly good job in the
fragile frontiers. Oil operations coexist in harmony
with wildlife on land and offshore. [148]
Environmentalists, though, paint a different picture based on
their backcountry encounters with current exploration
activities:
The site looked more like a construction zone than a
wilderness area, with drill rigs, water tanks,
pipelines and work crews dotting the landscape.
Instead of the scent of mountain wildflowers, all they
could smell was diesel fuel. Quiet and solitude were
elusive; helicopters darted over the ridge with such
regularity they said they felt they were in a Vietnam
war movie. The only wildlife they saw was a few
chipmunks, and they may have been packing their bags.
[149]
Disagreement about potential impacts is not limited to these
traditional adversaries either. As discussed in the last
chapter, even government "experts" disagree about the impacts
of oil and gas exploration and development.
Regardless of this pervasive uncertainty, the Forest
Service must make oil and gas leasing decisions almost daily.
But, the mineral leasing laws give little guidance about how
to make decisions when the outcomes are unknown. When these
laws were enacted uncertainty was deemed to be the problem of
private industry; the market system would adjust prices to
account for the risks associated with doing business in an
uncertain world. But today this same uncertainty has
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considerable import for federal land managers. Because of
increasing and competing demands for the varied resources of
the public lands, the stakes in these decisions are much
greater now. But, the Forest Service is not able to
determine which demands should be satisfied and which
objectives upheld because it does not know what is gained or
lost by different decisions. The conservation paradigm helps
little in situations such as these.
Uncertainty about the consequences of decisionmaking has
always existed. But, now that industry interest in
exploration in national forest lands has intensified and
begun penetrating areas valued for other uses, uncertainty
has become a critical factor in decisionmaking. Uncertainty
is particularly problematic when proposed or potential
wilderness areas are involved.
Conclusions
The public land management paradigm was developed to
pursue conservation objectives. And, it succeeded in serving
those ends for the first half of this century. Now, though,
the traditional conservation objectives have been
supplemented with preservation and non-commercial objectives.
Inherent value differences separate these different
objectives; scientific expertise and technical analysis
cannot choose which objective should prevail in a particular
case. But, because the long-held paradigm remains intact,
that is precisely how these decisions are made today. The
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consequences, as has been seen, is persistent conflict.
Professionals schooled and experienced in the conservation
tradition are no longer trusted to make these choices by
those adhering to preservation ideals. Moreover, these
professionals are not capable of making these choices in a
manner that accommodates all interests because of the
differences in values involved. Because power has become
well-distributed by Congressional mandates and favorable
court rulings, land management is at an impasse in many
cases.
Trying to fit a square peg into a round hole has never
been an easy task; neither has making judgmental decisions
through technical analysis. Society has a penchant for
leaning on scientists and experts for making the tough social
choices that inevitably must be made precisely because they
are difficult, controversial and many outcomes are possible.
When power becomes distributed, as it has over public lands
issues, viable decisions are decisions that accommodate the
concerns of all interests at stake to their satisfaction.
Technical analysis fails at this task. Likewise,
Congressional intervention and judicial rulings have
similarly failed. Other means must be found.
The current debate over how public land decisions should
be made is not new. For the past two decades, academics,
practitioners, professional foresters and political
scientists have studied and criticized the current process.
Reform has been proposed and attempted. As discussed in the
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next chapter, however, past analysts have blamed the agency
and not the paradigm. As a result, efforts at reform have
been misdirected and, thus, unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER 5
WHY THE PROBLEM PERSISTS
The US Forest Service task differs markedly from that
encountered when the agency was established at the turn of
the century and the mineral leasing laws were enacted in
1920. Professionally trained foresters now have resource
allocation responsibilities that defy their technical
expertise and that are more overt than at any time in the
past. These foresters are charged with meeting many
contradictory objectives. Their decisions must be made in the
face of uncertainty about potential outcomes. They are
required to make decisions in "the public interest" yet no
single "public interest" exists. While the decisionmaking
process is designed to make scientifically defensible
decisions, the decisions to be made are inherently
judgmental; objectively correct answers simply do not exist.
The Forest Service now confronts a political resource
allocation task in addition to the traditional scientific
land management task to which it is accustomed. But, the
decisionmaking process remains one based in technical
expertise. It provides no means for resolving the disputes
that inevitably arise. It cloaks political problems in
technical analysis. The past three chapters have described a
process that is obviously mismatched to the problem it is
meant to address. In fact, too obvious. Why does the
mismatch exist and persist? Moreover, how might it be
remedied?
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The answer to the first question is complex. First,
many past analysts have misread the nature of the problem
posed by public land management. [1] Rather than addressing
the scientific management paradigm within which the Forest
Service makes decisions, these analysts have attacked the
conservation ideal. But, by attacking the long-held
conservation notion of good public land management and by
demanding that the agency consider other, non-commercial
values in decisionmaking, these critics have recommended
procedural changes aimed at the wrong target. It is the
paradigm that needs adjustment; it is how these many
conflicting values are considered that is critical to reform.
As seen, interest "airing" is not the same as interest
"accommodation." But, within the scientific management
paradigm wherein experts acquire information and then make
decisions, interest airing is all that occurs.
Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, Congress responded to
the expanding demands over public land resources following
World War II by demanding precisely what land management
agencies are now doing: considering other values in
decisionmaking. But, by shifting these tough social choice
questions to the land management agencies, Congress implied
(and at times explicitly stated) that these decisions were
best left to scientific expertise. It implied that these
decisions had right answers that could be determined through
the rational, dispassionate analysis of scientific experts.
In so doing, Congress reinforced this paradigm. Hence, the
256
Forest Service has not been given a message to change from
that body with the direct authority to do so: Congress.
Finally, there are organizational limits to change in
the manner this author argues is needed. While Forest
Service officials acknowledge that a problem exists, they
logically frame their solution in the context of the
traditional paradigm. Partly this response is due to the
Congressional legitimization mentioned above. But, more
critically, it is due to the culture of the public forestry
profession that is imbedded in this paradigm. This chapter
discusses both the prescriptive sources of failure and the
organizational factors that limit change in order to
determine how the mismatch might be remedied. As is seen,
the root of both is in continued adherence to the long-
established land management paradigm, one relying on
scientific expertise to resolve political questions.
Past Perceptions of the Problem and Prescriptions for Reform
This study is hardly the first to critically analyze the
Forest Service and to recommend reform. Over the past two
decades the problem has been studied extensively by students
of administrative law and behavior, foresters, academics and
groups and individuals with a stake in public land
management. They have criticized the Forest Service's
failure to recognize the limits of its expertise and to
change its behavior and procedures accordingly. While almost
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all have come to study land management because of the
dissatisfaction of different user groups, none have discussed
how the underlying conflict between these groups might be
resolved. While proposed reforms have become more exacting,
they still are not well-suited to the problem at hand.
Although the problem is often recognized as political, reform
proposals are almost always directed at changing agency
behavior within the context of the traditional professional
expertise land management paradigm.
As the demands placed on national forests broadened
following World War II, Congress responded by expanding the
list of objectives to be met in national forest management.
National policy no longer centers on conservation ideals but
now embodies preservation and non-commercial ends as well.
Given the changed policy, the "problem" warranting the
attention of past analysts became the inadequate
representation of these newly-legitimized values in national
forest management.
Forest Service officials responded to these new demands
in a professional manner. When making decisions, they
"consider" the many resource values at stake in a particular
proposal and then make decisions reflecting what they believe
to be "the public interest." As might be expected, this
determination reflects both their training in commercial
forestry practices and the norms of the public forestry
profession. Forest Service staff seem to have confidence in
their ability to master this increasingly complex management
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task and still make decisions in "the public interest." This
confidence has several roots. It is partly born of the
Forest Service's long tradition of decisionmaking in "the
public interest." It is also due to their systematic
approach to decisionmaking in which all issues are
theoretically uncovered and considered before a decision is
made. And, partly it derives from their belief that, even
though current problems are much more complex than in the
past, professional land managers are better able than other,
potentially more political bodies to make these decisions;
professional land managers understand what resources are at
stake and have an eye for long-term efficiency. But, the
apparent confidence of the Forest Service on this account has
not been universally shared. Some have argued that it is
unethical for the agency to take "the public interest" into
its own hands.
A Question of Professional Ethics
In the mid-1960's, University of Montana Forestry
Professor R.W. Behan was one of the first members of the
profession to express uneasiness about the changing nature of
the forest management task and the inability of professional
foresters to respond to it. In an editorial in
The Journal of Forestry he criticized the ethic adhered to by
the forestry profession, one articulated to Behan's freshman
forestry class by "a forester of considerable professional
status":
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We must have enough guts to stand up and tell the
public how their [sic] land should be managed. As
professional foresters, we know what's best for the
land. [2]
Behan referred to this ethic as "the myth of the omnipotent
forester." In this editorial, he hoped to plant the seeds for
reform. He emphasized the extent to which value judgments
pervade forest decisionmaking and the need for professional
foresters to acknowledge different values and consider them.
He recognized the limits of professional land management
training to make the inevitable value choices:
"Goodness" and "badness" in our society are collective
value judgments, and land expertise is no better a
qualification than many others for making them. [3]
Additionally, he pleaded for a shift in forester loyalty from
the profession and to society:
For the "various ends of society" in our unique
society, are and will be set only by that society, and
not by a professional class of foresters. It is when
we as professional foresters either can't or won't
understand this that we get the most rapidly into the
hottest water. (And our forestry school training helps
us very little in sensibly avoiding getting there or
capably getting out.) It is when we attempt to
determine ends that "pressure groups" become the most
hostile, challenging our leadership in resource
conservation, and they do so quickly and properly. [4]
He concluded that freshman forestry classes should not be
indoctrinated with the myth of the omnipotent forester but
rather should be told:
We must have enough sense to stand up and listen to
the public, and to work with it in setting forest land
objectives. Then as professional foresters we can
supply the technological means to these sociological
ends, and not confuse the one with the other. [5]
In the end, though, Behan offered no plan either for
accomplishing the shift in attitude or determining what
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"society" wants. He defined the problem as one of an ethical
bias on the part of the Forest Service and thus believed that
appealing to their sense of "right," combined with a more
appropriate forestry education, would sufficiently amend the
system.
Behan's prescription for expanding the realm of forestry
education was echoed by others during the 1960's and 1970's.
When Daniel Henning studied the wilderness designation
process in 1972 he found, not surprisingly:
Wilderness preservation, in many cases, is dependent
on the recognition of intangible and qualitative
values as opposed to tangible or quantitative values
as dollars or numbers of people. Yet federal agencies
and many aspects of society are committed to values of
the first order (progress, materialism, tangibles) as
contrasted to values of the second order (quality,
intangibles, ecological considerations)... [6]
He, too, blamed professional forestry education for this bias:
Forestry schools, professional and agency
indoctrinations are oriented to producing a timber-
management orientation in many governmental foresters.
Although the claim of professionalism and agency
objectivity is made by many resource managers and
administrators in the wilderness classification
process, value considerations pertaining to economics
and mass recreation are obvious. [7]
Henning called for opening the "closed ring" of forestry
education which now only involves "technically trained
forestry professors who are training students for government
positions where the requirements are made by professional
foresters." [8] He believed that a curriculum including
courses dealing with values, ethics and humanities would
offset the apparent commerical orientation of professional
foresters. He also believed that the use of committees and
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consultants with expertise in various issue areas could
supplement the agency's expertise and help foresters
"determine the social ends or value base of the public
interest." [9] He denounced the current process in which
"the same administrators who initiate and argue in support of
a particular proposal" are the judges that then evaluate
public input in reaching a decision. [10]
With time, university level forestry programs have begun
to offer or require courses on ethics and the value aspects
inherent in a professional forestry career. [11] In
addition, the USFS has held its own workshops in inter-
personal skills and different strategies for involving the
public in decisionmaking. [12] More recently, the Forest
Service has begun sponsoring professionally-run training
sessions in conflict management and dispute resolution
techniques for its field personnel. [13] But, while
education in non-technical forest management considerations
and professional training in conflict management and
interpersonal skills are a critical first step in meeting the
needs of today's land management task, they cannot stand
alone. At bottom, education and open-mindedness do not give
a professional forester the ability to actually represent the
values of others in decisionmaking.
A Question of Unbounded Administrative Discretion
While many have criticized professional forestry
training as the source of inadequate interest representation
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in Forest Service decisionmaking, most have pinpointed the
problem as one of unreined administrative discretion and an
agency bias in favor of some interests over others. There
have been two levels of attack on this account and hence two
levels of reform prescribed. Some perceived an internal bias
that could be offset through education, combined with public
involvement, broadened hiring practices and more formalized
procedures. Others perceived a bias that was imposed
externally by agency "capture." All blamed Congress for the
predicament.
Agency Bias
As early as 1962, Charles Reich asked many of the same
questions that have been posed in this analysis:
Management must decide between the competing demands
on the forests. When different uses clash, which
shall be favored? How are local needs to be balanced
against broader interests? Who is to have the benefit
of the economic resources, and on what terms? How are
the conflicting recreational demands of fishermen,
skiers, hunters, motorboat enthusiasts, and automobile
sightseers to be satisfied? Should the requirements
of the future outweigh the demands of today? [14]
He criticized the power bestowed on "small professional
groups....[to] make bitterly controversial decisions, choices
between basic values, with little or no outside check." [15]
He blamed Congress for delegating such extensive
administrative discretion to the Forest Service with little
attempt to bound the agency's authority:
The standards Congress has used to delegate authority
over the forests are so general, so sweeping, and so
vague as to represent a turnover of virtually all
responsibility. "Multiple-use" does establish that
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the forests cannot be used exclusively for one
purpose, but beyond this it is little more than a
phrase expressing the hope that all competing
interests can somehow be satisfied and leaving the
real decisions to others. The "relative values" of
various resources are to be given "due consideration,"
but Congress has not indicated what those values are
or what action shall be deemed "due consideration."
Congress has directed "harmonious and coordinated
management of the various resources," but it has left
the Forest Service to deal with the problem that
different uses of resources often clash rather than
harmonize. Most significantly, Congress has told the
Forest Service to "best meet the needs of the American
people" but has left it entirely up to the Service to
determine what those needs are. [16]
Reich criticized Congress' "multiple-use" mandate in that it
justified all land uses. In so doing, he charged that any
Forest Service choice could be justified and few could be
questionned legally.
Reich then turned his attention to how the Forest
Service exercised its broad discretion. He lambasted the
Forest Service presumption that it could determine what
constituted the "public interest" before making a decision:
...the Service recognizes, in the matter-of-fact pages
of its manual, that its ultimate job is nothing less
than the definition of "the public good," a task once
reserved for philosopher-kings. [17]
Finally, he stressed that the Forest Service manner of
decisionmaking inevitably led to bias in representing the
many land use values at stake:
It is too much to expect that foresters who initiate
and argue in support of a particular proposal can then
adequately evaluate public criticism or counter-
proposals that often represent thinking they have
earlier rejected. [18]
Reich recommended three reforms. First, he called for
public hearings on controversial proposals to ensure that the
264
Forest Service was made aware of all concerns before making a
decision. Second, he proposed that the many different
resource values be institutionalized within the Forest
Service by hiring staff other than foresters. In so doing,
these other values would be automatically incorporated into
day-to-day agency decisionmaking. Finally, Reich called for
formal justifications when decisions are made so that all
concerned groups know how and why the decision was reached.
Reich believed that such justifications would make the Forest
Service more accountable for their decisions and, ideally,
force them to represent all interests in decisionmaking. [19]
To some extent, all of Reich's reforms have since been
institutionalized. As a result of National Environmental
Policy Act procedures as well as new agency policies
described earlier, public hearings are held on most
controversial decisions. Environmental assessments and
environmental impact statements now contain the formal
justifications he suggested. The agency also has expanded
the profile of its staff in a special "public information
office" as well as within its field staff. [20] But, as seen
in the oil and gas case, "all competing interests" have not
been "satisfied" by these measures. While most interest
groups actively participate in formal agency hearings on
various proposals and comment on draft analyses, they still
do not feel that their concerns have been accommodated by the
Forest Service decisionmaking process. Hence, opposition
persists.
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In the year following Reich's article, University of
Virginia Economics Professor George Hall similarly blamed
Congress for delegating broad discretionary authority to the
Forest Service:
It appears that in voting for multiple use Congress
believed it was voting for virtue and against sin
without having a definite idea about just what actions
constituted virtue or sin. [21]
He criticized what he viewed to be the fundamental flaw of
the multiple-use doctrine, that being that:
it fails to provide a criterion for resolving the
conflicts among demands except for the general and
unspecified standard of "the best interest of the
public." [22]
Hall also criticized the apparent Forest Service bias in
exercising its discretion in decisionmaking. He labelled a
"myth," the Forest Service belief that its "professional
competence...savvey [sic] ...and good judgment" [23] could
successfully balance competing interests in multiple-use
management:
The myth is that such practices are capable of
resolving all conflicting demands and allowing us to
have our cake and eat it too. Resolution, of course,
occurs in the sense that some land use plan is
selected. [24]
Hall's recommended solution to the multiple-use dilemma
differed from Reich's. He proposed that procedures be
instituted for assessing the costs and benefits of different
land allocations. He believed that, in so doing, conflicting
demands would be appropriately "resolved," thereby ensuring
that that "socially best administrative decisions for the
national forests were made." [25] But, Hall also admitted
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the difficulty in devising such a scheme when so many
intangible values were involved. [26] Economists have often
debated different means for quantifying environmental
amenities and hence remedying that failure of cost-benefit
analysis. But, no specific measures have ever been generally
accepted by these economists. [27] And, when the Forest
Service has tried to quantify the values at stake in its
decisions it has always been soundly criticized. [28] The
groups involved seldom trust the agency's evaluation of their
concerns and thus they oppose the outcomes of such analyses.
Reich's and Hall's prescriptions came before many
natural resource protection statutes had passed, particularly
the National Environmental Policy Act. As discussed in
Chapter 4, these statutes eventually gave considerable power
to user groups to oppose land use plans and decisions deemed
inappropriate. Hence, today's conflicting demands are not
resolved when, as Hall implied, "some land use plan is
selected" or decision is made. It was not until the early
1970's that the persistent and powerful opposition of
dissatisfied user groups became a cause for concern. At that
time analysts turned their attention to this consequence of
the agency's broadened mission.
In 1972, M. Rupert Cutler analyzed, in his doctoral
dissertation, the growing dissatisfaction with and litigation
over Forest Service decisions. [29] He attributed this trend
to two factors. First, numerous court decisions in the late
1960's and early 1970's had liberalized judicial rules of
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standing in environmental disputes and thereby provided
previously unavailable opportunitites for court review of
Forest Service decisions. Second, he determined that these
newly-opened doors to the judicial system were well-used
because Forest Service decisionmaking procedures failed to
provide adequate opportunities for public involvement.
Cutler recommended five specific reforms to overcome
this problem of constant litigation, all designed to improve
public involvement and Forest Service receptivity to non-
traditional concerns. First, he called for an improved
multidisciplinary profile within the agency. This could be
accomplished by "personnel recruitment and in-service
training" and "two-way communication with clientele groups."
Second, he encouraged early involvement of all "clientele
groups" in agency decisionmaking. Third, he suggested "the
use of independent hearing officers and semi-independent
citizens' committees." Fourth, he called for the Forest
Service to generate several alternatives for public review
and comment and, finally, to provide enough time for
different groups to conduct "adversary analyses" of agency
actions. [30]
Many of Cutler's recommendations have been adopted to
some extent by the Forest Service. "In-service" training
efforts have been mentioned earlier. The multi-disciplinary
profile has improved, mostly through expanded-hiring of land
management professionals other than foresters. In 1959,
foresters comprised 90% of the Forest Service staff compared
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to 50% in 1975. [31] Extensive public workshops involving
thousands of individuals were held during the Forest Service
wilderness reviews (RARE I and RARE II). [32] At times,
"independent hearing officers" have been used to run public
meetings. But, these meetings were always to obtain public
input, not resolve disputes. As a result, the independent
hearing officers often only complicated the meetings by
impeding the flow of information between Forest Service staff
and those attending the meetings. Their efforts seldom
facilitated discussion between the different groups. [33]
"Semi-independent citizens committees" are seldom used by the
Forest Service in decisionmaking. Red-tape associated with
the Federal Advisory Committee Act is often given as a reason
for not more formally involving such committees. [34]
This Forest Service response is partly due to Council on
Environmental Quality regulations under the National
Environmental Policy Act. [35] Environmental impact
statements must now contain analyses of several alternatives
and public comment on a draft version of the report. But, to
a large extent, today's public involvement efforts by the
Forest Service are a result of Cutler's own efforts as
Assistant Secretary for Conservation, Research, and Education
in the Department of Agriculture during the Carter
Administration.
Cutler was placed in the enviable position of
implementing the recommendations made in his dissertation
research. As Assistant Secretary, he immediately commented
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that the "one imprint" he wanted to make on the Forest
Service was "development of policies that ensure extensive,
high quality, public involvement in policy determination."
[36] His reasoning was that:
The amount of citizen litigation to block unacceptable
decisions relates directly to the opportunities, or
lack of opportunities, for public participation. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture's aim is to make such
litigation unnecessary, to tear down any remaining
shrouds of administrative procedure that tend to
shelter our decisionmaking, and to get everyone
affected by the results of our decisions into the
decisionmaking process." [37]
Cutler established "five stages" to be followed in
decisionmaking in order to ensure successful public
involvement. Success, in this scheme, was reducing the
extensive litigation plaguing the agency. These five stages
were:
(1) defining the issue
(2) collecting public input
(3) systematic analysis
(4) evaluating public comments
(5) decision implementation
[38]
It was Cutler's belief, given his research findings, that
more open and accessible decisionmaking would be
representative decisionmaking. In theory, this
representativeness would offset the widespread opposition to
Forest Service decisions. The final test of this theory
would be in the decision implementation stage; to use
Cutler's words, this stage would reveal "whether the public
has been adequately involved in the decision." [39]
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Cutler's proposals and the Forest Service response are
to be commended. Dramatic change has occurred in the way the
agency involves the public in decisionmaking. [40] But, if
the "final test" is in decision implementation, these reforms
have not been enough. The problem persists. Cutler's
prescriptions have failed to end the litigation at which they
were targeted because, like those before him, he prescribed
reform that reinforced the scientific management paradigm and
further entrenched the technical analysis approach to
decisionmaking. While the Forest Service has employed more
and more sophisticated analysis techniques to systematically
evaluate public input, the public is not satisfied and
continues to try to redress the perceived wrongs of the
administrative process by appealing to the courts. Consider,
for example, the showpiece of this participatory process:
The RARE II wilderness reviews. Fifty-thousand people were
involved in providing input to the scope of the wilderness
review EIS. Seventeen-thousand more were involved in
workshops to structure the review process. When the dEIS was
released, 264,000 more comments were received. [41] But, in
"the final test," the process and its conclusions has been
attacked on all fronts. Mining and timber industry groups,
environmental organizations, ORV and other backcountry users
have all opposed its conclusions as either too much or not
enough wilderness protection. [42] And, moreover, because of
a recent court ruling that the EIS was inadequate, the Forest
Service has just announced plans to convene a new, "RARE III"
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process. [43]
While the problem addressed in this analysis closely
parallels that studied by Cutler, the root of the problem as
defined here is much different. This study argues that the
paradigm in which technical analysis is used to determine
outcomes is the root of the problem. But Cutler's reforms
reinforced this paradigm. Cutler admitted that "there is no
formula in the decision process that tells USDA what weight
public participation should receive relative to other
factors." [44] But, he still called for agency officials to
"weigh public input against other decision factors" in the
evaluation stage. [45] He believed that the public would
have faith in the administrator's decision as long as public
comments could be related to alternatives in a "consistent,
visible and traceable way." [46] But, this fishbowl
decisionmaking effort has not addressed what this analysis
indicates is the heart of the problem: the many affected
interests do not feel represented unless their concerns have
been accommodated to their satisfaction. And, critically,
they no longer trust the systematic, technical analysis of
the public administrators to accomplish this end. Some other
means for accommodating these many interests must be found if
viable decisions are to be made. Systematic, technical
analyses that do not conclusively pinpoint solutions should
no longer be used to hide the judgments that invariably must
be made.
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Agency Capture
There was also a minority during this time that framed
the problem somewhat differently than simply agency bias in
decisionmaking. They argued that the Forest Service was
"captured" by a single clientele group, and that other
interests could never be represented under the existing
system. Some claimed that the Forest Service was captured by
environmental concerns [47] while others believed that
development interests were the culprit. [48] These analyses
diverged from those discussed above and called for Congress
to avert single-interest domination by setting the specific
priorities to be adhered to by administrative agencies.
A Yale Law Review article analyzing the federal
multiple-use management system found that land management
decisions benefit local and development interests at the
expense of needed environmental protection. [49] In a
scathing attack of the multiple-use system, the unnamed
author criticized the "vacuous platitudes" of the Multiple-
Use and Sustained-Yield Act and called for a complete
Congressional overhaul of the entire natural resource
administrative system. In order to better represent
environmental and other national interests, the author
proposed three new agencies, each with a specific management
task: grazing, timber and recreation (including wilderness).
In this scheme, Congress would reshuffle all public lands and
then allocate them to one of the three categories. The
specific resource value would then prevail, with other uses
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only allowed when compatible with the primary use. Congress
would make these broad land allocation decisions with the
help of special commissions consisting of "industry
representatives, conservationists, and some agency
specialists." [50] The Commission's proposals would solely
be advisory and Congress would have power to change
allocations whenever national needs dictated. Current agency
officials were to be kept out of this allocation process,
however, because they "have a penchant for empire building,
and are more likely to fight for expanded domains than to
fairly articulate and choose among the interests involved."
[51] The author seems confident that this type of system
would be better able than the existing system to end the
persistent opposition to land management decisions:
Resort to adjudication would be much less frequent...
The inefficiencies of using the cumbersome, case-by-
case adjudicative process for policymaking would
disappear once policy was established by Congress.
Adjudication would become a process of testing an
administrator's actions against Congressional
directives, as it ought to be. Since there would be
manageable directives from Congress greatly narrowing
the range of discretion, appeals within the agency and
to the courts could provide meaningful control. [52]
But, it is not clear that the basis for this article's
criticisms -- that the Forest Service is captured by local
and development interests -- is well-founded. Paul Culhane
recently questionned the periodic attacks levelled against
the Forest Service by those adhering to the capture theory.
In a comprehensive analysis of Forest Service decisions, he
found that, far from being captured, Forest Service decisions
274
appear, overall, to be quite well-balanced among the many
different interests involved. [53]
Regardless, such an extreme response, if not
unnecessary, is politically infeasible. As discussed in
Chapter 4, Congress mandated its long list of legitimate
public land uses for many reasons. It is seldom costly
politically to support legislation that promotes many varied
uses for the national forests as opposed to special, single-
purpose uses. In fact, sometimes it is beneficial to do so
as such legislation is often symbolic and enhances a
legislator's reputation. [54] Furthermore, the "vacuous
platitudes" of many Congressional acts are a result of real
constraints -- both political and technical -- on greater
specificity. [55] Congress would be overwhelmed if it tried
to dictate precise measures for implementing its mandates.
Making site-specific choices between, for example, energy
development or endangered species protection or wilderness
preservation would only further crowd Congress' already-
burdened agenda. It would also be politically costly for
many legislators to do so because it is at this site-specific
implementation of Congressional mandates that the "winners"
and "losers" become clearly defined. When possible,
legislators prefer to avoid resolving such controversial
choices. [56] Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Congress
would ever voluntarily take on the hot potato suggested in
the Yale Law Review article. And, in fact, they have refused
to do so on several occasions in the past. [57]
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The Problem of Administrative Discretion: A Larger View
The common theme underlying these past critiques is the
extent to which Congress has delegated broad administrative
discretion to the Forest Service. Critics argue that the
problem persists because the Forest Service exercises its
discretion in an inappropriate manner. Hence, many measures
are proposed to redirect or curb agency discretion as a way
of allowing full representation of all interests.
Framed as a problem of excessive administrative
discretion and thus agency bias in decisionmaking makes the
Forest Service situation appear little different from that of
many administrative agencies. Students of administrative law
and administrative behavior have long criticized
Congressional delegation of broad authority to non-
representative agencies. Their proposed reforms echo those
recommended for the Forest Service.
But, as Richard Stewart argues in "The Reformation of
American Administrative Law," these reforms are seldom
appropriate. [58] He describes the role of administrative
agencies to be a political one of "balancing" competing
interests, not solely a technical one:
...the application of legislative directives requires
the agency to reweigh and reconcile the often nebulous
or conflicting policies behind the directives in the
context of a particular factual situation with a
particular constellation of affected interests. The
required balancing of policies is an inherently
discretionary, ultimately political procedure. [59]
But, Stewart notes that most reforms that are proposed rely
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on Congress setting strict standards and procedures for
agency compliance. Such prescriptions assume that today's
complex problems can be solved using explicit procedural
formulas applied in a professional manner. In so doing, all
interests theoretically are fairly represented because
administrators are no longer able to exercise discretion in
favor of particular client groups. Stewart argues, though,
that most administrative tasks are not adaptable to these
formalized procedures:
...the relatively steady economic growth since World
War II...has allowed attention to be focused on the
perplexing distributional questions of how the fruits
of affluence are to be shared. Such choices clearly
do not turn on technical issues that can safely be
left to the experts. [60]
As a result, he labels the traditional model of
administration as "an essentially negative instrument for
checking governmental power." [61] Because the decisions are
inherently political, no technical formula can ensure that
all interests are represented in decisionmaking. But, by
trying to do precisely that, the traditional model relies
predominately on the judicial system to review administrative
decisions after they are made. Stewart argues that a more
appropriate approach would be an "affirmative" system of
"government 'which has to do with the representation of
individuals and interests' and the development of
governmental policies on their behalf." [62]
Unfortunately Stewart does not recommend any means for
developing this "affirmative" system, one recognizing the
political dimensions of today's complex social choice
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problems. His conclusion is that general reform is
impossible but instead that energies should be devoted "to
treating various instances of administrative 'failure'
through case-by-case examination." [63]
One Case Examined: Public Land Management
Unlike many administrative agencies, the Forest Service
was not established to either serve or regulate a particular
clientele. Instead, it was charged from the outset with no
less a task than managing the national forests in "the public
interest," and to serve "the greatest good of the greatest
number in the long run." For much of Forest Service history,
achieving this end was a relatively easy task. "The public
interest" was perceived to be the outcome of professional,
scientific land management. Hence, if the agency responded
to its task professionally and managed the lands using
scientific silvicultural, fire, flood and pest control
practices, the outcomes would, by definition, coincide with
the public interest.
But, the conception of what constitutes "the public
interest" has changed. No longer is the Forest Service
merely able to exercise its technical expertise in land
management. Now it is expected to also consider many non-
technical, judgmental values in decisionmaking that are
counter to the conservation values that dominated for so
long. Now it is expected to weigh values that yield no
measurable commercial return from the national forests. No
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longer do Forest Service scientific management practices and
technical analyses automatically result in outcomes
satisfying "the public interest." The agency is charged with
making some difficult social choices that are political, not
scientific, in nature. Like most administrative agencies,
the Forest Service is unequipped to do so.
Public Administration and the Public Interest
The Forest Service is not alone in its charge to
represent the public interest in decisionmaking while having
many publics advocating just as many different public
interests. That is the responsibility of most administrative
agencies. The federal government generally adopts
responsibility for tasks for which a broader public interest
exists that otherwise would not be met. In fact, many
administrative agencies arose out of the same scientific
management ideal that gave birth to the Forest Service. [64]
How do these other agencies define and then satisfy "the
public interest?" As one student of public administration
theory has phrased it: "If the bureaucrat is exposed to the
babel of many voices, speaking different tongues to convey
various messages, how can he know which among competing
alternatives he ought to choose?" [65]
Unfortunately, there is no single answer to this
question. Public administration theorists have long debated
but never resolved how administrators are to determine and
then serve "the public interest." Three different theories
have been offered regarding the role of public
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administrators: Administrative Rationalism, Administrative
Platonism and Administrative Realism. The Administrative
Rationalists assume that efficient management coincides with
the public interest. In Herbert Simon's words:
The criterion which the administrator applies to
factual problems is one of efficiency.... Once the
system of values which is to govern an administrative
choice has been specified, there is one and only one
"best" decision... [66]
While this view prevailed during the progressive conservation
era when scientific management principles were devised, it is
seldom professed today. Today the specified value system is
internally inconsistent. For example, the problem frequently
faced by the Forest Service is how to choose between
commercial and non-commercial values that have legislatively
been given equal weight even though they are often
incompatible. The Rationalists' theory is unenlightening
when, within the boundaries of "efficiency," several
legitimate outcomes are possible.
The Administrative Platonists, while not in total
agreement on how to operationalize their theories, view
public administrators as taking a more active approach in
defining the public interest and then using technical
expertise to achieve it. For example, Paul Appleby notes
that:
Neither the simple reconciliation of private interests
nor their reconciliation modified by considerations of
public interest is in the end a technical performance,
no matter how many technical factors may figure in it.
It is a political function, involving essentially the
weighing of forces and the subjective identification
of the narrow area within which these forces may be
280
balanced and the exercising of discretion concerning
the point within that area at which acceptability and
public interest may be effectively and properly
maximized. [67]
To a large extent the Forest Service adheres to this latter
view of appropriate behavior. The agency acknowledges the
many publics affected by its decisions and thus the necessity
to move beyond just technical analysis in decisionmaking.
Forest Service officials perceive it to be their
responsibility to seek out and then weigh the public interest
when making decisions. Unfortunately, though, this approach
does not satisfy the many publics; the "babel of voices" only
grows louder with their efforts. As one student of these
theories concludes, the problem with the Administrative
Platonists is that "they have described the public interest
as a thing of substance, independent of the decisional
process and absolute in its terms." [68]
The Administrative Realists, in contrast, argue that
there is no such thing as "the public interest" and thus the
key to administrative decisionmaking is in the process by
which the "babel of voices" is quieted, not gelled into a
single will. David B. Truman describes this view that "the
public interest" is a non-existant entity:
Many...assume explicitly or implicitly that there is
an interest of the nation as a whole, universally and
invariably held and standing apart from and superior
to those of the various groups included within it...
such an assertion flies in the face of all that we
know of the behavior of men in a complex society.
Were it in fact true, not only the interest group but
even the political party should properly be viewed as
an abnormality....Assertion of an inclusive "national"
or "public interest" is an effective device in many...
situations....In themselves, these claims are part of
281
the data of politics. However, they do not describe
any actual or possible political situation within a
complex modern nation. In developing a group
interpretation of politics, therefore, we do not need
to account for a totally inclusive interest, because
one does not exist. [69]
The Realists' observation coincides with the current Forest
Service dilemma over oil and gas exploration decisions.
There are many publics affected by these decisions and each
is advocating decisions satisfying its particular concerns,
arguing that they coincide with "the public interest." The
Forest Service decisionmakers have been unable to define a
particular "public interest" to which the many publics will
agree. It appears, then, that the Realists might provide
some direction for the Forest Service out of its current
dilemma. One of the major criticisms levelled against the
Realists, though, is that they have been unable to articulate
an operational definition for converting their theory to
practice. [70] Perhaps the closest guide to implementation
is Appleby's statement that public administration:
is the eighth political process. It is a popular
process in which vast numbers of citizens participate,
in which assemblages of citizens comprise power units
contending with each other, in which various
governmental organizations are themselves functional
representatives of special interests of many citizens,
and in which these organizations themselves contend
mightily with each other in the course of working out
a consensus that translates many special interests
into some workable approximation of public interest.
This process is as essential to the evolvement of
governmental action as public debate, and closely akin
to it. [71]
The Forest Service rejects the Administrative Realists'
theory, though. Agency officials argue that it is their
responsibility to make these decisions, not to turn their
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authority over to the vocal, but not-necessarily
representative, public. [72] Instead, the agency seems to
adhere to the Administrative Platonists point of view. Agency
officials seem confident that by determining and then
analyzing the many different interests at stake, an outcome
can be determined that will coincide with the public
interest. But, the "babel of voices" that arises when these
decisions are to be made is not quieted by administrative
decisions stamped with the Forest Service label: "Made In
The Public Interest." The Forest Service adherence to a
Platonist-type ideology does not direct it out of its
predicament.
The USFS Decisionmaking Process
USFS officials are fully aware of the many perceptions
of the public interest in their decisions. They, perhaps
more than anyone, acknowledge the inherent difficulty of the
decisions to be made in the face of these competing demands.
But, in many ways, they feel vindicated by these contrary
opinions. If left to its own devices, "the public" would be
constantly embattled, never able to decide who gets what. By
having an agency of trained public land managers, these
decisions can be made in a systematic and scientific manner
in which all the different competing interests can be heard
and their interests balanced. Theoretically, this approach
should lead to decisions that best approximate the "public
interest."
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The Forest Service Manual clearly states that it is the
Forest Service's administrative responsibility to "weigh the
public's interest" in decisionmaking:
The Forest Service...encourages identification of the
values to be protected, definition of resource
protection and mitigation needs -- based on relative
values of minerals and impacted resources -- and a
weighing of the public interest where there is a
conflict. If, after such weighing of public interest,
the potential adverse impact of mineral development on
surface values of an area is judged to be unjustified,
considering the value of the minerals, the Forest
Service shall recommend (or require, where
appropriate) no leasing. [73]
But, assessing the "relative values of minerals and impacted
resources" and "weighing the public interest" are much easier
said than done, especially when there are so many publics,
each advocating different outcomes, each allegedly in "the
public interest." How do Forest Service field staff
implement this mandate?
The Cache Creek/Little Granite Creek drilling permit
review process illustrates the thorough information gathering
and public participation efforts of the Forest Service in
decisionmaking. In June 1980, a three-day public scoping
meeting was held in Jackson, Wyoming, to help the US Forest
Service/US Geological Survey task force in charge of
developing this EIS determine what issues and topics should
be addressed in it. Before the public scoping meeting, the
interagency task force drafted a preliminary scoping document
to provide a base for discussion at the meeting. This
document was distributed to over 300 groups, individuals and
public agencies. Responses as well as additional ideas could
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be presented at the formal scoping meeting, in writing to the
USGS or by calling the USGS collect. In addition, public
hikes to both proposed wellsites augmented the scoping
meeting. [74]
Public input and fact-finding were hardly limited to
this three day scoping session, though. The USGS/FS task
force prided itself in its extensive "consultation with
others." In Chapter VIII of the draft EIS, entitled
"Consultation with Others," the interagency task force
discussed the tremendous amount of input and analysis
supporting the EIS conclusions. The discussion noted that
the original USFS Environmental Assessment on the proposal
was completed in December 1977 and that more than 200 written
comments were received on it. A formal public meeting was
then held in January 1978. Next, an additional USGS
"unusual" environmental assessment prompted more input both
in writing and public hearings held in late July and early
August 1979. The chapter went on to list the task force's
information gathering efforts:
Over 160 people attended the public (scoping) meeting,
and some 35 individuals participated in the "show-me"
trips to the proposed wellsites.
Well over 1,000 private individuals were personally
contacted or consulted for information on technical
aspects by project scientists during the course of the
EIS investigation.
A series of [eighteen] reports was prepared by
Government personnel and private consultants to
analyze and document various aspects of the Cache
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Creek-Bear Thrust EIS. The reports cover
environmental, engineering and legal issues.
Personal contacts with concerned individuals were made
by the task force leaders and other members of the
USGS and FS throughout the analysis period. These
personal contacts, and other informal meetings, were
extremely important in developing an understanding of
the various publics' positions....All such information
has been used to assess the issues and concerns,
public needs, demands and alternative formulation.
[75]
It is not clear that this extensive public involvement
made the Forest Service's decision any easier. In fact, the
manner in which the public was involved in the Cache
Creek/Little Granite Creek process may actually have
complicated the agency's task. As they acquired more and
more information either about technical or ecological aspects
of the proposal or about public attitudes towards it, the
agencies in many ways isolated themselves from the various
interest groups. Perceiving themselves to be "the
decisionmaker," the two agencies set themselves apart from
interests directly affected by the decision. As a result,
each interest group saw its task to be one of convincing the
federal agencies of the "rightness" of their position and the
"wrongness" of their adversaries' positions. This approach
shadowed the legitimacy of all affected groups; it provided
no means for resolving the conflict that existed between
them. Eventually, this approach led these groups to distrust
the decisionmaking process and hence reject those decisions
made by it. In the end, the Forest Service decided to permit
exploratory drilling at both wellsites. As has been
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discussed, this decision outraged several local, state and
national groups and led to several administrative appeals,
state hearings and lawsuits. [76]
The Cache Creek/Little Granite Creek case illustrates
the Forest Service emphasis on public involvement in
decisionmaking. Furthermore, the outcome of this case is
representative of public dissatisfaction with this process.
While the Forest Service's approach to decisionmaking might
give the public land managers confidence that the final
assessment is in the "public's interest," it leaves the many
different publics feeling unrepresented. In selecting its
"preferred alternative," in the Palisades environmental
assessment, the agency found, after obtaining and then
analyzing public input, that this alternative:
is responsive to the key issues raised by the public
since it balances the intense opposing concerns of
environmental groups and the energy industry.
(emphasis added) [77]
But, the Sierra Club disagreed with this assessment and
appealed the Forest Service's decision, eventually taking the
agency to court.
The many publics do not perceive the USFS to be
responsive to their concerns when the decisions reached run
counter to their individual best interest. While the current
administrative decisionmaking process provides for
participation by these many publics in order that the
concerns of each are aired, it is not designed to accomodate
their concerns in a way that satisfies them that they have
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indeed been accomodated as well as possible. Interest airing
is not interest accomodation.
The Forest Service predicament persists not because it
has not been acknowledged or analyzed but rather because
proposed reforms have not been viable. Analyzed in the
context of the long held public land management paradigm,
past prescriptions are based on the assumption that
scientifically trained land managers are capable of making
these decisions and the only question is how to bound their
discretion to ensure that all interests at stake are fairly
represented. As a result, most reform prescriptions as well
as Forest Service procedural changes, have been inadequate.
Despite extensive public involvement efforts, despite
extensive public input to and review of decisions, and
despite Congressional mandates that all values be
represented, frequently one user group or another is not
satisfied that their concerns have been accomodated. These
groups distrust a process that yields decisions contrary to
their best interests and hence they oppose those decisions
and appeal to other avenues for obtaining representation. To
use Professor Stewart's terms, the process is a "negative"
one with energies devoted to checking administrative behavior
in the judicial arena rather than an "affirmative" one
ensuring representation in the administrative arena. It is a
political problem lacking a political process in which the
competing demands can be made and resolved through bargaining
and compromise.
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The Forest Service Capacity for Change
Conflict is the foundation of most social problems. [78]
Bargaining and compromise to resolve disputes are the rule
rather than the exception in solving such problems. If some
aspects of land management have become more politicized and
if power has become fairly well-balanced as suggested here
and elsewhere, why do bargaining and compromise not naturally
occur in the management of public lands? As the land
management task developed political aspects, why did a
political system not evolve to accomodate it?
While the Forest Service has employed several public
involvement methods in order to represent all
decisionmaking, its efforts have clearly not
Some might argue that the mismatch between poli
policy process persists because the Forest
resisting the type of change that must occur.
agency acknowledges a problem and desires chang
always a simple task to effect that change.
extensive literature on organizational behav
barriers to change are analyzed and means
effecting change when desired. [79] In
concerns in
been enough.
cy problem and
Service is
Even when an
e, it is not
There is an
ior in which
explored for
The Limits of
Organizational Change, Herbert Kaufman identifies a long list
of factors that inhibit change within an organization. [80]
Change is not effected when the benefits of maintaining an
organization's stability outweigh the benefits of change.
Sometimes members actually oppose change because of
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individual advantage in maintaining the status quo, in order
to protect the quality of the good or service produced by the
organization or because of the psychic costs associated with
change regardless of its overall benefits. Often there is an
aversion to the unpredictability inevitably brought about by
change. There are also "systemic" barriers posed by limited
resources with which to effect change, sunk costs precluding
change, official constraints on behavior imposed by laws,
regulations, rules, and previous decisions as well as
unofficial constraints posed by traditional rules or norms.
The Forest Service exhibits many of Kaufman's "systemic"
barriers to change. Change in the agency must overcome
professional norms and traditional procedures where the
resistance is greatest. Ashley Schiff's Fire and Water [81]
describes the twenty year battle within the agency to replace
the traditional fire prevention policies with improved
controlled-burning practices. Fire prevention had become as
much a philosophy as a professional practice within the
agency. Even raw data proving its inadequacies could do
little to change the historic zeal with which foresters
denounced forest fires as one of the worst threats to the
national forests. In-house research indicated, as early as
1927, that controlled burning often improved timber health
and productivity. But, change in Forest Service policies did
not come about until the late 1940's. Even then it was not
without considerable resistance. The informal network within
the forestry profession ridiculed the idea and hence had
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developed a professional bias against it that was difficult
to overcome.
The US Forest Service has a level of professionalism and
political independence that distinguishes it from most
administrative agencies. It was established at the turn of
the century and is staffed by professionally trained land
managers. Its chief officer is not a political appointee but
is instead a forester who has always worked his way up the
ranks of the Service. The Forest Service is highly
decentralized with most management tasks occurring in the
field, far from the agency's Washington headquarters. But,
as Herbert Kaufman discovered in The Forest Ranger, [82] it
is structured to be directly controlled by and responsive to
executive orders. Conformance with organizational procedures
is tightly enforced by a highly-detailed Forest Service
Manual, by ongoing intra-agency review procedures and through
long-established professional norms that are reinforced in
university-level forestry education as well as in on the job
experience. The organization rewards conformance to its
norms by promotion and advancement. There are few incentives
for innovation or change. Hence, as Ashley Schiff
discovered, the stability of the organization resists change.
While the agency's stability and traditional norms may
inhibit change the Forest Service's tightly-reined
hierarchical structure facilitates change when it is deemed
appropriate by agency executive officials. And, as has been
seen, there has been some dramatic change in the agency in
291
response to the demands of different interest groups for
representation. Public participation programs were rapidly
instituted during the early 1970's where they had previously
been nonexistant. In 1970, public participation became an
official Forest Service policy. [83] In 1972, the agency
established its "Inform & Involve" program. This program
illustrated a dramatically changed perspective on the part of
the Forest Service about the value of public input. It
directed field staff to:
Broaden contacts with groups, associations, and
organizations to better inform and involve a wide
range of the public on current programs, projects and
issues.
The key...is "awareness," and the key to awareness
is "listening."...It means seeking out and listening
to individuals and groups which may have traditionally
opposed certain aspects of Forest Service management.
Recognize that public involvement is an essential
part of decision making since it can enable the
decision maker to render a better decision.
Discard any notion that actions which will affect
environmental quality or the public interest can be
judged only by professionals.
Keep in mind that all interest groups are champions
of some aspects of good resource management.
Disregarding the concern of specific groups on one
issue because of extreme controversy may well weaken
their desire to get involved on other issues in which
they could make valuable contributions.
Recognize that public involvement requires that it
must be sought out before a decision has been reached.
[84]
The Forest Service now uses what it terms "Information and
Education" efforts to help groups understand different public
lands issues and proposals. Public meetings and tours are
held much more frequently now than in the past. One-to-one
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meetings with different groups are also used more often to
obtain input as well as inform the public. [85] The Forest
Service is hardly ignoring the problem; nor does it appear to
be resisting change. But, that change that does occur is
clearly defined by professional norms and clearly within the
context of scientific decisionmaking consistent with the land
management paradigm.
Retargeting Reform: The Public Land Management Paradigm
The paradigm remains intact for two reasons. First,
past reform proposals as well as Congressional mandates have
reinforced it. Society continues to turn to scientific
experts when tough problems must be solved; in this respect,
the Forest Service cannot be blamed for its current dilemma.
Second, the paradigm prevails because it represents the norms
of the public forestry profession. While Forest Service
officials acknowledge public dissatisfaction with their
decisions, they respond, as seen, by providing more
opportunities for public input to decisionmaking. But, the
decisionmaking itself still occurs through technical analyses
consistent with this paradigm. This approach should come as
no surprise considering who established the paradigm at the
outset.
Past efforts to change the behavior of the public
forestry profession, have, not surprisingly, failed. The
culture of a profession is, by nature, self-reinforcing and
stabilizing. By design, it resists external pressures for
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change. The profession defines its role and establishes it
in society; it would be counter to the concept of professions
if outsiders were able to fill this role. [86] Political
scientist Frederick C. Mosher explains why this is true:
Professionalism rests upon specialized knowledge,
science and rationality. There are correct ways of
solving problems and doing things. Politics is seen
as constituting negotiation, elections, votes,
compromises -- all carried on by subject-matter
amateurs. Politics is to the professions as ambiguity
is to truth, expediency to rightness, heresy to true
belief. [87]
Mosher has identified several common characteristics of
professions. First, their purpose is to elevate or maintain
its "stature and strength in the public image." Second,
their objective is to expand the boundaries of work in which
they have "exclusive prerogatives to operate." Third, they
establish and maintain professional standards and norms
through education and entrance requirements to the
profession. Finally, they identify their niche by
concentrating on "work substance" and expertise that sets
them apart from other groups or individuals. [88] The
forestry profession is no different than other professions in
this respect. That they accept the responsibility for the
expanded public land management task is not surprising; nor
is the way they have responded.
As seen, the Forest Service's public involvement efforts
have not proven sufficient to end interest group opposition
to many Forest Service decisions. The agency's efforts to
obtain input from "the public" do not always satisfy groups
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that their best interests have indeed received a fair
hearing. While official Forest Service directives now
require that field staff listen to the public and keep it
informed, these directives do not explain what the field
staff should do with this input once they have acquired it.
Is simply "considering" it all that is required? One Sierra
Club Director praised the Forest Service public involvement
efforts but lamented that, once decisions are made, "it is
like they never listened." [89] While a problem of interest
group opposition was noted by Forest Service officials and a
solution seen in public involvement, the involvement that
occurred, even though rapidly instituted and thorough, has
not been sufficient to avert continuing and successful
opposition to decisions made.
In the oil and gas case analyzed in the last two
chapters, it became clear that the institutional means have
not been provided to accommodate the concerns of affected
groups. The power bestowed on these many groups is a
political power that can now only be used to question
decisions after they are made but not to ensure that concerns
will be accommodated in decisionmaking itself. The authority
to make these decisions still rests appropriately with the
Forest Service. But, the agency's power to implement
decisions' once made has dwindled as that of different
interest groups has grown.
Congress has not necessarily shirked its duties by
passing these tough resource allocation decisions to
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administrative agencies. Because of the level of information
needed and number and complexity of decisions to be made, it
would be infeasible to expect Congress to make these
decisions. But, by framing its task to administrative
agencies as it has, Congress has couched a political problem
in technical terms. In both the language and intent of the
numerous natural resource statutes, Congress has implicitly
labelled the decisions to be made as technical, best left to
the professionals trained to make them. It has instructed
the Forest Service to consider and weigh all values in
decisionmaking. In so doing, Congress has reconfirmed the
progressive ideal that professionally managed national
forests, by definition, serve "the public interest." In this
sense, any need for change has been overshadowed by an
apparent Congressional validation of established Forest
Service decisionmaking procedures. In so doing, it has
failed to provide the political means for making these
decisions. It has given power to the many different
interests with which to advocate and protect their concerns
and has thereby indirectly curbed administrative discretion.
But it has not provided a forum within which this power can
be exercised. As a result, the power must be used in a
negative manner to question agency procedures judicially
rather than to directly represent their interests in
Stewart's "affirmative" manner.
Both Congressional mandates and past reform proposals
have cast professional land managers into a comprehensive
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planning role in addition to their traditional scientific
land management role. But there is little reason to expect
that foresters trained to address conservation ends in land
management will be able to suddenly adopt this comprehensive
view. It is counter to their professional background and
norms. In fact, considering these inherent professional
biases, we should probably be more surprised that they have
responded as dramatically as they have in providing means for
obtaining public input than critical that these efforts have
not been enough. Public land managers are not like
comprehensive city planners who obtain information and
develop alternatives that are then subjected to a political
decisionmaking process by elected officials. [90] The task
that has been given to Forest Service officials is to both
develop these alternatives and then make the highly political
decisions. That the outcome is opposition and litigation is
hardly surprising. Means for making these political, as
opposed to scientific, decisions have never been prescribed.
Hence, the response conforms to professional norms.
The technical expert model of decisionmaking that has
long been the hallmark of the progressive conservation ideal
is not adequate when viewed in the context of today's public
land management task. The political, resource allocation
dimensions of the decisions to be made must be recognized
rather than hidden within technical analyses. In order to
avoid the now pervasive and costly opposition, each interest
group must be satisfied that its concerns have been
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represented. The established process is clearly unsuccessful
at this task; procedural change is needed. Experts alone are
not able to represent the many interests at stake, no matter
how systematic, how thorough nor how objective they may try
to be. These disputes must be resolved through the direct
involvement of affected interests. The indirect
representation approach has proven itself incapable of making
viable decisions; the process is no longer trusted by the
many affected groups and individuals. A reformed paradigm
must not only acknowledge the limits of scientific expertise
and technical analysis in decisionmaking but include other
means for making the value judgments that invariably must be
made. It must recognize the legitimacy and forcefulness of
the now well-distributed power and direct it towards
facilitating acceptable decisions, in contrast to opposing
unacceptable decisions.
The next chapter discusses how institutional reform
might be accomplished in oil and gas leasing and permitting.
It draws from a growing theory and practice of environmental
conflict management to illustrate how other, similar disputes
have been resolved. It indicates that, in many ways, this
public land issue is ripe for reform. Finally, Chapter 6
proposes specific steps that might be taken by both the
Forest Service and Secretary of Agriculture to facilitate
consensus among the interests involved in oil and gas
exploration disputes and thereby reduce the costly but now-
inevitable opposition to decisions reached.
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CHAPTER 6
EIGHT STEPS TOWARDS RESOLVING
OIL AND GAS LEASING AND PERMITTING DISPUTES
Confronting 150 lease applications for the Washakie
Wilderness in Wyoming, Shoshone National Forest Supervisor
Randall Hall expressed his dilemma, one facing most forest
supervisors today:
I don't see where there is any middle ground between
the oil people and the environmentalists when it comes
to questions of wilderness....whichever way we go, I'm
afraid we'll end up in court. [1]
Hall has responsibility for making these leasing decisions.
As described in the Forest Service Manual, he must balance
the competing interests of the environmentalists, industry
and the public in general. In other words, he is responsible
for identifying that elusive middle ground. But, how he
might successfully do so has never been adequately defined.
M. Rupert Cutler, when Assistant Secretary for Natural
Resources and Environment in the Department of Agriculture,
acknowledged that no "formula" exists to guide land managers
to a "right" choice. [2] Similarly, USFS Chief Max Peterson
bemoans the fact that few of these decisions can be proven
"measurably correct." [3]
To try to avert the non-conclusive nature of their
analyses, Forest Service officials apply even more
systematic methods, computer tabulations, cost/benefit and
other extensive analytical tools to the decisionmaking
problem. But, as seen, their efforts have been to no avail.
Technical analysis, no matter how thorough and seemingly
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objective, does not assure user groups that their concerns
have been accommodated as well as possible. Consequently,
opposition persists.
Consciously or not, Congress has significantly
redistributed power over public land management. And, because
the institutional means have not been provided to direct this
power towards developing acceptable outcomes, it is instead
used to oppose unacceptable decisions. The result is
paralysis of the decisionmaking process. Efforts to avert
this outcome have centered on public participation and more
visible decisionmaking in hopes of assuring public land users
that their concerns have been considered. But, as seen, these
efforts have not succeeded.
In many cases there is no middle ground; the clash
between values is too extreme. In just as many other cases,
a middle ground may exist. But, the decisionmaking process is
not structured to determine what that point is. Shoshone
National Forest Supervisor Randall Hall, like all Forest
Supervisors and Regional Foresters, is responsible for making
a decision. He follows all the steps outlined in the
Forest Service Manual. But, these guidelines cannot tell him
which decision to make. And, he is under pressure from
several different groups to make very different decisions.
Each time he tries to balance these competing interests, each
time he tries to pinpoint and then achieve that middle
ground, his decisions are contested. The process encourages
this opposition by providing no other means for
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accommodation.
The reform recommended in this chapter institutionalizes
an alternative forum in which affected groups can influence
decisions in the making rather than oppose decisions once
made. It provides an alternative to the defensive posture
now adopted universally and without choice by public land
user groups. The process proposed is one in which
professional foresters do not alone make the critical value
judgments that must be made before a decision can be
rendered. It substitutes a consensual approach to
decisionmaking for that dictated by the long-held land
management paradigm. It encourages those groups affected by
a particular decision to work together in developing a
proposed action for the Forest Service. By participating
directly, the process focuses efforts on real issues of
concern rather than, strategically, on issues that "win." It
encourages cooperation, not adversarial behavior. It seeks to
accommodate concerns directly in decisionmaking and allow
those affected groups to ensure that their concerns have been
accommodated as well as is possible. It focuses the broadly
distributed power over public land management decisions in an
affirmative rather than negative manner. [4] The objective
of this process is to promote accepted and hence decisive
decisionmaking.
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Politicizing vs. Depoliticizing the Process
The argument made here is not that authority over
national forest management in general, or oil and gas leasing
and permitting recommendations in particular, should be given
to some organization other than the Forest Service. Despite
the difficulty of the task, the Forest Service remains the
one body with the most experience and expertise about the
national forests and forest management. The question is not
who would make these decisions better but rather how might
the Forest Service reduce the now inevitable and costly
opposition to its decisions in order to better fulfill its
complex mandate.
From a political science perspective, many would argue
that the problem exists today because too much opportunity
for public participation has been provided. They argue for a
return to "responsible governance" and the cultivation rather
than the ridicule and demise of the public service
professions. [5] But, the process proposed here is not meant
to question the public forestry profession and to replace it
with a purely political decisionmaking body. Instead, it is
designed to assign the profession those tasks for which it
has expertise and should prevail. And, in those cases where
Congress has mandated tasks that require judgments beyond
this scientific expertise, the agency receives assistance by
those directly affected by the decision.
Public administrators in foreign countries are
frequently bemused by the widespread distrust of American
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administrative agencies and the political realm in which
their decisions must be made. [6] In their countries, public
administration is based upon trust in professionals to do
their jobs and, in so doing, to serve national interests.
These foreign public administrators would undoubtedly be
appalled at the proposal made here, one that seemingly
further politicizes an already highly-politicized situation.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that the American
public is not going to suddenly shift a growing distrust into
the trust and respect that non-American administrators
advocate. Similarly, it is not clear that, in our democracy,
we would ever want to "depoliticize" the process by removing
those avenues for review and revision of administrative
decisions that preserves our "government for the people and
by the people." Such "depoliticization" is, in itself, a
highly political undertaking. Nor does it seem, in this case
at least, that it would accomplish the public policy
objectives that Congress has so enthusiastically embraced.
Whether this forum is further politicizing the process
or actually depoliticizing it is not obvious. As seen in
Chapter 3, the process is already both extremely political
and extremely ineffective. By bringing groups together in a
cooperative setting (as opposed to the adversarial and
divisive setting established by the current process) to use
their power to directly influence the outcomes of
decisionmaking, this process appears to be further fueling an
already excessively political process. However, by looking
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at the outcome, if successful, there is support rather than
opposition for decisions made. And, at that level of
evaluation, it appears to be depoliticized. Regardless, if
the point is to facilitate oil and gas leasing and permitting
decisionmaking rather than have it delayed indefinitely in
appeals and lawsuits, whether the process is more or less
politicized is perhaps irrelevant.
Environmental Conflict Management
The idea that some environmental disputes might be
managed and resolved is not a new one. For the past decade,
academics and practitioners have explored ways in which these
conflicts might be resolved through cooperative, consensus-
building processes rather than in the traditional,
adversarial manner that current processes often encourage.
[7] Disillusionment with the results of court decisions as
well as the limits of administrative appeals have led some
traditional adversaries to the bargaining table in hopes of
achieving a more desirable outcome. [8] Moreover, the costs
involved in current appeals procedures and judicial reviews
are encouraging environmental and community groups,
development and business interests, as well as public
agencies to seek other means for resolving their differences.
These alternative processes have led to more creative,
problem-solving sessions and outcomes often not possible in
the traditional, administrative or judicial proceedings.
And, in turn, past successes are attracting other groups in
311
additional cases to try resolving their differences rather
than automatically proceeding to the courts.
The actual bargaining that occurs in settling
environmental disputes may take on many different forms.
Gerald Cormick of the Institute for Environmental Mediation
in Seattle, Washington, makes the distinction between
conflicts and disputes. His distinction is helpful to this
discussion. He defines conflicts as occurring "when there is
a disagreement over values or scarce resources" while a
dispute "is an encounter involving a specific issue over
which the conflict in values is joined." [9] It follows then
that "resolution of a conflict is achieved when the basic
value differences that separate the parties are removed," and
"settlement of a dispute is achieved when the parties find a
mutually acceptable basis for disposing of the issues in
which they are in disagreement, despite their continuing
differences over basic values." [10] Using Cormick's terms,
the process proposed here is not designed to resolve the
fundamental value differences separating groups like the
Sierra Club or The Wilderness Society and the Mountain States
Legal Foundation or Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association.
It will not create universal agreement on the proper
allocation of public land resources. These value differences
will always exist. The process proposed here is designed to
settle the national forest management disputes that arise
because of these underlying value differences.
Many national forest management decisions involve
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questions of "right" against "right." All concerns, even
when conflicting, are legitimate. Yet, the decisions to be
made inevitably affect some groups beneficially at the
expense of others. As such, legitimate claims seem to go
unanswered. Tradeoffs inevitably occur in decisionmaking but
not all groups believe they were fairly treated when these
tradeoffs were made. To be viable, decisionmaking must
acknowledge the legitimacy of each set of concerns. It must
assure each group that their best interests are represented
in the decision made. That is the intent of the proposed
process.
Environmental conflict resolution is not merely the
subject of academic thought and discussion. The examples of
successful attempts at all levels of government to resolve
environmental disputes are numerous. Such a list, while too
long to detail here, would include cases involving wilderness
and proposed wilderness areas and endangered species; cases
in which, at first glance, all involved would confidently
proclaim that "there is no middle ground!" The list would
even include an oil and gas exploration proposal in a
national forest under consideration for wilderness
designation. The reason that such disputes over "non-
negotiables" can be settled is not that one side "sells out"
or "caves in" to another. Rather, by substituting a
cooperative, consensus-building process for the more
traditional, adversarial process, groups can focus on issues
of direct concern to them rather than on positions with which
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they might "win." For example, when the endangered Whooping
Crane was threatened by construction of the proposed
Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming [11] or when the endangered Sandhill
Crane was threatened by construction of Interstate 10 in
Mississippi, [12] predictable battle lines were drawn.
Environmental interests fought to stop both proposals in
order to protect the endangered species. Development
interests sought to obtain approval for the proposals by
arguing for the benefits to be achieved. While the
predictable, costly and time-consuming court battles were
forecasted for both disputes, the eventual outcome differed
markedly. Dispute resolution processes were used to change
this position-orientation of the disputants (disapprove the
dam/approve the dam) to an issue-orientation (how can the
endangered species be protected and the energy or
transportation needs be satisfied?). By changing their
orientation, the disputants were able to then focus attention
on ways in which all concerns could be addressed. This
approach broadened the agenda of alternative solutions and
eventually led to settlements that would not have been
achieved in the courts. Similar processes have been used
successfully to resolve disputes over the allocation of
resources in Idaho's Gospel-Hump Wilderness Area, [13] to
develop a consensus on Colorado's wilderness designation
recommendations, [14] to protect an endangered bear in
Alaska's Kodiak Wildlife Refuge, [15] and to permit oil and
gas exploration in a Wyoming Further Planning Area while
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still preserving the area's wilderness characteristics. [16]
The growing literature on environmental conflict
management contains criteria on disputes that can likely be
resolved. [17] The raging dispute about how and where oil
and gas exploration should occur on national forest lands
fits the description of a dispute amenable to dispute
resolution. The different parties to the dispute -- those
having a stake in the decisions to be made -- are well-
identified and organized. The issues of dispute are well-
defined. Power between these parties has become well-
developed and balanced through lawsuits, administrative
rulings and Congressional mandates. These leasing and
permitting decisions inevitably must be made. The different
parties to the dispute have exhausted other avenues by which
to obtain representation to their satisfaction. It is costly
to them all to continue in an adversarial process, never
focusing on and resolving the real issues of concern.
Eight Steps Towards Resolving Oil and Gas Disputes
The eight procedural steps proposed below are designed
with four purposes in mind. First, they are designed to
supplement the current process, not to supplant it. They are
developed recognizing the authority and the responsibility of
the Forest Service in national forest management. Hence the
intent is to help Forest Service officials make viable
decisions, not to remove this responsibility from them.
Second, this amended process acknowledges both the judgmental
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and scientific aspects of the decisions to be made. It does
not ignore the critical need for Forest Service expertise and
experience in making these decisions. Nor does it overlook
the value judgments that must be made. It acknowledges that
professional expertise only goes so far in actually
determining what decision should be made once understanding
the implications of various alternatives. Third, this
process is designed to avoid the shortcomings of the current
process when highly controversial decisions are involved. It
is designed to encourage cooperation, not adversarial
behavior between the potentially affected user groups. It
should promote positive rather than negative involvement in
the process and, moreover, result in accepted, not contested,
decisions. Finally, this process is designed to provide a
forum within which groups can more directly ensure that their
concerns are addressed in decisionmaking. While it in no way
precludes administrative appeal or judicial review of
decisions made, it should encourage participation since it
provides a more direct and manageable outcome as opposed to
the uncertainties and costly delays associated with the
current process. In this sense, the process has built in
incentives for participation; each group's power should be
greatest in the process, not by following other avenues for
intervention.
These eight steps are not dissimilar to those
recommended by M. Rupert Cutler when he was Assistant
Secretary in the Department of Agriculture. [see chapter 5]
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The intent behind both Cutler's reforms and those recommended
here is to more directly involve affected groups in
decisionmaking and, in so doing, assure them that their
concerns have been accommodated. The difference between
these two reforms, however, is in how the steps are actually
executed and what is done with the information acquired in
each step and by whom. The reforms proposed here are not
consistent with the traditional land management paradigm.
These eight procedural steps have been developed
understanding both the nature of the oil and gas problem and
the lessons of past efforts to structure effective conflict
management procedures. Several criteria were mentioned above
that make the oil and gas dispute amenable to resolution.
But, merely satisfying these criteria does not alone
guarantee that a dispute will be resolved successfully. If
these elements are present in a dispute the next step is
structuring a process that facilitates negotiation and has
the trust of its participants and identifying and involving
the critical parties at the bargaining table. MIT Professor
Lawrence Susskind has highlighted the critical components of
successful negotiations and put them into a series of "nine
steps" to consider and follow as negotiations proceed:
1. Identify the parties with a stake in the outcome
2. Make sure all parties are appropriately represented
at the bargaining table
3. Narrow the agenda of items to be discussed and
debated; confront the fundamental value differences
and assumptions separating the parties so all sides
acknowledge and accept these differences
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4. Generate sufficient numbers of alternatives and
options for consideratoin
5. Agree on boundaries and time horizons for analysis
6. Amalgamate impacts
7. Determine fair compensation
8. Implement the agreement
9. Bind parties to the agreement [18]
Susskind's nine steps have been amended here to specifically
address the oil and gas leasing and permitting problem and to
acknowledge the Forest Service authority to make these
decisions. The specifics of this case make the binding and
implementation tasks somewhat different than those addressed
more generally by Professor Susskind. Because the Forest
Service implements the final decision, legal means are not
needed to bind all parties to the agreement. Instead,
incentives built into the process should ensure that
agreements, once reached, are then supported. In theory
these same incentives bind the Forest Service to the spirit
of the proposed decision.
The eight steps proposed for the oil and gas leasing and
permitting process are:
1. trigger this supplementary process into effect
when it might facilitate decisionmaking.
2. convene the different groups affected by the
decision
3. joint fact-finding
4. identify issues of concern
5. develop alternatives
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6. agree on a proposed decision
7. public review of proposed decision
8. decision implementation
Each of the eight steps is described below.
Forest Service decisionmaking is generally of two types,
occurring at two levels in the agency's hierarchy. The first
type of decision is that involving policy affecting agency-
wide administration. The Washington, D.C. Office establishes
policy. It structures how the agency will implement
Congressional mandates by developing guidelines, procedures
and regulations that are then placed in the lengthy Forest
Service Manual. An example would be the Further Planning
Area (FPA) Stipulation and Guidelines that played a critical
role in the Palisades leasing dispute discussed in Chapter 3.
The second type of decision occurs when officials in the
Regions, Forests and Districts apply these internal mandates
to site-specific proposals or general management tasks.
Implementing the FPA Stipulations and Guidelines in the
Palisades case, or permitting procedures in the Cache Creek
and Little Granite Creek cases are examples of site-specific
decisionmaking. Since disputes arise in both policymaking
and policy implementation, attempts to resolve them should
also occur at both levels.
Step 1
Triggering The Process
Not all oil and gas leasing and permitting decisions are
controversial; not all processes yield decisions that are not
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viable. Because this process is merely supplementing
existing procedures, it needs to be triggered when those
decisions arise that will potentially benefit by it;
decisions that exhibit those characteristics highlighted in
the cases described in Chapter 3.
The Assistant Secretary for Natural Resources and
Environment in the Department of Agriculture triggers this
process for policy level disputes. This assistant secretary
has jurisdiction over the Forest Service. The Forest Service
Chief triggers it for site specific disputes. These two
individuals are chosen because they do not have initial
responsibility for making the particular decision (although
that responsibility could be appealed to them by dissatisfied
groups). Hence they will not be party to the dialogue that
ensues. They are in a position of authority over those in
charge of making the final decision. As such, their action
legitimizes the process. Moreover, by institutionalizing this
process, the Assistant Secretary or USFS Chief empower the
different groups participating in it.
The Assistant Secretary or USFS Chief triggers this
process upon petition of the Forest Service Chief (for
policy-level decisions) or the responsible Regional Forester
(for site-specific cases). A particular public land user
potentially affected by the decision or the lease or permit
applicant can also petition to have this process triggered.
The process is designed to provide a means for facilitating,
not delaying decisions. It does not represent more work for
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the agency or other participants; just redirected efforts
that already occur. Hence, the incentives built into the
process should be such that only those cases that can
potentially be resolved will trigger it.
The process is triggered when the Forest Service Chief
or Assistant Secretary files a notice of intent in the
Federal Register to commence this process and convene the
different participants. Consistent with current lease and
permit review procedures, this notice should be supplemented
by announcements sent to those on the agency's already-
established mailing list of interested parties and to the
media. [19]
To a large extent, the cases that might benefit from
this process are self-defining. When the Washington Office
must develop rules governing decisionmaking, officials there
generally have a good idea at the outset what different
groups are going to think about these rules and the concerns
they will express. At this point there are few surprises.
Similarly, when a lease or permit application is forwarded to
a Forest Supervisor he has a good idea who is going to be
concerned and likely responses to it.
Decisions that should trigger this process are those in
which different interests clash and in which much is at
stake; decisions that potentially affect some user groups
beneficially and others adversely and hence will likely be
opposed however made. For example, should exploratory
drilling be proposed in an area with valued scenic resources,
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important wildlife habitat or wilderness characteristics,
this process should be commenced. In so doing, the critical
issues of concern can be identified early in the process.
Moreover, if there is a mutually acceptable outcome, it can
be determined before the predictable battle lines are drawn.
Policy decisions broadly affecting the management of specific
areas -- wildernesses, further planning areas, wild and
scenic rivers -- should trigger this process. More generally,
decisions should be triggered that will likely be contested
at later, implementation stages if disputes are not resolved.
Similarly, cases warrant triggering where initial
announcement of intent to develop a rule or regulation or
evaluate a lease or permit application generates conflicting
input. And, precedent-setting decisions broadly affecting a
range of different users in numerous decisions over time
should be subject to consensus-building in order to avert the
domino effect wherein they are contested when applied in
case-after-case.
Step 2
Convening Representative Groups
Three different groups participate in this process: a
government group, an applicant group and a land user group:
The government group represents those federal, (ie.
Forest Service, BLM, USGS, Fish and Wildlife Service, etc.)
state and local agencies or ruling bodies that have some
authority over the proposal. This is not a one-step
permitting process after which all permits are granted,
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however. Instead, it is an opportunity at the outset to
identify all requirements that must be satisfied and what
must be accomplished in order to satisfy them. In Getty Oil
Company's Little Granite Creek case, the Wyoming State Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission and the Wyoming State Game
and Fish Department would have been involved at the outset
rather than having to react after federal decisions had been
made.
The applicant group includes representatives of the
lease or permit applicant(s) as well as industry associations
or interest groups perceiving a larger stake affecting their
memberships because of a potentially precedent-setting
decision.
The public land user groups category represents those
individuals or groups currently using or proposing particular
uses for the public lands in question. This category
includes environmental organizations at the national,
regional and local level, grazing interests, outfitters, ORV
users, and any other groups or individuals with an interest
at stake in the decision.
In Step 2, these three different groups are individually
convened and representatives selected to participate in the
process. The Assistant Secretary or USFS Chief's Federal
Register announcement in Step 1 indicated their intent to
commence this process by convening the different groups. It
invited concerned groups to participate in selecting the
participants. (If every individual were to participate the
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process would be unwieldly and unlikely to succeed.) These
groups are convened and representatives self-selected by the
efforts of an independent convenor, at the request of the
Assistant Secretary or Forest Service Chief. A likely
candidate to serve as convener would be the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, should it be willing to take on
disputes of this nature. [20] Another possible convenor would
be the American Arbitration Association. [21] Representatives
of these organizations do not select the participants.
Instead, they assist the groups in selecting their own
representatives: people who are trusted, whose decisions
will be supported and accepted and who will be able to speak
for the groups they are representing. Throughout the process
these participants will maintain contact with their
constituencies. By this time, the national and regional
environmental and industry groups are well-organized and
identified. This should facilitate convening these groups.
The Assistant Secretary and Forest Service Chief may assist
the convener in bringing together the representatives for the
government group. The convener not only brings the groups
together but also assists them in understanding the process,
identifying concerns and coordinating efforts between
participants within a group.
The convenor's task of coordinating efforts within the
different groups is critical in order to avoid disjointed or
inconsistent negotiations. For example, when the Sierra Club
sued the Forest Service over leasing in the Palisades Area of
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Wyoming and Idaho, U.S. District Court (Washington, D.C.)
Judge Aubrey Robinson suggested that the groups try to settle
their differences out of court. He gave them one month to
reach a settlement before he would commence judicial
proceedings. While negotiations initially were encouraging,
disagreements and uncertainty on the part of the government
representatives (attorneys for the BLM, DOI and USFS) helped
to preclude any final agreement. The government
representatives did not have power to make the decisions
necessary to an agreement and hence had to continually go
back to their respective agencies before making any
commitments. They did not have expertise in the areas under
consideration and hence had to continually go back to agency
officials for information. Additionally, they had not
developed any consensus on a consistent negotiating strategy
at the outset so they actually represented two bargaining
teams, not one. While the lease applicants and the Sierra
Club seemed able to reach agreement on an outcome that would
accommodate their concerns to their satisfaction, the prob-
lems within the government team precluded this outcome. [22]
Three factors are critical in convening these groups.
First, participants must represent all interests at stake.
If they do not, then an overlooked group will not necessarily
support any agreement reached. For example, when leases were
originally filed in the Palisades area in 1977, the Forest
Service was in the midst of its wilderness reviews. It
initially decided to grant the leases but the Sierra Club
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appealed the decision. Upon appeal the Regional Foresters in
Regions I and II reached agreement with Sierra Club
representatives not to issue any leases in wilderness study
areas until the wilderness review was completed. [23] But,
since oil and gas industry representatives were not party to
these negotiations, they did not feel bound to the agreement
reached. As a result, as discussed in Chapter 3, the
Mountain States Legal Foundation took the Forest Service to
court to force them to make the leasing decisions. [24]
The second critical factor in convening these groups is
to ensure that participants have decisionmaking authority.
This requirement is critical to avoid the problem mentioned
in the Palisades case where government representatives had to
keep going back to the agencies for information and
direction. Third, participants must have the trust and
respect of the constituent groups they are representing in
order to make decisions that the group will support. If they
are not, there is nothing preventing a splinter group from
forming to oppose any agreement reached.
Step 3
Fact-Finding
The intent behind Steps 3 (Fact-finding), 4 (Issue
Identification), 5 (Developing Alternatives) and 6 (Agreement
on a Proposed Decision) is to more directly incorporate the
concerns of all potentially affected public land users in the
environmental assessment process. Rather than a "black box"
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approach to decisionmaking wherein Forest Service officials
both acquire and then assess information themselves, the
events that usually transpire in this "black box" are brought
out into the open with those affected directly participating
in it. In this way, critical facts are raised at the outset
rather than in criticizing analysis after-the-fact. Issues
of concern are raised initially and then alternatives devised
that specifically address these issues. In so doing, the
process avoids what current Secretary of the Interior James
Watt refers to as the "paralysis by analysis" that now
afflicts the process. [25] In the end, the process should
not have failed to gather or consider critical facts or have
overlooked viable alternatives.
Once the participants are convened, this process
essentially becomes an amended version of the current
environmental impact assessment process. As designed, this
process satisfies NEPA requirements for assessing the impacts
of several different alternatives before making a decision.
The Forest Service may want to consult with the Council on
Environmental Quality to determine whether or not scoping
requirements will be satisfied in this process or if an
additional public meeting should be held to accomplish the
required scoping objectives. This meeting, if required,
might help the participants ensure that their initial agenda
has not overlooked any critical issues. However, should
these participants have successfully been selected at the
outset to represent all affected groups, scoping is built
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into the fact-finding and issue identification stages and an
additional scoping meeting will likely raise few, if any, new
issues.
The first stage the Forest Service conducts in the
current process is acquiring information with which to make
their decision. In this amended process facts are similarly
compiled but in a more participatory manner. Meetings are
held during which agreement is reached between the three
groups on the scope and boundaries of the assessment. Once
these factors are defined, attention turns to acquiring the
information needed before a decision can be made. There is a
variety of different facts relevant to oil and gas leasing
and permitting decisionmaking: For example, what surface
resources exist in the area? What are likely impacts on
these resources and how might they be mitigated or avoided?
What is the probability of finding oil or gas in the area?
What different means are available to conduct drilling
operations? Who will likely be affected both beneficially
and adversely by the proposal and how, specifically, will
they be affected?
At this point, the three groups might want to select an
independent facilitator or mediator to assist them in the
next four steps. As defined by the American Arbitration
Association, a facilitator:
assists the parties to define the key issues and rank
them for orderly discussion, encourages the parties to
communicate clearly and makes sure that all parties'
opinions are heard, offers suggestions on the process
for problem solving, but does not offer opinions on
substantive issues, and remains available to assist
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the parties openly in a group, but does not ordinarily
meet with them privately. [26]
In contrast, a mediator:
educates the parties about the negotiation process and
helps them develop negotiating positions, assists
parties to understand each other's perceptions and
positions, helps the parties clarify the issues and
identify areas of conflict, cooperation and
compromise, serves as a "go-between" by meeting
privately with the parties, and occasionally offers
creative suggestions for possible solutions, and is
therefore concerned with the issues as well as with
the process. [27]
The original convenor from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service or the American Arbitration Association
could assist the groups in jointly selecting a facilitator or
mediator if desired. There are numerous organizations and
individuals nationwide offering environmental conflict
management services. [28]
Much information, given the agreed upon agenda, will
likely be provided by the applicant (particularly in the case
of an APD) or by Forest Service staff. Should the groups
believe that independent analysis is needed, private
consultants can be hired to address a specific question. The
process is iterative; should fact-finding reveal unforeseen
concerns, additional data may be desired and added to the
agenda. But, these determinations are made together by the
participants, not by an individual group. This process puts
the Forest Service in the position of representing and
protecting surface resources and other national forest
management objectives rather than appearing to represent the
applicant as in the current process.
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The joint fact-finding, issue identification and
alternative generation proposed here has been accomplished
successfully in at least one oil and gas permitting case.
Typically, after a lease application or APD is filed, the
applicant fades into the background while the Forest Service,
BLM and/or USGS evaluate the proposal. In controversial
cases where competing demands are placed on the same lands,
these federal agencies are then inevitably confronted with
counter claims. The process provides no forum for the
competing user groups to get together, focus discussion on
the issues that actually concern them and reach an outcome
satisfying them all while still within the Forest Service's
land management responsibilities. The situation is a win-
lose one. A case that illustrates the development of a
different forum for decisionmaking, with a cooperative rather
than adversarial dialogue, is the Fall Creek drilling
proposal.
In early 1978, Getty Oil filed an APD with the USGS
Office in Rock Springs, Wyoming, for leases it held in the
Fall Creek section of the Palisades Further Planning Area.
Getty officials were not aware of the ongoing leasing battle
in another section of the Palisades FPA. [See Chapter 3]
Getty's leases had been issued in May, 1970, well before the
area became part of the Palisades FPA during the Forest
Service's RARE II program. When Getty's APD was forwarded to
the USFS Bridger-Teton National Forest headquarters in
Jackson, Wyoming, public notice was routinely made of the
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impending Forest Service review and recommendation. Sierra
Club representatives immediately responded. They had just
filed their first appeal of the Regional Forester's decision
to recommend leasing in the Palisades area and they merely
supplemented this appeal with a new paragraph noting their
opposition to Getty's Fall Creek plans and why the Forest
Service should be prohibited from taking action on this APD
until after a final wilderness decision was made. [29]
Getty officials foresaw all too well the events that
would likely follow. They were prepared to drill then and
did not want to spend years in court before learning whether
or not they would ever be able to do so. As seen in the
Little Granite Creek case, this uncertainty and delay can be
very costly. Getty has spent almost $1.5 million and, four
years after filing its APD, does not know whether or not it
will ever be able to drill in Little Granite Creek. Hence,
in the Fall Creek case, rather than wait for the Sierra Club
appeals to be concluded with no guarantee that the courts
would not then become involved, Getty officials decided to
play a more active role than traditionally adopted by APD
applicants. [30]
At Getty's encouragement, Phil Hocker of the Sierra
Club, USFS Bridger-Teton National Forest minerals specialists
and the Forest Supervisor and Getty Oil representatives met
together at the Bridger-Teton National Forest headquarters in
Jackson to discuss Getty's proposal, the Sierra Club's
concerns and what could be done to merge the two. Phil
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Hocker expressed the Sierra Club concern that the proposed
drilling would be an intrusion into an area that was under
consideration for inclusion in the National Wilderness
Preservation System. The Sierra Club was concerned that such
an intrusion would ultimately affect the Palisades FPA
wilderness decision and that, on those grounds, it should be
deferred or denied. [31]
Getty representatives countered with assurances that the
access road to the Fall Creek wellsite could be maintained,
reclaimed and the entire site reseeded to mitigate any
impacts. They assured Hocker that Getty would work under
close Forest Service and Sierra Club supervision in
developing and reclaiming the site. Discussion then
proceeded about the specifics of road location, construction
and reclamation and how drilling activities would be
conducted. Visits to the Fall Creek site were made.
Agreement was reached setting forth the conditions under
which Getty could drill its exploratory well at Fall Creek,
how and where the access road and wellsite should be
developed, and how road and wellsite reclamation should
occur.
The dialogue established between Getty Oil, the Forest
Service and the Sierra Club over the Fall Creek well allowed
all three groups to determine whether or not a common ground
existed between them. Because Getty was willing to
accommodate Sierra Club concerns and because Sierra Club
representatives were willing to be upfront about their
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concerns with the proposal, the dialogue uncovered a mutually
acceptable operating plan. Forest Service officials viewed
the agreement as a godsend. They were relieved of the
frustrating and time-consuming burden of themselves trying to
resolve the differences between these two adversaries.
Moreover, the negotiations between the Sierra Club and Getty
are often extolled by Forest Service officials desiring
similar, harmonious outcomes in other difficult cases but
unsure how to achieve them. Getty has since drilled its well
and fully reclaimed its wellsite and access road to both the
Sierra Club and Forest Service's satisfaction. In fact, both
Phil Hocker and Bridger-Teton National Forest minerals
specialist Al Reuter describe the reclamation as "excellent"
and "a model for other reclamation activities." [32] These
negotiations do not occur more frequently, however, because
the institutional structure is not in place to encourage and
support them.
The process proposed in this chapter puts this
institutional structure into place. In so doing it promotes
a dialogue between affected groups such as that which
occurred between Getty and the Sierra Club. Obviously, not
all cases are amenable to resolution. But, when a mutually
acceptable alternative does exists as in the Fall Creek case,
this process will encourage the groups to determine what it
might be.
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Step 4
Identifying Issues Of Concern
In Step 4, each group identifies issues of concern given
their understanding of the proposal and its implications
derived from Step 3. Unlike the current process, this
approach encourages each group to focus attention on those
issues of direct concern rather than those issues that
strategically might "win." In the Cache Creek case,
attention shifted immediately from the community's specific
concerns (ie. impact of the well on town character, public
services and tourism) to positions (an EIS must be prepared
and no well should be permitted). The point of the proposed
process is to identify and then focus attention on the
specific issues of concern before they are transformed into
positions that then overshadow the actual concerns. In Step
4 these issues are broken down into their component parts.
For example, in the Cache Creek case what public services
would have been affected and in what manner? What aspects of
the tourist economy would likely have been affected and how?
In what way would town character be affected by the proposal?
By breaking down the issues in this manner, the participants
should be better able to identify and create alternatives
that specifically address these issues in the next step of
the process. Because the current process provides no
opportunity for the various groups to focus their attention
on specific issues, it forces the less flexible position-
taking response. As a result, opposition to whatever
decision is reached is guaranteed whether or not a mutually
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acceptable outcome exists.
Each group has an incentive to be upfront and thorough
about their concerns. The next step -- alternative
generation -- is designed to determine ways of addressing
those specific issues raised in Step 4. If all concerns are
not on the table, it is going to be difficult in the end for
a group to decline support for a scheme that seemingly
accommodates all issues raised. The point of this process is
to provide all affected parties with an opportunity to
directly contribute to a final decision that accommodates
their concerns; it does not preclude the other options. By
not participating forthrightly, honestly and reasonably in
working towards a mutually agreed upon solution, they merely
throw themselves back on the mercy of an uncertain appeals,
judicial and legislative system. Furthermore, the costs of
doing so are not minor; why bother participating in the
process if not sincerely? Moreover, it is not clear that
judicial and legislative avenues will be as responsive if a
means for settling the difficult dispute were not given a
fair chance. Because it is likely that groups will
participate together more than once in this process, failure
to negotiate in good faith will only make future negotiations
more difficult, with other parties less likely to be
reasonable and compromising.
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Step 5
Developing Alternatives
In the current process, Forest Service officials select
several alternative decisions that are analyzed in depth.
This selection is made after obtaining initial public input
and from the agency's own preliminary evaluations.
Frequently, these alternatives do not fully encompass the
concerns of one group or another. More frequently, the
"preferred alternative" is not the one that most closely
accommodates a particular group's concerns. And, as seen,
when a final decision is rendered it is contested on the
grounds that an equally legitimate alternative has not been
considered. The analysis is therefore labeled inadequate and
reassessment demanded. And, undoubtedly these claims are
valid since there is an infinite number of potential
alternatives depending upon how one bounds the analysis. [33]
The task before the participants in Step 5 is to develop
a list of mutually acceptable alternatives to be analyzed and
discussed. Each alternative is to be designed addressing the
issues raised in Step 4 and understanding the facts gathered
in Step 3. As alternatives are developed, each group makes
sure that its constraints, legal requirements and other
concerns are understood and addressed.
Developing these alternatives can best be described as
side-by-side problem solving. Rather than selecting a
standard range of alternatives, the alternatives generated in
this process specifically address the issues raised and are
developed cooperatively and creatively as in the Fall Creek
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case. The Forest Service frequently requires different
mitigation measures for exploratory drilling operations and
different stipulations on leases. These measures either
completely avoid or minimize potential impacts to surface
resources. In the proposed process, these mitigation
measures are evaluated and applied in a manner that is
visible for all to see and in a manner that ensures each
group of its intent. In so doing, it should avoid any
distrust or misunderstanding of the conclusions reached. For
example, in the Palisades case, the Sierra Club was not
convinced that Forest Service lease stipulations for
protecting wildlife habitat and wilderness resources were
sufficient. Sierra Club representatives had not been
involved in the analysis that developed these alternatives
and therefore did not have confidence in the intent behind
the stipulations. They did not trust the Forest Service's
assurances because of contradictory administrative actions in
other areas. As a result, they took the Forest Service to
court, demanding an EIS before a final decision was rendered.
The Washington, D.C. district court judge in this case ruled
that an EIS was not required because the stipulations were
enforceable to the extent of precluding exploratory drilling.
[See Chapter 5] While the Sierra Club lost the case in that
their argument that an EIS was needed was rejected,
representatives of the organization believed that they had
"won the war this time." They had achieved assurances from
the district court judge that their interpretation of the
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lease stipulations was valid. This outcome, however, might
have been achieved more directly and with more far-reaching
consequences if the process proposed here were in place.
This judge's ruling is contradicted by rulings in several
other cases. [See Chapter 5] Thus, it is not clear whether
or not the Sierra Club's perspective will apply beyond the
Palisades case. Furthermore, it is not clear that it will
even apply in the Palisades case should an APD be filed and
the case reenter the courts before a less sympathetic judge.
Additionally, if the proposed process were in place and
agreement had been reached on lease stipulation intent and
enforceability at the policy level, then the outcome would be
more far-reaching than just the Palisades case. In so doing,
the need for other cases questionning precisely the same
issues (ie. The Wilderness Society and Sierra Club suit over
leasing in Montana's Deep Creek Further Planning Area) would
be precluded.
Another example of the distrust and misunderstanding of
administratively-generated alternatives is the Washakie case.
The Forest Service analysis of oil and gas lease applications
for Wyoming's Washakie Wilderness indicated that 13% of the
area could be leased but the remaining 87% should not be
leased. [34] Predictably, environmental groups responded
that even the 13% portion should not be leased and industry
responded that the 87% figure was much too high. Neither
group was party to the analysis and inevitable value
judgments that produced this alternative. Hence, each
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questionned its validity; none were convinced that their best
interests were addressed in this proposed decision. None
fully understood and accepted how the critical 87% and 13%
figures had been derived. The consensual decisionmaking
process proposed here would have the groups such as those
involved in the Palisades and Washakie cases directly
participate in developing alternatives that address the
various issues raised. In so doing, these groups help make
the value judgments that must be made in generating
alternatives and eventually selecting a preferred
alternative.
Because of the uncertainty involved in oil and gas
decisionmaking, contingency agreements should be considered
when alternatives are developed. These agreements -- "if
this happens then that must be done" -- help offset the
uncertainty that now makes decisionmaking so difficult.
Additionally, it ensures an ongoing review process. Several
court decisions and Interior Board of Land Appeals rulings
indicate that it is a valid approach to decisionmaking. [35]
In creatively and cooperatively developing these
alternatives, other options that are usually not now
considered can be raised. If impacts to a town's streets or
public services are a concern, then compensation to offset
these costs might be considered. If a national forest
recreation area or campsite is affected, compensation for
relocating or mitigating the impacts might be considered.
Compensation and other "rewards" have been considered in
339
resolving many environmental disputes. [36] For example, in
agreeing to an alternative that would both allow construction
of the Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming and protect the endangered
Whooping Crane's habitat downstream, the energy consortium
involved agreed to establish a $7.5 million "trust fund" for
maintaining and protecting the habitat. [37] While such
solutions can more directly address the issues of concern,
the current process and judicial reviews seldom raise or
consider them. Moreover, these traditional forums frequently
preclude these solutions.
Another problem with how alternatives are currently
developed and analyzed is that alternatives that are not
viable or are much more complex than implied are frequently
advocated. In the Little Granite Creek case, when the Forest
Service recommended that Getty Oil Company's exploratory
drilling permit be granted, Jackson Hole community groups and
national environmental organizations immediately began
demanding that Getty's leases be exchanged for leases in a
less scenic and wild area. They charged that this
alternative had not been adequately considered in the EIS and
that it should have been. It provided a rallying point for
future debate. But, Getty responded that such an apparently
simple solution was actually very complex. One Getty
official asked:
How would you determine what was an equitable trade or
swap? We frequently expend large sums of money
looking for traps [oil-bearing formations] and never
find one. Here we have defined a potential trap. The
leases are worth more to us now than before we did the
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seismic survey. [38]
After completing $852,000 in seismic testing a year earlier,
Getty concluded that its chances of finding oil or gas were
best described as "excellent." [39] A USGS geologist
concurred, stating that Getty's prospect is atop a structure
with the greatest likelihood of success in that area of the
overthrust belt. [40] To Getty, a lease trade was out of the
question; to opponents of the well it was a logical way to
preserve the area's wilderness and wildlife attributes.
The raising and then rallying around of questionable
alternatives is not limited to site-specific cases. It
happens just as frequently at the policy-level since there is
also no common forum there for combining fact-finding, issue
generation and, only then, generating viable alternatives.
For example, a common argument in the current debate over
energy exploration in Wilderness is that exploration should
be allowed in these areas simply to inventory the oil and gas
resources there. On its face, the proposal seems reasonable.
This exploration would give land managers more information
with which to make a land allocation decision. Seemingly, it
keeps Wilderness Areas in their pristine condition until that
day when the energy resources laying beneath them are
critically needed. This apparently perfect solution to the
current stalemate has considerable support in Washington.
But, this alternative has major flaws that are seldom raised
in a forum where it can be revised and a truly viable
alternative developed. [41]
341
Step 6
Agreement On A Proposed Decision Or Rule
Step 6 is perhaps the most difficult step in this
process. Now that specific issues of concern have been
identified, tradeoffs must be made in order to achieve
consensus. As discussed earlier, a mediator or facilitator
might be involved at the request of the participants to help
them focus their discussions and develop agreements when
possible.
To successfully reach an agreement may require expanding
the list of negotiable items. Since many disputes are
interrelated, tradeoffs can encompass factors in other
disputes. Many participants undoubtedly will be negotiating
together on several occasions. If participating in a similar
process involving a different area, a final agreement may
involve aspects of a proposal beyond that being considered.
As is already widely practiced, lease applications can be
combined on an area-wide basis, perhaps through the forest
management planning process. By expanding the context for
decisionmaking, potential tradeoffs are increased and
negotiations facilitated. Moreover, by consolidating leasing
decisions in this manner, disputes involving a specific area
can be resolved comprehensively rather than incrementally, on
a lease-by-lease basis. Any agreement reached would cover
where leases may or may not be issued and subject to what
stipulations.
This process will not always result in an agreement. In
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some cases, participants may, after reaching partial
agreement, leave the final decision to a jointly-selected
arbitrator or to the Forest Service. If agreement cannot be
reached, it may indicate that the particular dispute is not
suited to administrative resolution. In these cases, if good
faith efforts have been made to resolve the dispute, Congress
or the courts may be more willing to adopt the issue and try
resolving it in their forums. Moreover, the results of the
assessment thus far should provide a more coherent and
concise set of facts and issues with which a substantive
decision might be made in these alternative forums.
Step 7
Public Review Of The Proposed Decision Or Rule
Because the authority for making these leasing and
permitting recommendations and decisions rests with the
Forest Service, Forest Service officials cannot merely adopt
the agreement reached in this process. They must first
provide an opportunity for those not directly participating
in these negotiations to comment on the proposed decision or
rule.
In this step, the Forest Service completes its
procedural obligations and ensures that all concerns have
been raised. As is customary now, the Forest Service should
place this proposed rule or decision recommendation in the
Federal Register for comment and, when required, hold a
public hearing to obtain further feedback. The agency then
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accomodates these additional concerns in its final decision
or recommendation. If considerable additional comments are
received that are contrary to the proposed decision or rule,
agency officials may want to reconvene the original
participants to discuss how to acommodate these new concerns.
The decision may be contested if the three groups do not
understand and agree to the changes that were made. A fine-
tuning review may avoid this consequence. But, if the
process were successfully designed at the outset to be
representative and have constituent support, this outcome
should be the exception, not the rule; the proposed decision
should represent the collective interests of the three
participant groups and, thereby, public land interests in
general.
This final adjustment to the proposed rule should not
merely reinstitute the problems that currently plague
decisionmaking. While the Forest Service was a party to the
negotiations that originally developed this proposal, they
have no incentive to drastically revise the proposal to
reflect their concerns although they have authority to do so.
Such action would void the integrity of the process, ensure
opposition to it and taint the inevitable future interactions
with the same groups.
Step 8
Forest Service Implementation
The Forest Service implements its decision as outlined
in current procedures. The agency's authority is retained by
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this process. It is fulfilling its Congressional mandates,
perhaps to an even greater degree if the outcome is
"harmonious" as Congress has required in several land
management statutes. [see chapter 4] The professional
expertise that is critical to proper national forest
management has not been sacrificed to a purely political
solution. Instead, the scientific expertise has been applied
to facilitate and inform the inevitable value judgments that
must be made. Of course, many Forest Service leasing and
permitting decisions at the site-specific level actually
constitute recommendations to the BLM or USGS. In these
cases, the BLM or USGS, having participated in the process in
the government group, would have little reason to undermine
the agreement and not abide by the Forest Service
recommendation. Forest Service recommendations to the USGS
or BLM are generally accepted as issued in the current
process, even when the BLM or USGS had no role in their
development.
Prospects and Potential Problems
There are several advantages for the US Department of
Agriculture, the Forest Service and the US Department of the
Interior in adopting a system such as that proposed here. It
should reduce litigation over administrative decisions and
thereby reduce the cost and time now associated with
decisionmaking. It should generate allies for the Forest
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Service and support for the agency's decisions rather than
the immediate adversaries produced by the current process.
It is designed to facilitate decisionmaking by providing
specific phases of analysis that directly build upon each
other. In so doing, it should generate confidence in the
conclusions reached and agreement on the value judgments and
tradeoffs that must be made. Moreover, it should reduce the
now inevitable delay that is creating tensions between
Congress and the executive. Furthermore, this process is
responsive to the current Congressional and administrative
calls for regulatory reform. It should increase public
confidence in the Forest Service by reducing conflict and
hostility over its decisions and by providing means for
different groups to substantively ensure that their concerns
have been addressed. It insulates the administrative
agencies from the extensive and frequently heavy-handed
lobbying efforts that now make decisionmaking so difficult.
Should the Forest Service adopt this process and make
decisions consistent with any agreement reached, its
decisions should be immune from later charges of being
arbitrary and capricious. Inevitably, these ad hoc decisions
will not always be consistent across cases. The
peculiarities of particular proposals and disputes will
require creative solutions that will distinguish them from
previous agreements. Moreover, because many of the same
groups will be frequent participants in this process, some
disputes may be resolved in a broader context, applying to
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more than just the issues at hand. Hence, agreements that
provide for considerable development in one area and little,
if any, in another or agreements that require different
conditions in different areas are not necessarily
inconsistent. Instead, they are making the delicate
tradeoffs that must be made in these decisions and doing so
in a manner that accommodates the concerns of the
participating groups.
The Forest Service's authority and responsibility for
decisionmaking remains intact in this process. Moreover, if
the process proves successful, the
strengthened. After two decades of
decisions, the Forest Service's image i
now has few constituent supporters.
that a strong conservation-oriented
Department of the Interior is all that
transfer of the agency from USDA to DOI
management agencies reside. [42] It
interests advocate. [43] But, should
agency's position is
controversy over its
s badly tarnished. It
It has often been said
Secretary in the
is needed to effect a
where the other land
is a move that some
the Forest Service be
able to rebuild its image and regain constituent support,
then its position as a relatively independent administrative
agency would be strengthened, not weakened by the process.
The proposed process acknowledges the critical need for the
expertise and experience of Forest Service officials and
staff in making these controversial decisions. It should
lend more credibility to and support for their analyses. In
so doing, the process is structured to ensure that final
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decisions are based upon scientific land management needs
rather than questions of administrative procedure or law as
in the current process. As a result, the Forest Service can
put greater effort into other land management tasks that are
now shelved while controversial decisions drag on.
This process is not solely advantageous for federal
agencies responsible for public land management decisions.
There are also incentives for environmental and industry
groups to both advocate and participate in a consensual
decisionmaking process. The uncertainty and delay now
plaguing decisionmaking makes the current process very costly
for industry. Four years and $1.5 million after filing its
APD for Little Granite Creek, Getty Oil Company does not know
whether or not it will ever be able to explore its leasehold.
Getty officials would certainly have preferred knowing before
making this expense whether or not it would ever receive a
drilling permit. [44] Environmental groups such as the
Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society similarly find the
established process costly. [45] Moreover, the influence of
environmental groups in final decision outcomes turns more on
questions of how leases and permits are issued, not whether
they should even be issued at all. At present, no
exploratory drilling permits have ever been denied for
environmental reasons. Similarly, very few (1-2%) lease
applications are ever rejected. In the negotiations that
would occur in the proposed process, areas of particular
concern may have a greater chance of being preserved than
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currently. Should environmental organizations believe that
some specific areas should never be developed, the current
process provides little hope for achieving this end. The
proposed process however would encourage tradeoffs among
areas. For example, by agreeing to facilitate exploration in
one area, environmental organizations may be able to preclude
exploration in another area. Furthermore, as described in the
Palisades case, they can have a more direct hand in
establishing critical precedents in this process rather than
leaving it to the uncertainties of the judicial system. For
both industry and environmental groups, this process provides
an opportunity for bettering their situation without
precluding administrative and judicial recourse should
negotiations fail.
For this process to be viable, two important factors
must be satisfied. First, representatives from both
environmental and industry groups must participate with the
Forest Service in fine-tuning the requirements and objectives
of each step. All groups must be involved at the outset in
order to understand this process and to establish the ground
rules that will govern how the process proceeds. If all
groups are not involved initially and at this level of
discussion the possibility exists that one or another
interest group will not trust the agency's motives in
proposing it and will therefore not participate. Second, a
conflict management capability must be institutionalized
within the agency. When a dispute arises that triggers this
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process, a Forest Service administrative office housing a
trained mediator or facilitator should exist in order to
usher the dispute through the process. Leaving this
responsibility to existing Forest Service staff not trained
in conflict management would neither ensure that appropriate
action is taken nor provide the independence necessary to
create a credible and trusted process.
Institutionalizing the process proposed here is not
without some administrative problems in addition to those
already mentioned. How, for example, will this process be
financed? How will the Federal Advisory Committee Act
provisions be fulfilled in convening these groups and
encouraging an effective dialogue between them?
An additional problem is overcoming the immediate and
inevitable distrust of a bargaining process to resolve
environmental disputes. [46] The mere suggestion that these
public land management disputes might be managed and resolved
inevitably provokes several, predictable counter-arguments:
How can there possibly be a middle ground between such
diverse groups, especially with respect to wilderness? If it
is such a great idea, with so many advantages for everyone,
why is it not happening now? Aren't environmental and
community groups just coopted by such a process? What's to
stop the different groups from going on to the courts in the
end if they do not like the settlement reached?
Financing
Financing can be arranged in a number of different ways.
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A special line item appropriation could be requested or
special Congressional funding on an experimental basis might
be acquired for the program. Probably the most easily
accomplished and perhaps the most appropriate manner of
financing, however, would be to earmark a certain portion of
the oil and gas lease rent and production royalty revenues to
a special fund supporting this process. If the process is
successful in its objective of reducing the now costly
opposition by producing viable decisions at the outset, this
funding should not actually constitute an addition to the
agency's budget. If application review and analysis time and
administrative appeal and judicial review costs are reduced
by this process, this funding should represent an overall
reduction in agency expenditures.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires that
federal officials establishing advisory committees file a
"charter, meeting announcements and minutes in the
Federal Register; justification statements for the Office of
Management and Budget; public announcements of meetings and
meeting agendas; invitations to the public to attend meetings
and filing of annual reports." [47] Groups that are subject
to this Act's provisions are those "having fixed membership
selected by a federal official, created for the purposes of
providing advice, having an organizational structure and
holding periodic meetings." [48] Currently, Forest Service
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officials avoid using advisory committees because they find
the Act's requirements to be too "cumbersome." [49]
Furthermore, Forest Service officials avoid these committees
because, as they explain, "selection of committee members can
introduce a bias which does not represent the entire range of
public interests," and, moreover, not assure the "general
public" that it is being represented in decisionmaking. [50]
Another problem noted by the Forest Service is that
"membership tends to become permanent because of reluctance
to tell members their services are no longer desired. There
is danger that deadwood will build up and render the
committee ineffective." [51]
As described above, the proposed process goes beyond the
purpose of advisory committees as traditionally conceived.
Its recommendations are developed more interactively than in
the one-way comments of the current advisory committee
system. Moreover, its recommendations are then placed before
the "general public" for comment and potential revision. The
three proposed participant groups are self-selected with the
critical requirement that they be representative of the
interests at stake and, furthermore, trusted by their
respective constituencies. Fulfilling some aspects of the
FACA regulations would hinder proposal development. If
meetings were open, the critical dialogue between traditional
adversaries -- the give-and-take that occurs in reaching an
agreeable solution to the problem -- might be precluded.
But, if public involvement is provided later, this open
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meeting format may not be necessary to fulfill FACA's
requirements. Regardless, at the outset the Forest Service
and Department of the Interior may want to try to ease
fulfillment of FACA's charter requirements by making special
arrangements with the Office of Management and Budget for
approving participants in selected cases in order to
experiment with this process. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency has recently obtained a special charter
approval for participants in an experimental rule-making
process that is very similar to that proposed here. [52]
The Question of Wilderness
When The Wilderness Act passed in 1964, Section 4(d)3
permitting mineral leasing until December 31, 1983, was
included as a compromise to the mining industry. At the
time, oil and gas was not an issue, other hardrock minerals
were. [53] Today, however, the table has turned in a way
that was not foreseen in 1964. As a result, Congress is
reconsidering its intent with Section 4(d)3, potentially
rescinding the section entirely. Hence, there is no
incentive for preservationists to participate in the process
proposed here when Wilderness Areas are involved; there is no
incentive for them to concede to any oil and gas leasing or
exploration in Wilderness areas until Congress has rendered
its decision later this year. Whichever way Congress decides
-- to prohibit leasing entirely, to allow it until December
31, 1983 or to permit it until an even later date -- final
implementation will be shifted back to the Forest Service.
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If Congress permits exploration, the Forest Service is
still going to have to determine where and how that
exploration should occur. If Congress prohibits leasing in
Wilderness Areas, the Forest Service is still going to have
to complete its final wilderness designation recommendations
and determine how to manage its further planning areas in the
meantime. And, unless they develop some means for
accommodating the conflicting values at stake, their
decisions will continue to be contested. The process
proposed here could help them to do so. If a dialogue were
established at the policy-level, a consensus could be
developed between affected groups -- which then, of course,
would be subject to public review -- regarding these complex
wilderness management policies and oil and gas leasing and
permitting conditions. Because all groups' claims are
legitimate, tradeoffs are unavoidable. But, by making these
tradeoffs overt, those areas of critical concern might be
protected while exploration subject to agreed upon conditions
could be facilitated in others. Schemes could be
cooperatively developed by all participants such that some
areas like, for example, the Bob Marshall Wilderness -- the
"crown jewel" of the wilderness system -- could be left
untouched while the oil and gas industry was able to explore
for and produce the Overthrust Belt's energy resources from
other locations. But, only by having these groups place
their issues of concern on the table and begin making the
unavoidable tradeoffs together will these difficult choices
354
be made in a less combative and costly manner.
Why Do These Negotiations Not Occur Now?
Another hesitation expressed about a dispute settlement
approach to decisionmaking is that, if the advantages are so
great, why is it not happening now? As indicated above,
negotiations occasionally do occur but clearly not as
frequently as advocated here. To a large extent, such
disputes are not settled more frequently because the
established administrative decisionmaking process does not
accommodate it. The process, as structured, encourages
adversarial not cooperative consensus-building behavior. The
institutional structure is not there that would accommodate
bargaining and encourage dispute settlement; the needed
dialogue is never initiated. The process is structured to
convince the Forest Service because the Forest Service is
"the decisionmaker." Thus, it encourages the many different
groups to argue aggressively before the agency in support of
their positions. There is no incentive to cooperate in this
type of process because being more reasonable and less
extreme in presenting one's argument only means that you
might get less in the end. The point is to bolster your own
position and undermine your adversary's, not to be reasonable
or compromising.
Perhaps a more critical reason negotiations do not occur
now is that each group appears to have more power and
influence over the final decision outcome through means other
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than the administrative process. In fact, their power seems
least within the established process. And, as seen, because
other forums are not designed to acknowledge the legitimacy
of all groups and the need for tradeoffs in decisionmaking,
groups have little incentive to help effect the needed
tradeoffs. Furthermore, there is little incentive to
negotiate in the manner proposed here because there is no
assurance that it will make a difference; this approach to
decisionmaking has never been legitimized.
What Is The Role of the Forest Service?
A common Forest Service response to suggested conflict
management is that it is the agency's mandate, indeed its
raison d'etre, to make these decisions. [54] If professional
foresters were to let interest group negotiations decide the
fate of the national forests, why have a Forest Service at
all? Wouldn't agency officials be abdicating their
responsibilities?
A counter-argument could be that it is also the Forest
Service's responsibility to represent all values in
decisionmaking and to make decisions in a "harmonious"
manner. [55] There is clearly a need for a scientific,
professional Forest Service. Professional expertise and
judgment are critical for much of the day-to-day forest
management tasks. But, when disputes like those seen in the
oil and gas cases arise, it is also their responsibility to
represent each set of values in their decision. The Forest
Service has a critical role in the conflict management
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process proposed here. The eight steps do not occur outside
its jurisdiction but rather within it as a supplement to
existing administrative procedures. Agency officials need to
actively participate in this process both to represent the
non-vocal public that is not present as well as to provide
the technical and scientific facts and administrative
constraints that only they can provide.
Is Conflict Management A Coopting Strategy?
The argument has been made that environmental conflict
management strategies are designed to coopt environmental and
community groups in order to facilitate development. [56]
But, the process proposed here neither forces participation
nor forecloses other avenues should a group believe that the
process is not going to serve its best interests. This
process provides a choice of how to participate; a choice
that is lacking in the current process. At the policy level,
it allows both industry and environmental organizations to
assist in developing broad policies, rather than
incrementally questionning policy implementation in numerous
site-specific cases. At the site-specific level, it does not
preclude the critical precedent-setting nature of many cases.
In fact, the agreements reached in site specific cases,
precisely because they will be supported by many different
groups, will perhaps have greater precedent-setting value
than the cases that now end up receiving conflicting rulings
in the courts.
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Conflict management processes will not resolve every
conflict. There will inevitably be cases where precedent
setting issues are of concern that might be better resolved
in the courts. There might be cases where agreement between
the parties simply cannot be reached and the courts are
pursued. There might be cases where procedural or
constitutional concerns will need to be reviewed judicially.
But, there are many cases that are resolvable if the
institutional structure was there to accommodate them. Such
processes would make this difficult task somewhat "easier"
and much less adversarial. By cooperating and building
consensus over these decisions it will be much more likely to
accommodate more values than in the win-lose adversarial
processes now followed. Solving part of the problem is
certainly better than none.
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